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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. and REAL ) PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RENEE BAIRD, DENNIS SALLAZ, 
GLENN TREFREN, and TRADESMAN 
CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, 
LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFR CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, 
Case No. CV 09-11855 
ANSWER WITH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES TO DEFENDANTS 
GLENN TREFREN'S AND 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS 
AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S 
COUNTERCLAIM 
AND 
) 
RENEE BAIRD, DENNIS SALLAZ, ) 
GLE:t\TN TREFREN, TRADESMAN ) 
CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
and REAL HOMES, L.L.C., an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Eugene and Janet Rice, Real Homes, L.L.C. 
and Real Properties, LLC, by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and answer 
Defendants/Counterclairnants Glenn Trefren' s and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC.' s Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs deny each and every allegation contained in the Counterclaim not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1-7 and 9-10 of their Complaint in responding to 
Paragraph 96 of Defendants' Counterclaim. Plaintiffs deny that Renee Baird is a party to this 
case. 
3. In responding to Paragraph 97 of the Counterclaim Plaintiffs admit that 
Jurisdiction and Venue are proper however they reserve the right to seek consolidation of this 
case with Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2011-07253. 
4. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations from the remaining claims of their Complaint 
in responding to Paragraph 98 of the Counterclaim however Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend 
their Complaint in light of the changed nature of this case and the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S COUNTERCLAfM 2 
Breach of Purchase & Sale Agreement 
5. Plaintiffs the allegations from the remaining claims their Complaint 
to Paragraph 99 the Counterclaim Plaintiffs reserve right to amend 
their Complaint in light of the changed nature of this case and the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V. 
6. As to Paragraph 100 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that Roy Rice signed 
Contract attached to the Complaint as "Exhibit D" on behalf of Real Properties, LLC. Due to 
Dennis Sallaz' s overlapping assignment of the Real Hornes/Real Properties contract to Jim Bevis 
and Glenn Trefren as well as counsel for Dennis Sallaz's statements as to Mr. Sallaz's continuing 
ownership interest, Plaintiffs are without information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth 
or veracity of Mr. Trefren's allegation that Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in said contract to 
Glen Trefren. Contrary to the statement in Paragraph 100, no contract is attached to the 
Counterclaim and therefore Plaintiffs are without information sufficient to form an opinion as to 
the truth or veracity of Mr. Trefren's allegation and consequently must deny the allegations 
contained in Paragraph 100 of the Counterclaim. 
7. As to Paragraph 101 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that Counterdefendants 
Real Properties, LLC agreed to assume the encumbrances specifically listed in the Contract 
attached to the Complaint as "Exhibit D" based on the warranties provided by Sellers. Plaintiffs 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 101 of the Counterclaim. 
8. As to Paragraph 102 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that they have paid the 
$63,402.82 Note and Deed of Trust as well as the $5,000 advance to Dennis Sallaz. Plaintiffs 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 102 of the Counterclaim. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S COUNTERCLAIM~- 3 
9. As to Paragraph I 03 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that they have not paid 
Perry Harding or Bank. Plaintiffs deny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 103 of 
Breach of Contract with Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors, LLC 
10. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations from the remaining claims of their Complaint 
as well as the paragraphs above in responding to Paragraph 104 of the Counterclaim however 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend their Complaint in light of the changed nature of this case 
and the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V. 
11. As to Paragraph 105 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that Glenn Trefren 
performed labor on real estate, and the improvements thereon, which Plaintiff Real Properties 
believed it had purchased in Contract attached to the Complaint as "Exhibit D." Plaintiffs deny 
the remaining allegations contained in paragraph I 05 of the Counterclaim. 
12. As to Paragraph 106 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that Glenn Trefren 
performed labor on real estate, and the improvements thereon, which Plaintiff Real Properties 
believed it had purchased in Contract attached to the Complaint as "Exhibit D." Admit that Roy 
Rice, on behalf of, Real Properties, LLC terminated Counterclaimants due to the poor quality of 
said labor and Counterclaimants misappropriation of Plaintiffs' funds and goods. Plaintiffs deny 
the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 106 of the Counterclaim. 
13. Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained in paragraph 107 of the Counterclaim. 
Unjust Enrichment 
14. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations from the remaining claims of their Complaint 
as well as the paragraphs above in responding to Paragraph 108 of the Counterclaim however 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, 'S COUNTERCLAIM -- 4 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend their Complaint in light of the changed nature of this case 
and the Court's on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V. 
15. the paragraph I 09 the Counterclaim. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and or/reduced by a set-off for various 
amounts due and owing by Plaintiff to Defendants. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims are barred by application of the doctrine of estoppel, equitable quasi-
estoppel, and judicial estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims and damages, if any, are barred or reduced by Defendants' failure to 
exercise their duty under Idaho law to mitigate or reduce their damages. In asserting this 
defense, Plaintiffs do not admit any fault or responsibility, or that Defendants have suffered any 
damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' conduct made it impossible for Plaintiffs to meet the terms of the agreements 
at issue in this matter. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S COUNTERCLAIM~ 5 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' damages, any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages sought by 
if Defendants had acted reasonably to filing this 
action. 
SEVENTH AFFIR1v1ATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims for damages are barred and/or reduced by the doctrine of latches. 
EIGTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' damages, if any, are barred or reduced due to Defendants' own breach of the 
subject contract including but not limited to Defendants' failure to transfer marketable title. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant Trefren lacks standing to bring this suit due his lack of any ownership interest 
in Real Homes, LLC or any assets thereof. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant Trefren is not a real party in interest due to his lack of any ownership interest 
in Real Homes, LLC or any assets thereof at the time Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Complaint was 
executed. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' damages, if any, are barred or reduced by the application of the doctrine of 
unclean hands. 
TvVELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' damages, if any, are barred or reduced because Defendants caused Plaintiffs 
to sign the subject contract under duress. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC. 6 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' damages, if any, are barred or reduced because the contract was not 
supported by consideration. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants claim for Unjust Enrichment is barred because Defendants have an adequate 
remedy at law. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claim for Unjust Enrichment and Breach of Contract is barred because 
Defendants were compensated for said labor and materials and no sums are due and owing. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims if any are reduced or barred due to their failure to comply with I.C. § 
55-2501, the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act. 
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims if any are reduced or barred due to Defendants' failure to comply 
with the Operating Agreement of Real Homes, LLC, including but not limited to Defendants' 
failure to obtain authorization from Renee Baird. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Defendants have failed to 
perform all of the conditions, covenants, and promises required of them in accordance with the 
terms of the contract. 
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Defendants have by their own 
acts, omissions, or conduct waived whatever rights he may have. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S 7 
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs asserts the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, in equal fault or wrong. By 
to wrongdoing. 
T\VENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the doctrine of bad faith. 
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced due by Defendants' failure to comply 
with the Statute of Frauds. 
TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the Statute of Limitations LC. 5-216 
and LC. 5-217. 
TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims, if any, are barred or reduced because of Defendants' negligent and 
intentional misrepresentations and fraud. 
As discovery in this matter is still ongoing, Plaintiffs specifically reserve the right to 
amend their Complaint and their Answer to Defendants' Counterclaim to assert additional 
affirmative defenses as the same may become known. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Counterdefendants have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection 
with defending this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 120(3), and 12-121. 
Should this matter be resolved at the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, those fees and costs 
are $5,000. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRi\DESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S COUNTERCLAIM··· 8 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants pray for relief that the Court: 
1. Dismisses Defendants/Counterclaimants' Counterclaim and they take nothing 
2. Award Plaintiff/Counterdefendant their reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
3. For such other and further relief the Court deems just and fair under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this }{ day ofJuly 2012 . 
. rJ~ Bt7, ' J. KAHLE BECKER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
undersigned hereby certifies on this 9~ day of July 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS GLENN TREFREN'S AND TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, LLC.'S COUNTERCLAIM was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney.for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
Jared B. Martens 
1615 W. Hays St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
Attorney for Defendant Glenri Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
-A-us Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
\/ 
__LS_ US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
-2l US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
By: 2 ' :J4 v--
,/,?'J. KAHLEBECKER 
// Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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!VER J. LONGETEIG 
5304 Turret 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 342-5995 
1051 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counter-Claimants 
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LIS PENDEN 
LONGETEIG, IVER J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, huband ) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, LLC AND REAL 
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
) 
) 
) liability company, 
) 
Plaintiffs, and Counter- ) 
Defendants 
V. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, and 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
T. 
Case No. CV 09-11855 
LIS PENDENS 
0 8 2013 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above Defendants are bringing an action for 
rescission of contract of sale against the above-named Plaintiffs. 
The property in this county affected thereby is described as follows: 
(See Exhibit A attached hereto). 
All persons are charged with notice of this action. 
Dated: May 8, 2013. 
US PEND - P. 1 
Iver J. Longetei 
Attorney for Defendants and Counter-Claimants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On May 7, 2013, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared !VER J. LONGETEIG, known to me to be the person whose name appears on the foregoing document, and acknowledged to me that he ~xe~ute_d the ~ame. [. , 
--/J/~--v ~, 
P.2 
~-== J.-e7a ~-, Notary Public for Idaho~ l 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires 3,,_; /, -?O I I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 81h day of May, 2013, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was forwarded by the and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
LIS PENDENS ~ P. 3 
[ x J U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered [ ] Facsimile 343-3246 
[ x] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered [ J Facsimile 424-6972 
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Crrg l. S!inm:r, PLS 
. , 
Description for 
GL:nn Trefren 
Job No. JA2001 
Parcel 1 
Februazy 14, 2001 
11ns pim:cl is n portion of the SW~ NEV. ofSecti.on 11, Township 3 North, Range 3 West of the Boise Merlcfum and is mQro particularly dcscn"'bed o.s follows: 
· 
COMME.NClNG at the northwest cornet of said SW~ NE ~; 
thence South 00 35" 14" West along the west bOUJ1dary of said SW~ NE !4 a distance of74S.15 f~ 
thc:.nce North 89~ 4S' 51" East parnlld 'Wilh the north 'boundaty of the NE ~ o( said St:.e:tion L 7 a. dist:mce of 40.0Q feet U? the 'l'RUE l'OINT OF :BEGlNNING; 
_thence contimnng North 89° 45' Sl" &st ponilld with said no.rth.bounducya distan.c:c: of69S.9S 
·tcet to a point on the ~r:rline of tbe :Bunu Canal; 
thence South 45° 39' 4S" We.st along said centa1Ine n dir;tance of +58.62 feet; 
th~Jca'ring .said ccotaiine and bearing South 89° 45' SI" West p~el with the north botmdnzy of said NE !.4 a ~ce of S 15.82 f,:.,et; 
thence North oc> 35' 14 ... Enst parnllel with the west 1:iouru:fary of said SW Y.. NE ~ ~ distance of 180.00 !.:et to the T.RUE FOINT OF :BEGINNING. . . 
This pttn.d. contains 2.510 acres, nioro or lr::ss. and is subject to nll cnse.oiCDts and rights.of-way of. 
record or implied; also subject to it 30.00-foot ~&-ogress and utility c:!!.SCmCllt more 
· particularly ~cd ns .foUowa: 
COMMENCING '8! the northwest come. of.said SW !4 NE ~i 
. . 
th.enc~ South o0 3S' 14" West along-the west boundary of cz..id SW'/. NE !I. a. distance of745, 15 ~~ 
-
.._ ________________________ 
EXHIBIT A 
365 
; ·.· HAMILTON MI 
~:11trr· 
tm~~· X,1J.·:Ji1· escnption 
I •/U'!,~•l'i -t2r . r,~\oi 
(_ 
,~,fff11-P,rtii. 89° 4S' Sl" ~ parallel with too ~orth baun~ ofsrudNE ~a.di.stance of 40.0D 
, . ;:f llikouth o• 35' 14" W ..i porallel with tho WO!t Oouudaiy of s,tid SW Ii NE Ii • dist,mco of 
·.:~}l'~{}l~roo/fffl to the mUE POINT O'.IJ llEGINNING; 
.. J-.2~:!J~: /· -·. I ~ ,:1!'.'1f;.-;';, : t.henceNorth 89" 4S ' Sl" East pm.Jld with the north boundary of said NE 'ha distance of249.00 
., ~-:<,>:· . feet; I . . . 
·: . '!, ,:·:·. ''. I . 
' . • ,:._., .~·. : I 
• :•'-")·a·· ' . • 
• 
. 
· :~i·; thence ~forth O" 35• 14"' Em p~cl with the ·w"c:st boundu.ty of said SW !.4 NE Y. a distan!=o or 
~? 45.00 fecr, 
· I 
. . 
thence North B9"' 45' 51" East parallel with the north boundary of said NE. ''4 a illstance of3o.oo 
feet· I · 
~~ce ~outh ~ 3S' 14" W~ptmillel with th~wert bounduy of said SW 14. NE~ a distance of 45.00 !pet; 
I 
thence North 89° 45' Sl" East psr.allel 'With tllellOrth bcnmdaiy offlwd NE !'411 distM~ of ~S.00 
reet; I · 
thence~outh 003S' 14" West parallel wi~ thewtstboundaty of said SW 1A·NE· !4 a distmiceof 30,00 feet; 
. 1-
thenc::: ~outh 89° 45' 51" W c.,t paraUi=l with the, n.orili bou:ndnty of t:nid NE }{ a distiuice of 
324.00I~ . 
. 
thcnce!North 00 35' 14" East parallel with the west bounwuy of &&d SW !4 'NE !4 a d..istRncc of 30,00 feet to the TRUE :POINT OF BEG.JNNING. 
366 
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HAMILTON MI 
Description for 
Glam Trefrcn 
Job No. JA.2001 
Pnrce12 
( 
...;.. 
'.February 14, .2001 
nus paroduo.portion oft.he SW% NE~ ofScctloci 17, l'ownshlp 3 Nortl,, Range 3 Wen of the Boise ~eriwmt nnd iiz tnOT"C pmiculorly desaib~ a., fullowa; 
COMM.:ENCJNG at the northwest <:ow.er of said SW 14 NE Y~ 
thcooc South oa 3S" 14" Westaloog thc:wcst boundiuy of said SW% NEY.. a di.!flulcc: of745.15 ~ 
1lu:nce North S~ 45' 51 East parallel with the: north bo1.1ndszy of the NE ~ of said Section 17 a distant;e of 40.00 .fuet; 
theoce South 00 3S' 14" West parallel with the west bouudary of wd SW ~ NE ~ .a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE :POINT OF l3:EGINNING; 
thai,ccNorth B9° 45' sr'Bmparolld 'with tbo north boundary of said NE~ a distance of515.82 fc:ct to a. point on the centerline of the Bullis Canal; 
thence South 45° 39' 48'' Wt.st a!oo_g all.id centaiioc a. dim.nee of 434.92. f~ 
thi:nce JC4Vlng mid centerline mui bearing ~outh 89° 39' 2S' Wr::st pn.rallcl with the south bcundnzy of ~d SW~ NE ~ a ~ce of207.&S feet; 
· 
theno;: North o0 3S' 14 ~ parallc1 with tho west bound;uy and 40.oo :feet east of~ SW~ NEY.. a.disamc:e of.303.09 feet to the l'.RTIE.POINr OF BEGlNNJNG. 
. 
. ~ ~ coDt2li.Ds 2.515 AQ:"CS, more Ot' less. aud is subject to a11 ·eascnlents and cigh1$-of-way of n:;,conl or implied; 4.lso subj~ to a 30.00-fbot ~-egress zi.nd utillty easen1ent inorc pmicularly d.r:zcribed as follows: _ 
COMl\l:f.ENCING- at the northwest corru;::r of' siid SW V. NE V.; 
367 
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'"':D:~~~~~hon, 
.. ~ ~:at:z· 
~tF . 
:rft\'.°::~th 0° 35' 14" ~est ~or..g the west bouodlllyof said SW~ NB V" a dis~ of74S.15 
t~('.' .. 
~ ·North89" 45' 51'' Enst parallel with the north boundn.ry of snidNB V.. a diSP'lrtce of 40.oo· 
·~r~i£:·.· · it-:;.,· . 
~~··.~::,,,• . 
. ,~~} if'.~eqico South O" 35' 14'1 Westpnrullcl with the west bqandary °:f's.aid SW Y4 NE~ a distance of 
~ t11/JJ'/, , .. 165.00:fedto thc'I'RUEl'OINTOFBE~G; f;J}" ~cc North 89' 4S' S l" East pan,lld with the n~rth boundaty _of Wd NE V. a .clistance of 249 ,00 
thi:ncc North OC 35' l 4" Enst p~ \\'1th. the west boundary of said SW !14 NE Y. .a. distance of 
4S.OO 1i:et; 
t1icn.co North 89° 4S' ·51,. East pnrallcl with the non.h ·bauncuuy of said NB !4 a distnnco of:30.00 
feet; 
thence South. 0° 351 14" West panilld with the west boundary of Bl:lid SW Y. NE !4 n. dimncc 0£ 
45 .00 feet; 
thence North 89° 4s• Sl" East pnrrtllcl 'Wi1tt tlle north boundmy of said NE 1A a dir:.tlUlce of 45.00 
~ 
thcn.ci; South P° 35' 14" West parallel with tbJ.: wdt boundlllj' of uid SW ~. N.B IA a. dlstMOo of 
30,00fect; 
thancc SQuth 89° 4S' S 1" West parallel with the north bouridaty of said NE !4 a. distm."le(S of" 
324.00 feet; . 
thence North 00 35' 14n East punllel with the west boundary of said SW 1/.1 NE !4 a clistancz:: t1f 
J0.00 feet to the T.RUE :POINT OF BEG!NNING. 
368 
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HAMIL TO~ .. ~~C~- .=-::::- - - ---- - P- A_G_E _
_ 45_/_7_5_ 
( 
JI:;::b:J bit II A" 
" ,, .. .. ,,t;, ,,,'°':l>llCEL 1B 
~ ,tf ~ff~~~t~?~:_(~'-:· . . 
. 
~tkf{{j~ :,~rtj.on. 0£ ~ Southwest Qu:u;te ~ of the Nort~t Qnru;tcu: o£ f tf.:/ ·::.}:/;::i?.~9.t_idn 17. '.l'~p 3 .N~h .. Range. 3 Wcat o f the Boise Mer.icliml, f~;-\,;.,-_;_ ·, · ·C.i:riyon CoUI:tt:¥~ :Z:daho and -U3 :xnoro paxticu1nrl.y de.ac:rihcd lW foll.owa: rt>;·<" ~ at tho Northwest corner a £ aaid Soutlxwe.at Quarte::r.- of the i ~=- · · Northeast Quru:t:e.l:'; ~c:e. ; .- Sc;mth O" 35' 1~• West. nl.ODG · tho South haw:J..cLu:y of Ol!lid -Sontlxw:ei:it ~:r · of t'.he S'oxtheti..at Ouartoo:- a distance of 745·~15 · f~ct; tbl'l1::l.CC • 
. 
North 8.9"' 45 • 51.. ~t paxal.l.oJ. wi tb tli:e '.'North bo\l:lld...J.x";{ of the 
;No:r:~t Qca:rteJ: . 0£ mdd Set:.tiOJl l.'7 11. d:tnba:s.ce 0£. 239.00 feet to 
the nlUB POl:HT OP BEG~; 1::l:i.enc::e COAt.in~sr. : _ llo:r:~ 89· 45• s1•. Rast ~al.1cu. nth s~d North hot:ti:u:l:u:y a. 
dintan<:c of 449 .. 95 £eet to a point on th.a ,ce:i.te:riiJ:lo of th.a Burris 
C:ma1; thence 
· 
· South -45•_. 39' 48'" . Wc;i!at. · .. a.J.ang Daid c;c:ntex:1i:no .a clii:Jtance of . 
258.62. fa.et: thcnco 1~'11±ng ~d. cent~l-:i,ne .mid bcai:~g 
· 
South a9•·45,· 51"•'West pa:riu.1al. with tho.- l!forth boundary 0£ said 
N'o!l:'thezwt Quzlrte:i:- a dintaxi.C!e of 266 • .S2 feet; thence ?loxth 0- 35' 14"' Ba-8t pn.raJ.1e~ with the Weiat :bounda:r:y of oa.id 
S01:1thwcst Quarter 0£ the Northeast Quarter .a. di.Btanca 0£ 180. oo 
£eet: to t:he num POD'l' OP lJRGnmn{G. 
. "rOGBl!li&R w.r:ce: the UDa .of a=. i:agx-,oas-egxesR and utility erui~t 
mo):'e p.u:t:Lci;tlar1y desc:r.ihad as !o.1.lows = 
.C~ :at th~ !lortin..est ~l:l1.t'!r' ·of ·mdd South~t ~ter of t:ho 
l'fq:rt:l:ie.a.tst Quartel:."r tl:&eru::e · · ·. · . 
· .· . · . :· · . 
. · . . 
S~ O" 35" 14• li(?St a1png ~ West l>ound.a:ry of ·s~d S6t.thwe~t 
Quart:el;" 0£ the Northeast Qrmrter a· ~ata.n~e 0£ 745.l.S ' :feet; thence .North a-9• "15.,. 51"' Ea.nt pa:ra11el.,wit:h ~·No:cth bo,m.claJ:y of said 
Nol:the:t.st (lu..Zll:tcr a d.ist:anee of 40.00 ·feet: ~co 
· 
· · 
South o• 35' 14"' We.ot p;iraJ.lel. with ~ Wcat lxmndu1:ry o ·f eaid 
Southwo.st Qwcrto2: 0£ the N'orthea.st Qwu:ter a distanco · of 150. 0 O 
£oat t:o the DnE PODtt 'OP' ~; t:h.mwe 
. ' 
· 
North S9"' 45"' 51" Ea.st. pav,llcu. with. tho North :bolnld.a--y of sud 
Nort:hea.a.t Qu.ei.%'tc~·a di.ctzmce of 60.00 £aet1 thm:ic~ . Sou.th 0° 35' 1-1• Wet:it para.11e1 ntb. the Wcst botin~. of ea.id 
· southwest ~er 0£ tbe Noz-theia.st QO.a.rtcr a distance of; · 15. 0 0 
£eet;. ~ce 
.- -
. 
·:North BS'" ""tS' si• Ba.at po.raJ.l.el· wi-th the North boWl,d..u::y of en.id 
N'ortheaet ~ a dist.anc:c of ::l:89 . ·po . feat; thcmcc . . . · 
North 0~ 35r 14 •·East pl!.ral.le,. w::i.t:h -the Weiat J:>ouxuhu::y o f s a:i.d 
s aut::h,t,eut o-a.a.rtar 0£ tho l'lo rthe~ t ~ er ·a. <listnnce of 4S ~ 0 0 
feet: thenc e 
(cont.inu.ed) 
·- - / 369 
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.9~'4S~/:, 5l.~. i."Rast parallel with the North .bo~ 0£ sa::i.d 
.., , ,~"" ~ /i/d:(ii t::.n.nc o 0£ :rn . 00 fee t; thence ~:€~~~;~~-~'f.)14;"':_- :weut parallal. wi tll the Weat bo~ of va.:i.d ~·_..Quaxtar ·. o:f tita N'orthenat Qu.axte.r .:i. d.L;ti:mce o f 45. 00 
eel: ··~•l,;.")'.ce:~<:.:.:; _;. .. . . 
rtli~-8.9t45' SJ.• lmst pnrall.01 'rlth tho North b oundary of D.aid 
-~ o~{e)j\ ~cr a clistance 0£ 45. 0~ :feet; thence . . f/t'f~~f;-~~t,h''~O°. :3S 6 1.4• ~cat pax.:w.1cl. with the Weat lxro.nd'uy of oaid 
"'.l~tmrie:st-.:~Qunrter of the Ncrt:haaat Qtia.x'tru:- a diatance. 0-£ 30. oo 
.-... ~/llw,,,\'.r~I .. :%~~~~~~tt~OOC:8 
• 
;.t:{~}};,;;:i;:~T.t.?!"South g.9• 45' 51" Wc;:at pa.ral.lcl. ~th tho N'orth l;,~ry of Ba:f.d 
A :~t1.ff-~~~oatst ~e~ a d.ietwlce 0£ '264 .oo feot; t.heuce 
u•i,.::ru .. ~,J!:;<<,:/"::: ::-.>' -S011th o• 35' 14" Woat ~cl id.th. the West bot:lJ'ld:i.ry of .aaid 
:,'()'.~1}A:r .,>sa~tmrest . Qu.a:cter ·of th.a Nort,baaLJt ~er. a d:iata:nca of l.S. 00 
. : "- ;-:/ c,},' :. · : feet; theil.ce tk··.\i .~.. socth 89" 45¥ 51!" Weiit paral.J.el. 'With thd No:cth bo'tlJl.da.l:y of ¢d 
r;:· N'ortheaot Qu.tt:i:tcr a d.:i.titanc.a 0£ GO. 00 £eat:; thence 
/-!. North 0" 3 5 • 1-1 • Ea.st para.lle1 with the Went bom::i.da.cy of .a.a.id 
Sout:lntest Quaxter of t:be Nortb.eaat Quarter a di.Gtance of 6'0.00 feo~ 
to tbe TRUE POlXI' OF lmG::mNDro. 
' 
-------~ .. - -- .. . ' 
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T-553 P.03/0B r""B50 
os:5Ssm F rom-DL EVANS g, \IISTA 
;l ("'i ) ,. . .... __,, 
A· pox:t:i.cm. o:f t:b.e Sou~st: Qua:t:t~ of th.e .N'~t Quarter .::,f. 
Secti,o:Q. 17 .. !eo~btp 3 .'N"~., :Range 3 Wast of the llo;i.8~ Me:ci.d:L<'.n, 
r!.."!''llrv-""""-. COlttl.ty., !cushc an.ii iA :more particul...u::'1y d.csc:rihed as £o110'W8: c~c:o:m i.'i.t .th~ No:rehweat ccrrn~ o:f .zsa.id Sout:bl.iest ~tcr o:f ~ 
.l'fo~;:_uu; Quarter; t:b.~o. ·. aout::.b. 0" 35.., 14.lrl· west· al.cmg the Wetst hcra:Ila.:i.ry o~ oa.:iil Soo.thwest 
Qu.a:i::t:e:r o:f tb.o lio:t:tAt?a.st ~er a d:l.st::PJ:A.oc of 74:S .15 fiaet; 'thence 
. 'North 8.9" 45' ·.Sl,N %.:t.J?Jt p;µ:;al.lel. ~th the No~ b~ of the 
No~the~~ Q:qarter of aft.id s~~ti.on 17 a d:µrtauce of 40~00 £eot to 
the 'l!R1l'.S l10Jltt O:P BRG~.; thexu:a cOJ:1.t:h::m:f ug-llloi:-t:h ~.9" 4S 1• 5~ 11 Ea.at :paral.lel. 'w:i.th. l:l~d Nox:th bo1:n:1clrsxy a 
c:li~.n:~ca Q:f 24~-00 £~t; t.b..eni:o 
· 
South O" 3S1 ·1~· West ~lel. w.lth the wast b~ of' aa:id 
Soui::hweftt Qwu:te~ of the North;1::uur1:· Quarter a ciistance o:f 180.00 
feet; t::.hcm.c:o 
: 
· 
Soo:'l:h. ~s· 45 .. S1Q We~t: ~ara11el. witll. the, Nortli ll~ o~ Da.i.d 
l,fox-1:haaat gwu:;tm: a. cU.s~ce o:E 24.9 ~ 00 :feet; the:n.co 
North. o• 3.5' l.-'• ~a.tst p11ri1J i·e.1 w:tt:h 'Cha Wclllt .bc:nn:z.d;u:,y o:f aai.d 
Soutl:twotst ~ o:f tl:s.o llci-t:heJs.at Quart:.e:s: 11 d:tstauce o:f :t 80. O 0 
feet: t:o ~o ·"XlZ.'OE :f;IODr.L" O:B' ~
-· • 
(. ·.~.-; 
.......:v 
T-553 P.05/08 F-650 
-. -
PU~ 2A 
A po:r:ti.on c;,:!! ~i,. a.out:h"Weat: ~er 
· th~ '.Nox1:heart 
Se~t~Q.11:17, ~ow:iUlhip 3 North,~ 3 Weat of the ~o:in~ ~~-d,..,,.,r.UJ,; 
C!anyo:a CoUJJ.cy,. ldaho .u:..d :a;oz,e pa:r:ti@J.a:rly described :as ;followa:. 
. 
. 
C~ :+t '!yQ.e '.b1'orthweat: co:c:::i.e:r gf said So-ut::h:werst Qu;a.rte.r o£ the 
N"ort.l:!.eaat. Qwµ:tc.:r.. t::he%l.c:e 
· s~~ 0" 3S' l.41l W~st al.o:p.g the W~t '.b~ of aaid. Sou.~t 
9;tia:i;te:r; of the ~o:l!"t!heas-e ~~ a. d:lat:a:c1.co of' 745 _15 t.h.e.ucc: 
:N'o:rt:b. B.9° ~5' .$1• lb..Bt: paral..1.eI """1.th tb.a l'rci:ctl. l:loa:n~ of the 
No:rthi;zi.at ~e::r: or said .S<1cti.au. 1.7 tr. di..stauce of 40. oo· feet; 
thf.llllO~ · 
. 
• Sou.th. 0" 3 5 • 14'" WW3t pa.ra.1.l.e.1 >'f.l tb. ~ We.at :bou:n.da::cy 0£ mtld 
Sout:hwest . ~ o:f tll.e N'orthe~st ~~ a· ditst:a:nco ·o:f l.BO. ll O 
:l!e¢C tQ·the ~-l?O:tlr.t' OF~; ~suce Jifi;>rth 0.9° 45' 51"' ~t ~a..ra.l.1e1· 'With the '.Nczi:h J;)o1;Ulda_7 of sa.:i.o. 
No:rtheaat QJ:iartor a distal:l.c:e of l.5.a. so £eat; tb.e:ta.i::e • · · 
· • South 0 ... 3S' 14" Wc~t p~el. w.;Li:b; ~ West hou::a~ 0£ a~d. 
Sout;.hwest Qua.z-t:e.r ·9£ · tho l(o~eaa1: Qua..:z:te:e a. diastance of 302.80 
feet; thence 
· 
· Bou.tl. a.s• 3.9' 25;:i Wl!!:JJt pa.rul.E11 w:ith t:ho Scn:.tls. 'bo~ o:f sa.i.d 
~aui:.hwecsn:. · ~a:;- o:f the N'o~ea:n: Qu..a.rl:i:o:::" a d.:iatzu.,.co c;,£ 152. 5 0 
f~et; the:nee 
. 
· 
North . o• 3 5' J.i: • :Jt.aat p~a.l.l.e.l. w:l th t::b.o West bO'IXlli!a.r.y c;f sa.id. 
Scri:i.~at Qua:c"tc Qf ;tu"' li"c;r.rth~c. Qua.rl;o=- a. d:i.at:;&:r:u~a c;,£ 303.0.9 
:feat: 1:0 t:b.i:· ·n~ PPD:r.r 0'11' 'tl3~ • J?lUle&. :.m 
A. po:i;t::.:Lon of t;.be ::lOl.lt:hweSt ~ of 'Che liro:i::"chea.st;;. Qua::r:te:r: ¢£ 
Se(;t:lon 17,, -I'~p $ lil'o::1:h., ~e 3 Weat c:f the .Bcioa H~d.ia,.,, ... 
cai;i.~ Cc;u.m.t:l7',, rc'hul.o ·ltlld .:lt, :,nora pa.=:t::l~l.y desc::::x:-:i:bed as :eoUcrwa:; 
. ' 
. CO!!'HSNCDiG at the·l:lar~s.e con,.er ot q:za.i.<l SQU..1:J:+weat: Qua!l::t.e:i;- o:·t:.:b.e 
.N'o~t; QD;art:el:; cb.e:nce 
• 
s~u~ 0° 35_!' i4-. We~t. a:+cm.g 1;hQ Wee~ b~. of ,:said SQu.t;lnn:i.st: 
Qua...-car ('):f the N'c:>rt:heei.at QU.a.rtt:r e. d:Ls-ca:x:u:a 0£ 745 .1S feet; ell.ence 
N'o:r:th S~" ~5' 51~ Baat.J;;>araJ:1c1 w:ith.. the Nort:.h b~ of thE) 
Nort:l:i.c.:s.3t Qua:rt:a:r 0£ sa.:ld. Sectigc. 17 a di..oi:a:a.cet o;f 40. 00 foet1 
ci:;cnc:o 
.. 
· 
J~o'l1tl:t Q!" 3·5' l.~• Wewt ~cl. w:f.'Ch '*a W~t: ~ o:f aa.i.d 
sou.t.blltc.:,,~ ~e:r ot the litortb.ea.at ~ei:e a d.i.ata:Q.ee Qf 180.00 
fae.t; ~G . 
. ~ 
· lfo:n::.h s9• 45 1 ~1· Ba,st ~el. w:i'!:h th.a ll'Cl:rth. ho~ o:f sai.d 
~o~t ~e:,;- ~ d,i.Q"ta;Q.Cc Qj! l.:52.50 feet to the ~ PO::i::tr.J! OlJ' • 
BEGllffl;OlG; the.i;ca o,an.t:·bm:l:ag · ~ sg• 4:i' 5J.1' ~t:. p~cl.. w.t.t::b. .iaa:t.d No:rch :bom:i.~ a 
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COUNTY 
·, c&-- DEPUT't 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. and REAL ) 
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, and REAL PROPER TIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., an Idaho limited 
liability company, and REAL HOMES, 
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
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Case No. CV 09-11855 
ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS' PRE-
TRIAL BRIEF 
AL PLAINTIFFS' PRE-TRIAL BRrEF-
COME NOW Alternative Plaintiffs Eugene and Janet Rice, and Real Properties, LLC, by 
through their counsel ofrecord, J. Kahle Becker, and file their Pre-Trial as follows: 
CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW AND POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S POSITION 
This case has been dramatically trimmed down by a settlement with Dennis Sallaz's ex-
wife Renee Baird, rulings from this Court, and the voluntary dismissal of several of Plaintiff's 
claims. Unfortunately, the case slogs on and remains rather convoluted based on conflicting 
claims of ownership to Real Homes, LLC. Plaintiffs contend these conflicting claims are 
occasioned by Dennis Sallaz's wrongful actions; namely his creation of a false operating 
agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Plaintiffs contend this false operating agreement improperly 
removed Renee Baird's ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC prior to the purported sale to 
Real Prope1iies, LLC (an entity Dennis Sallaz created during his divorce for his clients the Rices) 
on January 6, 2006. Indeed, the court in Sallaz v. Sallaz (Ada County Case No. CV-DR-2004-
1075) has already rejected this second operating agreement and the Bankruptcy Court in In Re 
Real Homes, LLC, Chapter 11 Case No. 0-502051 looked at the second operating agreement with 
skepticism when granting Renee Baird's Motion to Dismiss filed therein. Exhibit G to the 
Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract 
Claim (hereinafter "Becker Affidavit"). 
This case was filed by Plaintiffs at the urging of their former friend and attorney, Dennis 
Sallaz. During the early phases of this litigation; it became apparent to Plaintiffs that Mr. Sallaz 
was providing false information to them. Accordingly, Plaintiffs settled their case with Renee 
Baird and voluntarily dismissed several of their claims: 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER that Defendant Renee Baird is dismissed with prejudice from this action and that Plaintiff and Defendant Baird shall bear their own attorney fees and costs. 
January 13, 2011 Order for Dismissal with Prejudice. 
Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiffs leave to voluntarily dismiss Counts I, II, III, and VI, with prejudice, with the issue of attorney fees and costs to be determined at the conclusion of the entire action. 
June 28, 2012 Order on Plaintiffs' Second A1otion to Change Venue and ~Motion To Dismiss at 3. 
It is Hereby ORDERED that Count IV as contained in Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed, with the Court reserving the issue of attorney fees and costs, for determination at the conclusion of this Case. 
February 22, 2012 Order On Motion To Dismiss Count IV In The Complaint. 
The original Complaint contained claims plead in the alternative and the statement: 
In the alternative, should this Court declai;e the subject purchase and sale agreement invalid or unenforceable and/or decline to quiet title in Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC, Eugene and Janet Rice, husband and wife, and Real Properties, LLC hereby state and allege the following in support of this Alternative Complaint for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment against Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Real Homes, LLC, Glen Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC (hereafter "Alternative Defendants"). 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Quiet Title, and Unjust Enrichment and Alternative Complaint for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment at 1-2. 
Following the settlement with Renee Baird in the summer of 2010 and the voluntary 
dismissal of the majority of Plaintiffs claims, this Court declined to grant summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' alternative claim for Breach of Contract (Count V) due to the existence of factual 
issues. See Settlement Agreement with Renee Baird, Exhibit C to Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in 
Support of A1otion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claim and July 13, 2012 Order 
on Plaintiffs' 1viotion for Summary Judgment on Count V; Order on Defendants' }.lotion for 
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Leave to File an Amended Answer; Order on Defendants' Motion to Strike; Order on Defendant 
's Motion for Relief (hereinafter on Summary Judgment"). 
Thus, Plaintiffs' only remaining claim is the alternative claim for Breach of Contract 
(Count V) on behalf of Real Properties, LLC. As the Court noted on page 9 of the Order on 
Sumnzary Judgment: 
In Paragraph 2.1 of the Operating Agreement, attached to the Complaint, Renee Baird is identified as the sole member of Real Homes, LLC. While the Operating Agreement provides for admission of additional members, Plaintiffs do not contend and do not purport to establish on this .Motion that there were additional members of Real Homes at the time the parties executed the Agreement. 
The Court also noted on page 5 of the Order on Summary Judgment: 
After reviewing the file in this action, it appears to the court that Real Homes, LLC has not filed an answer to the Complaint or otherwise appeared through counsel in this action. On December 10, 2009, Renee Baird filed a prose Answer on her own behalf and, purportedly, on behalf of Real Homes. However, there is no evidence suggesting that Renee Baird had legal authority to properly represent the LLC in her individual capacity. 
Therefore, pursuant to IRCP 55, it is appropriate to grant a default judgment against Real 
Homes, LLC on Count V (Breach of Contract in the Alternative). Based on Plaintiffs settlement 
with Renee Baird (the actual sole member/manager of Real Homes, LLC when the contract was 
signed in January of 2006) and the insolvency of Real Homes, LLC (an entity now wholly 
controlled by the Rices) it would be appropriate for this Court to enter a Default Judgment for $0 
against Real Homes, LLC on Count V of the Complaint. The sole remaining claim would then 
be Count V, Breach of Contract in the Alternative as asserted against Glen Trefren and Dennis 
Sallaz as "Sellers" under the Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
Alternative Plaintiffs desire to utilize the Pre-Trial Conference to further simplify the issues and 
any amendments to this single remaining claim as allowed under IRCP 16( d)( 1) and (2). 
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By and large, Plaintiffs are now in a defensive posture as to the Counterclaims asserted 
Glen Trefren (individually and as "assignee" of Dennis Sallaz) and Tradesman. Dennis 
Sallaz and Gien Trefren as "sellers" (allegedly on behalf of Alternative Defendants Real Homes, 
LLC) failed to convey 100% of the ownership of "Real Homes, LLC," and marketable title to 
unencumbered real estate Real Homes, LLC supposedly owned, to "Real Properties, LLC." See 
pp. 2-3 of Exhibit D to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Quiet Title, And Unjust 
Enrichment and Alternative Complaint for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment 
(hereinafter "Complaint"). Alternative Plaintiffs contend this failure is occasioned by Dennis 
Sallaz's fraudulent actions in creating a false operating agreement and providing highly unethical 
legal "advice" to his clients inducing them to enter into a business transaction Mr. Sallaz and Mr. 
Trefren had no authority to execute. 
Dennis Sallaz took advantage of Mr. Rice's friendship, the attorney-client relationship, 
and caused his client to enter into a highly unethical & fraudulent transaction during Mr. Sallaz' s 
divorce from his ex-wife Renee Baird in violation of the temporary restraining order issued 
therein. See Id. and Affidavit of Dennis Sallaz in Support of Motion to Disqualify J Kahle 
Becker from Further Representation. The magistrate for the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce (Ada 
County Case No. CV DR 04-0I075M) awarded Real Homes, LLC to Renee Baird and she filed 
several !is pendens on the real estate Mr. Rice thought he had purchased. See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, attached as Exhibit E to Counterclaim at pp. 22-25. At the 
urging of Dennis Sallaz, Mr. Rice initiated suit against Renee Baird for several causes of action. 
Due to the existence of the Sallaz marital community at the time of the events giving rise 
to the claims alleged in the Complaint in Canyon County Case No. CV09-11855, Dennis Sallaz 
was named as a Co-Defendant. See Complaint. Mr. Sallaz has not asserted any counterclaims 
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and "assigned" whatever interest he had the contract (first Jim Bevis Mr. Sallaz's divorce 
and then to Glen See "Assignment Interest" Exhibit B to Becker Affidavit. 
It is important to note that Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in the Real Homes/Real 
Properties contract to his divorce attorney, Jim Bevis, on March 6, 2006. Therefore Mr. Sallaz 
had nothing to assign to Glen Trefren when he subsequently "assigned" that same contractual 
interest on March 10, 2006. 
An assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to another. Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 125, 90 P.3d 346, 3 50 (2004) ( quoting Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999); 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 1 (1999) ). An assignment "confers a complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee." Id ( quoting 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 1 (1999)). "[A]n assignee takes the subject of the assignment with all the rights and remedies possessed by and available to the assignor." 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 144 (1999) (emphasis added). Once an assignor makes an assignment, he no longer retains control of the subject of the assignment. See First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2006). 
Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530,533, 164 P.3d 810,813 (2007). 
Plaintiffs contend (and the Sallaz v. Sallaz Court found) Mr. Trefren had no interest in 
Real Homes, LLC prior to this "assignment" from Dennis Sallaz. Thus, even if Mr. Sallaz 
lawfully assigned his interest in the subject contract to Mr. Trefren, as assignee, Mr. Trefren 
would only take what Mr. Sallaz was legally able to assign (a 1/2 community interest in his 
wife's LLC that was subsequently ordered to be liquidated to partially satisfy the judgment in 
Sallaz v. Sallaz) and would be subject to the same defenses Mr. Sallaz would have been subject 
to. 
It is undeniable that Defendants Sallaz and Trefren ("Sellers") breached ( or could never 
perform) several provisions of the "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, 
LLC." The pertinent warranties which were breached or could never have been performed are: 
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3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with Buyer as follows: (a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes 100% of the Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to Said Ownership Interest being sold and transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign, and transfer same to Buyer free and clear of all liens, pledges, security interests or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party. ( c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC 
and being transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed herein. 
· ( d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers 
shall execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer all interest therein to buyer. 
Exhibit D to Counterclaim at 2-3. 
Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren signed the agreement in their individual capacities and Mr. Trefren 
also signed in what appears to be his representative capacity as a "Co-Owner" of Real Homes, 
LLC. 
In an action for the breach of a contract for the sale of real estate by the vendor, the 
purchaser successfully bringing a claim for a breach of a warranty of title would ordinarily be 
entitled to seek a rescission of the contract and as such, if granted, they could be required to 
return the property to the vendor and collect damages in the form of a money judgment. See 
Ayotte v. Redmon, 110 Idaho 726, 727, 718 P.2d 1164, 1165 (1986). However, the subject 
contract was never validly executed by Real Homes, LLC and there was a failure of 
consideration. 
To be enforceable at law, an agreement must be supported by valid consideration. Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. NW Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769, 979 P.2d 627, 642 (1999). Similarly, an agreement is unenforceable if consideration fails after the contract is formed. World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884, 728 P.2d 769, 773 (Ct.App.1986). Generally, courts will not assess the sufficiency of consideration. lvfclvfahon v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27, 38-39, 357 P.2d 374, 380 (1960). Consideration "must have some value in the eyes of the law; but in the absence of fraud or overreaching, the promisor, if competent, can fix on 
anything not in itself unlawful as a consideration and put his own value on it, and whether it is equivalent" to the benefit bargained for is a matter left to the 
p 
'PRE-TRIAL BRIEF- Page 7 
determination of the parties. Id. (quoting 94 C.J.S. Wills § 113(1)). Where an agreement is captured within a written instrument, a presumption arises that it is supported by consideration. WL. Scott, Inc. v. lv!adras Aerotech, Inc., 103 Idaho 736, 741, 653 P.2d 791, 796 (1982). The party that asserts consideration is either lacking or has failed to support a written agreement bears the burden of proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id 
Beaver Springs argues that the question of consideration js immaterial because where "an agreement is fully executed on both sides, the question of consideration becomes immaterial." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 912, 204 P.3d 1114, 1123 (2009) (citing lvfarysville Dev. Co. v. Hargis, 41 Idaho 257,260,239 P. 522, 522-23 (1925)). However, a contract is fully executed only if all parties thereto have each performed their contractual obligations. Marysville Dev. Co., 41 Idaho at 260,239 P. at 523 .... 
A failure of consideration exists when a party fails to perform a contractual obligation. World Wide Lease, Inc., 111 Idaho at 884, 728 P .2d at 773 ( citing Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. a (1981)). 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 526-27, 272 P.3d 491, 498-99 (2012). 
"Failure" of consideration is to be distinguished from "want" or "lack" of consideration, which refers to instances where no consideration ever existed to support the contract, rendering the contract invalid from the beginning. General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884-85, 728 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Ct. App. 1986). 
This situation presents a rather unique set of circumstances occasioned by Defendant's 
fraudulent actions and Defendants' breach of several express warranties in the contract. 
Alternative Plaintiffs have not sought a rescission because Glen Trefren and Dennis Sallaz were 
not the rightful owners of Real Homes, LLC's interest in the property they purported to sell. 
"Returning" prope1iy to them would be directly contrary to the Court's holding in Sallaz v. 
Sallaz and would grant a windfall to parties who had nothing to sell in the first place. Rather, the 
actual member/manager of Real Homes, LLC (Renee Baird) has already settled this case with 
Alternative Plaintiffs. 
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"If, on the other hand, the compromise agreement itself is accepted as a substitution for and extinguishment of the existing claim, then the compromise is a substituted contract." Johnson v. Utile, 86 Nev. 593, ---, 472 P.2d 335, 337 (1970). Under an executory accord, the original duty is suspended until satisfaction or breach of the accord. 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 885, 728 P.2d 769, 774 (Ct. App. 1986). 
In this case the settlement with Renee Baird is either an outright release or a substituted 
contract. Consequently a money judgment for Alternative Plaintiffs' attorney's fees against 
Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren is the appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs intend to prove and will ask 
this Court to apply its discretion and make an equitable finding that the settlement with Renee 
Baird released any claims Real Homes, LLC might have had and satisfied the specific 
performance ordered by the Court in Sallaz v. Sallaz. 
The general rules of the common law are that: (1) a party is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance when damages, the legal remedy, are inadequate; (2) because of the perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are inadequate in an action for breach of a land sale contract, and the non-breaching paiiy need not make a separate showing of the inadequacy of damages; (3) the remedy is equally available to both vendors and purchasers; and ( 4) additionally, the appropriateness of specific performance as relief in a particular case lies within the discretion of the trial court. 
Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 582, 701 P.2d 198,202 (1985). 
Aside from defeating the Counterclaims, Judgment in favor of the Alternate Plaintiffs and 
an award of their attorney's fees is all that remains to dispose of this particular head of the Hydra 
that Dennis Sallaz's divorce has become. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
at 25. 
DEFENSES TO COUNTERCLAIMS 
The defenses to Counterclaims are set forth in the Answer With Affirmative Defenses to 
Defendants Glenn Trefren 's And Tradesman Contractors And Construction, LLC 's 
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Counterclaim and are incorporated herein as though set forth in full. Aside from those defenses, 
factual evidence adduced in discovery supports the Rice's assertion that the operating 
rPPYY>Pl'\T utilized by Mr. Trefren & Mr. Sallaz is false and that Mr. Trefren/Tradesman have 
been paid in full for the little bit of shoddy work they performed for Real Properties, LLC. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Rices are not personally liable on the Counterclaims: 
The Request for Admission at issue, set forth in Plaintiffs Second Set of Discovery, states: "Admit Eugene 'Roy' Rice is not personally liable for any sums which may be due pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit D." 
Defendant Trefren has not established that leaving the admission in place would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case. As noted above, the evidence before the court indicates that Plaintiff Eugene Rice executed the Agreement in a representative capacity, as Manager of Real Properties. Defendant Trefren has adduced no evidence or legal basis upon which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Rice is personally liable on the Agreement. 
Order on Summary Judgment at 13. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions against Glen 
Trefren and Tradesman for their repeated failure to substantiate their last minute•daims that they 
have yet to be paid for providing materials and performing labor on the subject properties (Count 
II of the Counterclaim). This Motion is set to be argued concurrent with the pre-trial conference 
on September 13, 2013. Plaintiffs urge this Court to strike Count II of the Counterclaim for Mr. 
Trefren/Tradesman's repeated failure to respond to discovery and disregard of this Court's 
August 8, 2013 oral Order on Plaintiff's Revised kfotion to Compel. 
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EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
1. Speaking Objections and Testimonial Questions by Counsel 
Rices ask this court to prohibit long compound testimonial "questions" by counsel as well 
as speaking objections. Though the Court has not had the opportunity to review the voluminous 
record of transcripts of depositions taken in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253, the Rice's 
discovery therein has been frustrated by Mr. Smith's testimonial "questions" and "objections." 
Both of these techniques improperly allow an attorney to use his position of authority as an 
officer of the court to present improper evidence as argument to the jury that should not 
otherwise be considered. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,718,215 P.3d 414,438 (2009). 
Because attorneys are prohibited from making any comments, either on or off the record, in the presence of a judicial officer, which might suggest or limit a witness's answer to an unobjectionable question, such behavior is likewise prohibited at depositions. 
Armstrong v. Hussmann Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299,303 (E.D. Mo. 1995). 
See also IRCP 30(d)(l) "Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated 
concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner." 
AL 
"[I]mproper questioning by counsel generally entitles the aggrieved party to a new trial if it conveys improper information to the jury and prejudices the opposing litigant." Silbergleit v. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, 37 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir.1994) ( citing Sanders-El v. Wencewicz, 987 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir.1993)). When counsel repeatedly attempts to use irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, the possibility of improper influence is increased. Id. Counsel's misconduct may be such that a district court cannot overcome its prejudicial effect by admonishing the jury or rebuking counsel; in such case a court should grant a new trial. Id. The District Court has broad discretion in deciding whether questioning by counsel is so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted, id., and we review this determination for abuse of discretion only, Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., 401 F.3d 901, 917 (8th Cir.2005). 
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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Such limitations will ensure that only admissible evidence is considered and will greatly 
increase the pace of is likely to be a contentious trial. Alternative Plaintiffs ask this Court 
to be vigilant and prohibit the introduction of impermissible evidence through the testimony of 
counsel. 
2. Defendants' Failure to Respond and/or Supplement Discovery Responses 
Mr. Sallaz & Mr. Trefren/Tradesman provided woefully deficient discovery responses 
throughout this litigation and failed to timely supplement those responses pursuant to IRCP 
26(e). Mr. Smith has made many comments on and off the record regarding various assertions 
which are not found in Mr. Sallaz' s discovery responses. Defendants have failed to identify the 
substance of proposed testimony of many of their witnesses greatly prejudicing Plaintiffs trial 
preparation. Mr. Sallaz has a routine of producing documents during trial which were not 
previously produced in discovery. Again, Counterclaimants ask this Court to carefully review 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order from Sallaz v. Sallaz which provides 
several examples of Mr. Sallaz's mid-trial manufacture of documents and false testimony. 
Counterdefendants should not be able to produce documents, spontaneously recall testimony 
which they "couldn't remember" when providing their discovery responses, and make assertions 
regarding matters which they failed to provide complete and timely discovery responses. 
Counterclaimants ask the Court to be vigilant on this issue and deal with such misconduct should 
it arise during trial. 
3. Collateral Estoppel Bars Reiitigation of Facts Determined in Sallaz v. Sallaz 
The Rices strongly urge this Court to apply the doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to 
streamline the trial in this matter. For example, Mr. Sallaz introduced an operating agreement 
for Real Homes, LLC which the comi in Sallaz v. Sallaz determined was not the actual operating 
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agreement for the LLC. Instead, the Court took days of testimony (including Glen Trefren's) 
considered dozens of exhibits to make its determination that the operating agreement 
introduced by Renee Baird was the actual operating agreement which had been in place for many 
years. Essentially, a Court has already found that Mr. Sallaz introduced a false operating 
agreement on Real Hornes, LLC, the entity Mr. Sallaz subsequently "sold" to his clients during 
his divorce. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order from Sallaz v. Sallaz at 6-8, 
10-11, and 22-25 attached to Second Amended Counterclaim as Exhibit J. 
Likewise, the Court also found that the reason for the foreclosure on some of the real 
estate owned by Real Hornes, LLC was Dennis Sallaz's unauthorized liquidation of 
approximately $60,000 from the Real Homes, LLC checking account. Id. This liquidation is 
established by days of testimony and dozens of exhibits. In the Rice's view the liquidation is 
relevant because it forms the basis by which Mr. Sallaz sold his clients the assets purportedly 
owned by Real Homes, LLC on an emergency basis during the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce trial 
without disclosing Renee Baird's interest in the LLC. 
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue previously determined when: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). 
Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren (who, as assignee, is in privity with Dennis Sallaz) will 
undoubtedly argue that Collateral and Judicial Estoppel should not apply to anything either said 
or did in Sallaz v. Sallaz because the case is once again on appeal (from Judge Sticklen's denial 
l TRIAL ~ Page 13 
of Mr. Sallaz's appeal from the magistrate' decision - 5 years earlier based on an issue that was 
not raised at trial i.e. the Mr. Sallaz wasn't actually married to Renee Baird). 
Though the preclusive effect of a judgment while on appeal appears to be an issue of first 
impression in Idaho, Defendants' anticipated argument is contradicted by Federal case law and 
that of numerous states: Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, (1903) 191 US 499, 24 S Ct 154 (1903); 
Washington v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 14 Fed. Appx. 12 (1st Cir. 2001); Black & Decker, 
Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 500 F. Supp. 2d 864 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 
825 (Alaska 2003); Rhoten v. Dickson, 223 P.3d 786 (Kan. 2010); In re Day, 409 B.R. 337 
(Bankr. D. Md. 2009) (applying Maryland law); Hughes v. Dundee Mortg. & Trust Invest. Co. 
(1886, CC Or) 11 Sawy 554, 28 F 40, followed in Hughes v. Dundee Mortg. & Trust Invest. Co. 
(CC Or) 11 Sawy 563, 28 F 47; Gonzalez v. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. 2010). This Court 
should not allow what can only be described as the most frivolous of appeals to disrupt the use of 
Collateral and Judicial Estoppel to prevent Mr. Sallaz from contradicting his prior legal and 
sworn factual positions. 
AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS, EXHIBITS, & WITNESSES 
This Court is well aware that this has been very contentious litigation. There is very little 
the parties to this litigation agree on and it has been nearly impossible to get any agreement on 
facts from Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren's legal team. Even facts which were previously testified 
to by Dennis Sallaz and/or those facts which have been adjudicated by the Court in Sallaz v. 
Sallaz are now disputed by Mr. Sallaz. Likewise, in pre-trial conferences conducted in Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 1107253, Mr. Sallaz's counsel informed counsei for the Rice that they 
D 
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will strenuously object foundational issues as to documents Mr. Sallaz produced in discovery and 
demand that court reporters be present to authenticate transcripts of Mr. Sallaz's testimony. 
It would appear the parties do agree that Exhibit D to the Complaint is the applicable 
Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
Plaintiff's vVitnesses: Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
PlaintifPs Exhibit List: Attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONSNERDICT FORM 
Alternative Plaintiffs desire to waive their right to a jury trial and consent to trying this 
case before the Court. Defendants/Counterclaimants Trefren & Tradesman have not demanded a 
jury trial pursuant to IRCP 38. See Defendants Glen Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction's Amended Answer with Counterclaim. It is unknown whether Dennis Sallaz still 
demands a jury trial. See Answer with Affirmative Defenses at 6. However, Dennis Sallaz did 
propose a Court trial in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253 and it is anticipated that he will 
consent to a Court trial herein. Therefore, Alternative Plaintiffs have not prepared proposed jury 
instructions or a verdict form. 
In the event Dennis Sallaz still desires to have a jury trial, Alternative Plaintiffs ask this 
court to schedule a Yz day pre-trial conference shortly before trial to discuss the marking of 
exhibits and objections thereto. The appointment of Jim Lynch as special master pursuant to 
IRCP 53 might also help with this process. Additionally, Alternative Plaintiffs seek additional 
time to prepare proposed jury instructions should Dennis Sallaz desire a jury trial. 
E 'P TRTAL BRIEF- Page 15 
MEDIATION 
The parties have attempted to ·-~·""- this dispute with Tony Park. That mediation was 
unsuccessfui. The parties have also informally discussed settlement throughout this litigation. 
An additional round of mediation may take place prior to trial. Jim Lynch, Special Master in 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253, has agreed to facilitate and observe this process. 
DATED this _6 day of September, 2013. 
I >K(AHLE BECKER f j\ttomey for Alternative Plaintiffs 
PRE-TRIAL Page 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
undersigned hereby certifies that on this £ day of September 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ALTERl~ATIVE PLAINTIFFS' PRE-TRIAL BRIEF was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83703 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
Jared B. Martens 
1615 W. Hays St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
_1 US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
_1 US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
X US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
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ET ERICE and JANET RIC 
I 
al, 
v. SALLAZ, TREFREN and TRADESMAN, et al 
CV 09-11855 
WITNESS LIST 
Subject to Revision 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this witness list as necessary 
l. Glen Trefren 
c/o Iver Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83703 
2. Renee Baird 
3. Dennis Sallaz 
c/o Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
4. Jim Bevis 
5. Debra Eismann 
6. Keli Walts 
7. Roy Rice 
c/o J. Kahle Becker 
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
8. Janet Rice 
c/o J. Kahle Becker 
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Exhibit B 
1. I 
I 
2. 
I 
I I 
EUG-!{NE RICE and JANET RICE, et al, v. SALLAZ, TREFREN and TRADESMAN, et 
CV 09-11855 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Subject to Revision Plaintiffs reserve the right to list as an exhibit any document produced during discovery and maintained in publically available sources, and to introduce additional exhibits necessary for impeachment 
I Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description l Source 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to John Runft, dated 
01/08/2009, re: Rice quiet title, BKO, $90k & $60k 
RICE 00886-00888 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to John Runft, dated 
03/02/2009 re: enc Quitclaim/ Baird Quitclaim 
RICE 00885 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to Jolm 
05/20/2009. 
RICE 00882 
Sallaz & Gatewood Facsimile from Dennis Sallaz 
to John Run.ft, with itemized outstanding debt to 
Roy Rice, dated 05/26/2009 
RICE 00873-00876 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to Jolm Runft, dated 
08/20/2009 re: RH & Denny's debt to Roy. 
RICE 00864-00865 
Supplemental Letter from Dennis Sallaz to John 
Runft, dated 08/20/2009 re: RH bko. 
RICE 00863 
Exh. I Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description l Source 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to John Runft, dated 
04/06/10 re: shut off water. 
I 
RICE 02039 
8. 
Ii Defendants/Counterclaimants' request for i accounting to Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, dated 01/14/2011. 
RICE 00860-00861 
I 
9. I Plaintiff/Counterdefendants' response letter dated 02/16/2011, to Defendants/Counterclaimants' I 
request for accounting to Sallaz &Gatewood, PLLC I I 
re: no $ in trust, compliance with IRPC, never I 
expected to be compensated. 
I 
I 
if t RICE 00844-00845 i 
:j~ Letter from Thomas Henry to Roy Rice, dated 02/18/2011, with Authorization for Release of 
Information 
RICE 00842-00843 
Letter to Plaintiff/Counterdefendants counsel 
Vernon K. Smith, dated 03/24/2011 (with attached promissory notes dated 06/10/2005 in the amount 
of $10,800, and 09/21/2005 in the amount of $10,000). 
RICE 00837-00839; 00400& 00402 
II 
I Demand letters dated 03/24/2011 and 04/22/2011 from Defendants/Counterclaimants to I Plaintiff/Counterdefendants counsel Vernon K. 
I 
Smith (no attachments) re: ATV & Winnebago. 
RICE 00833 
Exh. I Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling j Description 
Source 
i 
I 
! 
Response letter dated 04/25/2011 from 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendants counsel Vernon K. Smith's to Defendants/Counterclaimants demand letters re: refuse to pay & surrender property. 
RICE 00830-00831 
UCC Lien No. B200710389432, dated 12/27/2007, I 
renewed 11/07/2012, showing Roy Rice as Secured 
1 
! 
Party (filing no. B 6591607) 
i UCC Lien No. B200710389432, dated 12/27/2007, --
showing Roy Rice as Secured Pai1y for all personal property. 
SALLAZ 00926 
i 
I 
Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC 
Statements to Roy Rice, dated 05/04/2011 
SALLAZ_00103-00104; 00150; 00155; 00204; 00208;00209;00085; 00086;00090-00097; 
00140; 00158; 00167 
17. Sallaz Applications for Automatic Extensions of 
Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns (2010, 2009, 2007) 
United States Tax Coui1 Notice of Determination by Dennis Sallaz, dated 06/2011. "I have no 
income." 
-Warranty Deed Sallaz to Fox of 1000 S. Roosevelt, dated 11/12/2008 
Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description 
Source 
I 
Letter from Dennis Sallaz to White Peterson, dated I 05/23/2005, re: Saxton Fruit Farms and Real 
Homes LLC, referencing Cashier's Check 
09123643 in the amount of $10,072.32. 
I RICE 07058 I 
I 
Letter from Kevin Dinius dated 05/24/2005 
returning Cashier's Check 
I I 
RICE 07061-07062 
I 
I I 22. Affidavit of Dennis Sallaz in Opposition to I Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Breach of Contract Claim, with exhibits, filed in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 on 
06/22/2012 
Letter from Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. To White 
Peterson re: Saxton Fruit Farms, with attached Cashier's Check payable to Saxton Fruit Fam1 in 
the amount of $10,072.32. i RICE 02005-02006 I 
24. 
i 
Operating Agreement of Real Homes, LLC dated 01/19/2001 - Baird member and signature I Exhibit C to the Complaint; PLF 00256-00277 
Articles of Organization Real Homes LLC - Baird 
manager and signature, dated 01/19/2001 
PLF 00339 
Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description 
Source 
I 
I Amended and Restated Articles of Organization Real Homes LLC - Sallaz manager and signature, dated 09/12/2003 
PLF 00339 
I 
• Notice of Claim of Lien Real Homes, LLC - Daryl Sallaz, dated 02/09/2004 
I RICE 02149-02150 I 
I i Quitclaim Deed Real Homes, LLC to Renee Baird-Sallaz and Dennis Sallaz Riverside Lot lB, dated 02/10/2004 
PLF 00612-00614, PLF 00617 I I 
I 
Quitclaim Deed recorded 02/11/2004 between Real Homes, LLC unto Renee Baird-Sallaz and Dennis Sallaz - Signed by Baird as President of Real 
Homes and Notarized by Walts 
PLF 00170-00173 
Quitclaim Deed dated 02/16/2005 between Real Homes, LLC and Tradesman Contractors & Construction, LLC, Glen Trefren member Real 
Homes LLC 
PLF 00394-00395; PLF 00978-00980 !, I 
13 
Riverside lB Deed of Trust Baird-Sallaz and Sallaz, dated 02/18/2004 
PLF 00618-00620 
Stip' d I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling \ Description 
32. II Summary Appraisal Report Properties Owned by Real Homes, LLC, dated 10/01/2005 valued at I $195,000 
SALLAZ 01091-01106 
33. 1
1 Affidavit of Renee Baird in Suppo1i of Motion to 
Dismiss in Re: Real Homes Bankruptcy, Case No. 05-02051, dated 11/08/2005. 
SALLAZ 00757-00776 i 
i Order on Motion for Dismissal of Chapter 11 in In 
Re: Real Homes, LLC Bankrupcy case no. 05-0251-TLM, dated 11/25/2005 
Articles of Organizations Real 
dated O 1/04/2006 
RICE 07121 
I 36. Eugene Rice's DL Evans bank statement dated 
01/23/06 showing money used to purchase 
Ri versicle prope1iy I RICE 02007-02008 
Assignment of Purchase Agreement for Sale of 
Interest in Real Homes, LLC from Dem1is Sallaz to Jim Bevis, dated 03/06/2006. 
RICE 00522 
RICE 00521 
Source 
Assignment of Purchase Agreement for Sale of 
Interest in Real Homes, LLC from Dennis Sallaz to i Glen Trefren, dated 03/10/2006. 
----~----
Adm'd Stip'd I Objs Date Offered Ct.Ruling Description \ Source 
l 
Letter from Dennis J. Sallaz to Jim Re1mell at D.L. 
Evans bank re: 15580 Riverside Road., Caldwell, dated 04/04/06 with attached letters and copy of 
cashier's check 09124433 payable to Pioneer Title in amount of $63,402.82 
I RICE 02000-02004 
I 
04/06/2006 Sallaz & Gatewood letter from Dennis I 
I 
I Sallaz to Jim Bevis re: Real Homes Sale aka "Fire I I Sale," "copy of the previous and still existing loans 
and obligations to Rice," with attached Real Homes 
LLC docs 
PLF 00181, 00220-00225 
Purchase and Sale Agreement for Sale of Interest 
Real Homes, LLC 
RICE 02075-02080 
01/17/2007 Sallaz & Gatewood letter from Dennis I Sallaz to Roy Rice re: Real Properties, LLC, with I 
attached Real Properties LLC Articles of 
Organization and 2007 Annual Repo1i 
PLF 00383, PLF 00387, PLF 00390 
Quitclaim Deed from Dennis Sallaz to 
quitclaiming Lot lB (15584 Riverside Road) dated 03/02/2009 
RICE 02009-02011 
Quitclaim Deed recorded 03/02/2009 between 
Dennis Sallaz and Roy Rice 15584 Riverside Rd. 
l PLF 00174-00176 
Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description l Source 
i Quitclaim Deed recorded 02/27/2009 between 
Dennis Sallaz and Real Homes LLC 15584 
Riverside Rd. 
PLF 00177-00179 
. 
46 .. 
• Parcel map with Real Properties I Baird-Sallaz ! 
markers I 
PLF 00605 l I Real Properties, LLC Checking Account documents PLF 00539-00541, PLF 00543-0058, PLF 00451, PLF 00456-00458, PLF 00463 
i Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State 
Annual Repo1i Forms - Baird manager and 
signature only 
PLF 00598~00600 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Report Fom1 2005 - Just Sallaz listed 
i PLF 00601 
. 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Rep01i 
I Form 2006 - Sallaz and Trefren listed 
PLF 00602 I i 
I 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Rep01i Fo1m 2007 - Roy Rice manager; Sallaz signature PLF 00603 
-
Stip' d I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description j Source 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Repo1i Form 2008 - Rice and Sallaz listed 
PLF 00342 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Rep01i Form 2009 - Roy Rice manager; Sallaz signature 
PLF 00341 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Amrnal Rep011 
I Form 2010-Roy Rice manager i 
I 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Ammal Report I Form 2012 - Roy Rice manager; Rice signature 
Real Homes, LLC Secretary of State Annual Repori Form 2013 -Roy Rice manager; Rice fTJl :::itll 
-
Tradesman Profit & Loss Statement Jan - April 
I 
2006 
PLF 00839 
Glen Trefren Eye Surgery Transaction Report 2006 
PLF 00836 
Glen Trefren 2006 Federal Tax Return, without any 
mention of sale of Real Homes, LLC 
60. Deposition of Dennis J. Sallaz, Volume 2, dated 06/02/2005, from the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case No. CV DR 04-01075M. 
I SALLAZ 01215-01292 -
i 
Deposition of Dennis J. Sallaz, Volume 3, dated I I 06/15/2005, from the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case 
No. CV DR 04-01075M. 
SALLAZ 01293-01347 
Deposition of Daryl Sallaz, dated 07/19/2005, from 
the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case No. CV DR 04-
01075M. 
SALLAZ 01133-01154 
Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, 
Trial held 07/20/2006 and 07/27/2006, from the 
I Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case No. CV DR 04-
01075M. 
RICE 01144-01198 
I Testimony of Dennis Sallaz from Transcript of 
Hearing, all volumes, from the Sallaz v. Sallaz 
divorce, Case No. CV DR 04-01075M 
Final Judgment and Decree dated 07/22/2008 from 
Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case No. CV DR 04 
01075D 
I 
SALLAZ 00234-246 
66. I Amended Final Judgment and Decree dated 
01/04/2012 from Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case No. 
CV DR 04 01075D 
I 67. Notice of Appeal in Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, Case I 
No. CV-DR-2004-01075 D, dated 02/09/2012. 
I 
I 
Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description 
Source 
Order Denying Suspension of Appeal in Sallaz v. 
Sallaz divorce, Case No. CV DR 04-01075D, 
signed by Hon. Kathryn Sticklen, and filed 11/09/ 
2012 i 
! 
Any and all Discovery and discovery responses by I parties in Rice v. Sallaz, et al, Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 
i 
Dennis Sallaz' s Affidavit in Support 
Order Allowing Enlargement of Time to File 
Responsive Pleading in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855, dated 2/20/2010. I 
71. 
I Affidavit of Dennis J Sallaz in Support of Motion to 
I Disqualify J Kahle Becker from Further 
Representation of Plaintiffs, and attachments 
thereto, filed in Canyon County, Case No. CV 09-
I 
11855 on 06/10/2011. 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions in Rice v. 
Sallaz, et al, Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
11855, dated 07/07/2011. 
73. Any and all publicly maintained records by Idaho Secretary of State 
74. Any and all pleadings filed by Plaintiffs / 
Counterdefendants in this case and Sallaz v. Rice, et I 
al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
' I 
Any and all Affidavits of Dem1is J. Sallaz in this 
case and Sallaz v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 
Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description 
Source 
I 
Testimony of Dennis Sallaz from Order to Show 
I 
Hearing on 04/29/2011 in this case and Sallaz v. 
Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
I Any and all discovery and discovery responses by I Plaintiffs / Counterdefendants in this case and Sallaz v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 
I 
1107253 
I 
i-i Any and all depositions noticed by Plaintiff/ 
Counterdefendants in this case and Sallaz v. Rice, et 
al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
' ' 
: Any and all exhibits used in depositions in this 
: case, Sallaz v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. 
I 
cvoc 1107253 
I Any and all exhibits admitted in the trial of Sallaz 
v. Sallaz and Ada County Case No. CV-DR-2004-01075 
Deposition of Marcy Fox, taken 09/22/2011, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Thom Hemy, vol. 1, taken 
10/04/2011, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
Deposition ofThomHenry, vol. 2, take1::_J_ 12/14/2011, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
l 1107253 
Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description l Source 
Deposition of Scott Gatewood, taken 
in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Tracy Brown, taken 09/26/2012, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
' 
--
i Deposition of Keli Walts-Brown, vol. 1, taken 
09/26/2012, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
I 
i Deposition of Keli Walts-Brown, vol. 2, taken 
11/06/2012, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
Deposition of Janet Rice, taken 11/1 1/2 . 
County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
I Deposition of Roy Rice taken in connection with I discovery in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 I i 
I 
Deposition of Daryl Sallaz, taken 05/22/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
I Deposition of National Financial Services, taken 05/22/2013 & prematurely terminated by 
Counterdefendants, in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 I 
I I 
Deposition of Heather Skinner, taken 05/23/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Sarina Fifer, taken 05/23/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered Ct. Ruling Description 
'-----~---~--~-----~------~-----~------------------------------''------------,----1 
i 
101 
Deposition of Patrick Oar, taken 05/24/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Tim Birkle, taken 05/24/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Anita Jolmson, taken 05/24/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Deposition of Renee Baird, vol. 1 taken 
05/28/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1101253 I 
Deposition of Renee Baird, vol. 2 taken 
06/02/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
Deposition of Skye Hallett, taken 06/05/2013, Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Email from Ray Schild to Kahle Becker dated 02/22/2010 giving Mr. Becker authorization to 
speak directly to Dennis Sallaz 
RICE 00862 
Deposition of Renee Baird, vol. 3 taken 
06/13/2013, in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
to 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 11, 2011 in this case, Sallaz v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
i 
L-------L--,---L----'--------'----------'--------,._----------------------------------~----------------~ 
Adm'd Objs Date Offered Ct.Ruling Description I Source 
I I Affidavit of Dennis J ?az in Opposition to Rices Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in Sallaz I I v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 (05/24/2013) 
Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz in Support of Motion to I 
I Stay Proceedings and for Protective Order in I Sallaz v. Rice, et al, Ada County Case No. CVOC I 
1107253 (03/13/2013) 
I Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz 's Answers and Responses I 
to Defendant Roy Rice's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Requests for Admission 
(06/17/2011) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
i 
I 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz 's Answers and Re!)ponses to I I 
I Defendant Roy Rice's Second Set of Interrogatories 
' and Requests for Production of Documents I 
I 
I (09/06/2011) in Ada County Case No. CVOC I 
I 
I 
I 
1107253 I 
I 
i Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz 's Response to Defendant 
Roy Rice's Third Set of Interrogatories and Fourth 
Set of Requests for Production of Documents 
I (11/07/2011) in Ada County Case No. CVOC I 1107253 
Response of Marcy Fox to Roy Rice's First Set Jj 
Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents (12/27/2011) in Ada County Case No. 
cvoc 1107253 
Source 
I 
Answers and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Fifth Set of I 
Requests for Production of Documents to Dennis I ! Sallaz (01/17/2012) in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 
r--
Response of Marcy Fox to Roy Rice's Second Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents (03/01/2012) in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 
I . Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz's Response to Defendant Roy Rice's Second Set of Requests for Admissions 
I 
(03/19/2012) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz's Supplemental Answers 
I 
and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Requests for Admission (05/15/2012) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
I Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz 's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admission (09/25/2012) in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 
Stip'd Objs Date Offered Ct. Ruling Description 
1 Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's F(fih Set Jf 
Interrogatories and Sixth Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents to Dennis Sallaz (10/22/2012) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
I 
I 1 i Response of Marcy Fox to Roy Rice 's Third Set of I 
I Request for Production of Documents (10/24/2012) ' in Ada County Case No. CVOC 1107253 1 I i 
First Supplemental Responses to Defe~dant Roy . 
I 
I Rice's F(fth Set of Interrogatories and Sixth Set of / 
Requests for Production of Documents to Dennis 
Sallaz (12/03/2012) in Ada County Case No. 
cvoc 1107253 
' 
Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz 's Third Supplemental 
Answers and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's 
I First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for I ! 
' Production of Documents and Requests for I 
Admission (12/03/2012) in Ada County Case No. 
CVOC1107253 ~~ 
Counterdefendants 'Answers and Responses to 
Counterclaimants' Sixth Set of Interrogatories, 
I Requests for Production of Documents, and 
Requests for Admission (12/03/2012) in Ada 
County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
Stip'd Objs Date Offered Ct. Ruling Description 
Counterdefendants 'Answers and Responses to 
Counterclaimants' Seventh Set 
and Eighth Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents (12/19/2012) in Ada County Case No. 
cvoc 1107253 
I Response of Marcy Fox to Roy Rice's I 
Requests for Admissions (12/21/2012) I 
i 
I Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's Eighth Set of 
Interrogatories, Ninth Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents, and Requests for 
Admission to Dennis Sallaz (01/18/2013) in Ada 
County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
-Responses to Roy Rice's Eighth Set of Requests for 
Admission to Dennis Sallaz (03/13/2013) in Ada 
County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
I 
--
I 
Second Supplemental Response of Marcy Fox to 
I Roy Rice's Third Set of Request for Production of 
Documents (03/21/2013) in Ada County Case No. 
cvoc 1107253 
I 
Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's Third Set of 
Requests for Admission to Dennis Sallaz (03/29/2013) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
Responses to Roy Rice's Ninth Set of Requests for 
Admission to Dennis Sallaz (04/23/2013) in Ada 
I County Case No. CVOC 1107253 
--
Stip'd Objs Date Offered l Ct.Ruling l Description Source 
Supplemental Responses to Roy Rice's Eighth Set 
of Requests for Admission to Dennis Sallaz (04/23/2013) in Ada County Case No. CVOC 
1107253 
Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz 's Fourth Supplewzental 
Answers and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice 's 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admission (05/20/2013) in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 
Plaintiff Dennis J Sallaz 's Fifth Supplemental 
Answers and Responses to Defendant Roy Rice's 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admission (05/29/2013) in Ada County Case No. cvoc 1107253 I 
-I Defendant Sallaz 's Answers and Responses to 
I Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Requestfor i 
Production of Documents and Request/or : Admissions to Defendant Dennis Sallaz in Canyon 
I 
' 
County Case No. CV 09-11855 (01/10/2011) 
Defendant Trefren 's Answers to Plaint~ff's First Set 
of Discovery in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
11855 (01/27/2011) 
Trefren 's Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of 
Discovery in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
11855 (01/28/2011) 
-
Adm'd I Stip'd I Objs Date Offered I Ct. Ruling I Description I Source 
I Defendant Tradesman's Answers to Plaintiff's First I Set of Discovery in Canyon County Case No. CV 
I 
09-11855 (01/28/2011) 
Tradesman's Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of 
Discovery in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
I 11855 (01/28/2011) 
I 
Defendant Sallaz Supplemental Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
I for Production in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 (02/14/2011) 
I 
Defendant Sallaz 's Responses to Plaintiff's 
! Supplemental Requests for Admission in Canyon 
I County Case No. CV 09-11855 (03/17/2011) 
'i 
Defendant Sallaz 's Supplemental Response to i ! Plaintiff's Request for Production in Canyon i County Case No. CV 09-11855 (03/28/2011) 
Defendant Sallaz Supplemental Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 (07/21/2011) 
Trefren 's Further Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set 
I 
of Discovery in Canyon County Case 
11855 (08/08/2011) 
IVER J. LONGETEIG 
5304 Turret 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
No. 1051 
208 342-5995 
Fax: 208 424-6972 
s 
Attorney for Defendants Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, ) husband and wife, REAL HOMES, ) LLC and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, ) An Idaho Limited Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, and ) TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND ) CONSTRUCTION, LLC, An Idaho Limited ) Liability Company, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CV 09-11855 
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS TREFREN 
AND TRADESMAN. 
1 3 2013 
Essentially, this case boils down to a few facts, and a forgery. Glenn Trefren and 
Dennis Sallaz formed a partnership to buy land and install houses. Sallaz put up the 
money and Trefren did the work, which went on for several years, until the divorce filing in 
Ada County of Sallaz v. Sallaz. Dennis had more than $200,000.00 in the property, all 
from his grandmother's estate, until the restraining order was entered in the divorce. With 
that restraining order, he was not able to make the payments, an,d a foreclosure was filed 
by the sellers and a sale date set. 
In order to buy time to sell something, or get a loan to pay the mortgage, Sallaz 
filed a Chapter 1 i kruptcy proceeding that stopped the sale. However, Renee Baird 
(wife/plaintiff in Sallaz v. Sallaz) filed for a dismissal, and obtained it, which allowed the 
sale to be reset on a 30-day notice. 
a last-ditch effort, Sallaz, in January 2006, convinced Roy that he should buy the 
whole package for $250,000.00, pay the two mortgages, and upon resale of the property, 
pay Trefren and Sallaz $60,000.00 each for their equity. 
Roy signed the Purchase Agreement on January 6, 2006 (the day before the 
foreclosure), and went to work trying to sell the properties. Renee Baird immediately filed 
a Lis Pendens, clouding the title. 
When Renee and Dennis separated, she made a deal with Dennis and with 
Trefren that if she could move into 15580 Riverside, that she would pay the mortgage 
payments and use her new real estate license to sell the house without a commission and 
then move into a house of her own at closing. Instead of following through with that 
agreement, Renee filed for divorce and got a restraining order, forbidding Dennis to go 
near the place. 
During their conversations in early 2006, Rice agreed to pay Trefren for the 
remodel of the house on Smith Avenue. Trefren put in 3 months of work, with Rice 
paying for materials and labor, but not paying Trefren anything for acting as the general 
contractor. Rice fired Trefren in March or April, 2006, claiming that Trefren was doing a 
less than adequate job, and claiming that Trefren had embezzled some $3500.00 to pay 
for eye surgery. Trefren says that it was $2800.00 and that it was a personal, voluntary 
loan from Rice. 
Renee later came up with a potentially forged Operating Agreement, naming her 
as manager of Real Homes, LLC. Rice claims this as the reason he did not get good title 
from the Sallaz-Trefren "Real Homes, LLC." Defendants plan, by several methods, to 
show the Court that Renee's version was solely made her. 
It is interesting that Plaintiff waives his right to a jury trial, and claims that 
Defendants Trefren and Tradesman have not demanded one. Apparently, Plaintiff has 
not read p. 8 of Defendants' Amended Answer with Counterclaim, where demand for jury 
is made in all capital letters, boldfaced and centered. Defendants are considering a 
possible waiver. 
Respectfully submitted, 
September 10, 2013 
ivafJ. LONGIG 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
And Tradesman Construction 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 13, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served upon the following: 
J Kahle Becker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz 
IV~py/ 
RICE V. SALLAZ, et al. 
CV 09-11855 
(subject to revision) 
1. All witnesses listed by Plaintiff in his pre-trial brief; 
2. Daniel Reiss 
3. Dave Trefren 
4. Al Linze 
5. Trask Montgomery 
6. Bob Hitchcock 
7. Representative of Endicott Flooring 
8. Representative of Dollar Electric 
9. Steve Palleson 
10. Alex Lopez 
11. Michael Spink 
12. Jim Rennell 
RICE V. SALLAZ, et al. 
CV 09-11855 
EXHIBIT LIST 
(subject to revision) 
1. AH documents listed by Plaintiffs in their pre-trial brief; 
2. Exhibit D to the Complaint; 
3. All documents produced by Rice at his deposition of September 6, 2013, which are contained on two compact disks, marked: 
Rice v. Sallaz 
Bates numbered Docs 
Canyon County Case 
Disc 1 of 1; 
and 
09/06/13 CV 09-11855 
Rice v. Sallaz 
Docs Requested pursuant 
to Rice Subpoena 
Iver J. Longeteig (ISB 1051) 
5304 Turrett 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: (208) 342-5995 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, OEPU1Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. and REAL ) 
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an Idaho ) 
limited liability company, ~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C., an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE ) 
) 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband) 
and wife, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company, ~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 09 - 11855 
DEFENDANTS' -COUNTER CLAIMANTS' 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
DEFENDANTS' - PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDTJM 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS Al~D 
) 
) 
) CONSTRUCTION, 
liability and REAL! 
HOMES, LLC, and Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
This case is currently before the court for trial upon the Counterclaim and the remaining 
Count V of Plaintiffs' Complaint, alleged as an "alternative" cause of action, to become triable in 
the event the court declares the Purchase and Sale Agreement invalid or unenforceable, or 
declines to quit title to certain properties in Real Properties, LLC. There has been no conclusion 
as to the "validity or enforceability" of the Agreement, though the court's decision on the 
Summary Proceedings leaves very suggestive "fingerprints" as to how the court intends to handle 
this matter. Plaintiff has either dismissed, or in their "procedural" maneuvering, eliminated all 
other counts from their pleadings, leaving only this "alternative" claim, seeking "damages" by the 
alternative Plaintiff, Real Properties, LLC. This court has already focused upon the concept of 
"binding consideration", using Plaintiffs own affidavit, confirming Real Properties, LLC, has 
never paid any consideration for the Sale Agreement. Plaintiffs own evidence appears to defeat a 
binding contract, as Plaintiffs position has been there was no "authorized" agent of Real Homes 
involved in the sale, and Real Properties gave no consideration. 
If this Court finds there is a binding agreement, then it would be Defendants' position that 
"Alternative Plaintiff", Real Properties, LLC, has failed to perform under its commitment to 
Defendants, who had patiently waited two years to receive payment on the sale, allowing time for 
the properties to be sold by Real Properties, LLC, to generate the funds to pay the contract 
balance. 
After this case was filed, these Defendants came to discover Real Properties, LLC, 
elected to settle their dispute with Renee Baird, rather than get a declaratory judgment and Quiet 
Title resolution. In doing so, Plaintiff gave title to one parcel of property to Ms. Baird, 15584 
Riverside Road, and obtained a release from her to all the other property. Thereafter, 
Defendants discovered Real Prope1iies, LLC, conveyed those properties to Ada Properties, LLC, 
an by Roy Janet Rice, and they continue to enjoy clear title to those 
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retained properties. The settlement Plaintiff chose to undertake with Renee Baird was among the 
various options they could pursue, but more importantly, Real Properties, had assumed the 
obligation to resolve the recorded encumbrances and title disputes, and in pursuit of that, had 
initially elected to engage the Quiet Title Action, with the full cooperation and assistance of 
Sallaz and Trefren, but later resolved the matter in a way of their own choosing. 
Real Properties, LLC, in this "expanded" dispute, through its counsel J. Kahle Becker, has 
chosen to now rely upon Sallaz v. Sallaz, CV -DR -04 -01075M, advancing the Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment as entered by Magistrate David Epis, which Mr. Becker would argue 
is the controlling "law of the case" in this matter. This court will recall the Magistrate sought to 
create "Community Property Interests" in Real Homes, LLC and its assets, and sought to divide 
"Community Property Assets" as a result of this "marriage" between Sallaz and Baird. The issue 
of the "marriage" of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird, however, has been raised as an issue in the 
Sallaz appeal, as after their "divorce", Mr. Sallaz came to question the existence of a marriage, 
and now properly challenging the existence of a "marriage" and findings of "community 
property". Those are central issues in the Sallaz divorce appeal. As a matter of law, the 
Magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction, a fundamental element which can never be waived, 
and the statutory language of Idaho law, §§32-201, 209, 301 and 309, Idaho Code, are front and 
center of this dispute, as those statutes require the "existence" of a "certificate of marriage", or 
"marriage license", to create subject matter jurisdiction before you can establish the existence of 
a valid and lawful ma1riage in Idaho. 
It has always been one of the strongest public policies of the state of Idaho that "the law 
presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not 
bastardy, every intendment of the law leans to matrimony." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 127, 645 P. 2d 356, 361 (1982), citing to Mauldin v. Sunshine Mining 
Co., 61 Idaho 9, 17, 97 P. 2d 608, 611 (1939). Notwithstanding the strong public policy that 
favors the recognition of ma1riage, as a direct consequence of the Idaho Legislature's abolition of 
any further recognition of common-law marriage after January 1, 1996, it also has become the 
recognized public policy of Idaho that time that any marriage into without a valid 
marriage license is absolutely void. In Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho 777, 102 P. 3d 1096 
the Idaho Supreme Court 
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"The legislature of each state has the power to control and to regulate marriages 
within its jurisdiction. This includes the power to regulate the qualifications of the 
contracting parties in proceedings essential to constitute a marriage. J; Duncan v. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co., 83 Idaho 254, 260, 360 P. 2d 987, 990 (1961). By the amendments 
made in 1995, the Idaho legislature has clearly required a license in order to have a valid 
mamage. Idaho Code §32-201 expressly states, "Consent alone will not constitute 
mamage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and a solemnization as 
authorized and provided by law." Both the issuance of the license and solemnization are 
required. Idaho Code §32-301 states, on and after January 1, 1996 a marriage contracted 
or entered into in violation of the provisions of this title shall be void." The provisions of 
Title 32, Idaho Code, require both the issuance of a license and solemnization. The duties 
of the officiating officer were also amended to provide that he or she must "first require 
the presentation of a marriage license." Again, that is consistent with the clear legislative 
intent that a marriage license is required in order to have a valid marriage. Because the 
parties in this case chose not to obtain a marriage license, there purported maniage 
violated the provisions of Title 32, Idaho Code, and is therefore void. Idaho Code §32-
301. They were never married. Therefore the magistrate judge correctly dismissed Dire' s 
divorce action. 
140 Idaho at 779, 102 P. 3d at 1098. See also, Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 206, 560 P. 2d 
876, 877 (1977) (noting the existence of a void marriage ceremony in 1965 followed by a valid 
marriage in 1970). 
If a divorce decree is entered without the required subject matter jurisdiction that 
judgment is "void." See State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 244 P.3d 1244 (2010), wherein the 
Court declased with respect to void judgments as a result of the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction: 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or 
class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007). The 
source of this power comes from Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." IDAHO CONST., 
art. V, § 20. This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions, that subject 
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to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit clause the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978). This Court exercises free review over questions of jurisdiction. Doe, 147 Idaho at 327, 208 P.3d at 731. 
150 Idaho at 162-63, 244 P.3d at 1248-49 (emphasis added). The Nebraska Supreme Court has 
applied this principle to divorce judgments in, Ryan v. Ryan, 600 N.W.2d 739 (Neb.1999): 
Nevertheless, res judicata will not preclude a second suit between the same parties if the forum in which the first action was brought did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the action; stated another way, judgments entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction are void and subject to collateral attack. See, Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992) (applying this rule in action to enforce void dissolution of marriage judgment); Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955) (holding that divorce decree issued by court without subject matter jurisdiction was not res judicata as to any issue purported to have been raised therein); Koch v. County of Dakota, 151 Neb. 506, 38 N.W.2d 397 (1949) (holding that judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction may not be used as basis of application of res judicata). See, also, 50 C.J.S. Judgment§ 702 (1997). 
600 N.W.2d at 688. 
The rule in Idaho is that a party can move to set aside a void judgment at any time. In the 
Sallaz divorce case, it is now on appeal, and the question of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, 
as it can be raised at any time - even for the first time on appeal, State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 
832, 264 P.3d 935, 939 (2011). 
The general rule is that a motion to set aside a judgment as "void" under Rule 60(b)(4) 
can be brought at any time. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009) 
Hansen hold for the proposition that 'void judgments can be attacked at any time.' See Burns v. 
Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 402, 508 (2003)."). A judgment can be declared void only 
for defects in personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or if the court's action amounts to "a plain 
usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." Id. In the Sallaz appeal, the 
magistrate court's subject matter jurisdiction over the parties is put at issue. See State v. Housel, 
140 Idaho 96, 101, 90 P.3d 321, 326 (2004). In addition, the appeal presents a question 
there has been a fundamental denial of due process as to all the interested parties in respect to the 
matters affecting Real LLC, as as denial of an opportunity below to present 
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evidence as to the existence of a marriage license between Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird under 
Oregon law, which is a requirement under Idaho law. LC.§ 32-209. 
In Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Cas. Co., Idaho 193, 108 P.3d 340 
(2005) the Court, in reliance upon its earlier decision in McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 
P.3d 833 (2003), declared the due process aspect of a void judgment: 
A judgment is also void where it is entered in violation of due process because the party was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P.2d 910 (1963) (judgment void where trial court entered judgment against makers of note without giving makers an opportunity to present evidence regarding their affirmative defense of lack of consideration). See also, Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950 P.2d 1257 (1998) (default judgment void where parties whose attorney had withdrawn did not serve upon them a copy of the order which contained notice that judgment by default could be entered if they did not appear in action within twenty-one days). 
Oregon has long required a marriage license, as a prerequisite to a valid marriage. Oregon 
does not recognize "common law" marriage, as Idaho once did before it's was legislatively 
changed on January 1, 1996. The investigation by Mr. Sallaz confirmed not only was the 
"person" presiding over their "ceremony" in Portland, Oregon, not qualified under Oregon law to 
perform a "matrimonial" service, but the Oregon Department of Vital Statistics, and all County 
agencies throughout the entire State of Oregon have never issued or received any "certificate of 
marriage" or "marriage license" to establish a lawful marriage between the parties in Oregon. 
Oregon has provided official disclosures from their official Records to confirm that undisputed 
fact. 
As the evidence will demonstrate in this case, before the "divorce" action was filed by 
Ms. Baird in 2004, Mr. Sallaz had allowed Ms. Baird to become his "manager" in ce1iain matters, 
including his law office and certain business entities, as she wanted to demonstrate her "loyalty" 
and "commitment" to him, and develop her clerical skills. Ms. Baird's background was that of a 
former bartender, and a backhoe operator, and Mr. Sallaz wanted to advance her skills, once she 
was to become his "wife". However, once Mr. Sallaz experienced ongoing difficulty with her, 
they separated in 2003. 
When Ms. Baird vacated the Sallaz residence and his m 2003, up 
residency in the 15584 Riverside Road residence, one of the subject properties to be developed 
by Real Homes, LI ,C. She took computers from office, which contained documents and 
- COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PRE-TRIAL 
6 
office files. These computers were an integral part of the law office. Scott Gatewood sent a letter 
to Baird, instructing return of all computers and files, or suffer the consequence of a theft 
Following from Gatewood, Ms. Baird staged a "burglary" at that Riverside 
residence, filed a police report, and claimed those computers and files were "stolen" from the 
residence. Before claiming the theft, however, she entered the word document format on the 
computer, and modified the original "Operating Agreement" of Real Homes LLC. She failed, 
however, to "alter" all of the critical areas within the document. Mr. Becker has relied "entirely" 
upon her "modified" version of the Operating Agreement, as the "backbone" of his theory that the 
person signing for Real Homes, LLC, was not authorized, as Ms. Baird never executed the 
document as the "sole member" of the LLC. The record, however, will show Ms. Baird was 
nowhere shown to be a "member" of Real Homes, LLC, other than within the fabricated 
"Operating Agreement" she created when she took the computers. 
Her "burglary", documents and confirms she had taken the computers from the office, and 
establishes "when" and how this altered document came about. It remains an interesting 
observation that she would suggest the instruments "mysteriously" disappeared from her 
possession, and sought to leave the impression Mr. Sallaz "retrieved" his computers from her. 
Had it been true, Mr. Sallaz could have easily demonstrated the creation of the fabricated 
document with electronic technicians, who would quickly find the digital footprints of the 
"modifications", and be able to identify exactly when and what they were, compared to the 
original format. It is that same mentality, accusing him of "stealing his own computers", that 
fueled her false accusation Mr. Sallaz came to the house and stole his own horse trailer, and hid it 
in a potato cellar owned by his "good friend", Mr. Rice, in Marsing, Idaho. Ms. Baird would 
choose to ignore the fact she was the one who not only possessed the horse trailer, but also had 
the only equipment to move it, and we later discovered she entered into various "arrangements" 
with Mr. Rice, hoping to compromise Mr. Sallaz's law license, as a vengeful attempt to hurt him. 
Ms. Baird received the insurance proceeds from that "missing" horse trailer, and we understand 
she obtained possession of the horse trailer as well. 
Ms. Baird was initially successful, with the help of Mr. Rice, to cause criminal to 
be filed against Mr. Sallaz, claiming "Grand Theft", due to the "disappearance" of the horse 
trailer, but later it was confirmed Jvir. Sallaz vvas not involved. 
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investigation the 
charges to be dismissed with prejudice, and expunged the charge from the record, and the State 
vindicated Mr. Sallaz. (See State v. Sallaz, Case Number CR 2010-0029076-C, with final 
dismissal with prejudice entered by the Court). 
This court needs to appreciate the "motive" of Ms. Baird, in order to accept the fact she 
not only is willing to fabricate documents, but also willing to commit pe1jury on a regular basis. 
Ms. Baird, being 20 years the junior to Mr. Sallaz, chose to develop her position their separation 
was the result of Sallaz having an affair, though quite the opposite was the truth, in keeping with 
the known course of events. It was only after their separation Mr. Sallaz discovered the missing 
computers and altered "Operating Agreement", where she was posturing to help herself 
financially, as no woman would want to return being a "backhoe operator", as most woman find 
little comfort in returning to such a lifestyle, or a bartender or barmaid, at her advancing age. 
In 2001, before their separation in 2003, Mr. Sallaz formed Real Homes, LLC, intended 
for him and Mr. Glenn Trefren to pursue their partnership agreement, as addressed in the Sallaz 
and Trefren Affidavits submitted in opposition to the Summary Judgment. Sallaz filed the 
Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2001, identifying himself as 
the authorized agent, and declaring Ms. Baird his "manager", as she wanted to be his "clerical 
helper". Glenn Trefren was a close friend and business associate of Mr. Sallaz for many years, 
and prior to the formation of Real Homes, LLC, he was the one who found these several 
properties, and by his agreement with Mr. Sallaz, he acquired and deeded those properties with 
Mr. Sallaz, to the LLC, as described in the Sallaz and Trefren Affidavits. Sallaz and Trefren were 
long term business partners, and wanted to use Real Homes, LLC, as their development vehicle, 
since their plan was to develop lots, and relocate a removed house from their highway expansion 
projects, move them onto those developed lots, and generate a market for the developed home-
sites with residences. The "members" for this LLC were Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren, as 
confirmed in their Affidavits. Sallaz would provide the funds; Trefren would perform the 
services associated with the relocation and the physical development of a finished residential 
facility. They each held a 50% member interest in Real Homes, LLC, and Ms. Baird, was never 
to be more than a "clerical" manager, acting for the benefit of Mr. Sallaz. After their separation 
2003, however, Mr. Sallaz saw the wisdom to remove her as his "manager", and in September, 
articles and filings Secretary of State, as identified in 
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D 
to the Smith Affidavit in the Summary Proceedings. In 2003, she was removed as a "manager", 
and the member-owners were shown to be Sallaz and Mr. with Trefren becoming the 
manager. 
It was during the divorce proceedings when Ms. Baird produced her own "version" of the 
"Operating Agreement" for Real Home, LLC. She claimed her version was the "original 
operating agreement" and from within its contents, she was claiming 100% ownership of the 
membership rights of Real Homes, LLC. The Sallaz appeal should ultimately confirm the 
Magistrate never had subject matter jurisdiction to render any decision, let alone create 
"community property interests" and address any "operating agreements" of an entity not a party to 
the action. The Magistrate lacked jurisdiction over Real Hornes, LLC, or Glenn Trefren, as 
neither was a party to the action. The Magistrate had no authority to address "operating 
agreements" or determine who its rnernber(s) were, as that was not an issue before it. 
Additionally, in their "divorce" proceedings, there was no evidence of any "contribution" made 
by Ms. Baird to justify a claimed right as a member, required under Idaho law. The "Operating 
Agreement" she created was a sham, and this court will be able to make a Finding as to the 
"authenticity" of the true "Operating Agreement" Mr. Rice and his counsel have chosen to rely 
upon the Baird version, which we address herein in detail. 
The "Operating Agreement" of Real Hornes, LLC was drafted by Mr. Sallaz, in 2001. It 
was uniquely drafted; not a "cam1ed" print from a boilerplate format where "one document fits all 
purposes" in the world of LLC's. Ms. Baird could never demonstrate she had ever purchased the 
properties or ever deeded them to the LLC; Mr. Trefren was the one who located both the houses 
and found the properties he deeded to the LLC. Ms. Baird, a former bartender and a former 
backhoe operator, had no savings, no credit, or capital resources from which to have the capital 
funding to undertake the development of several parcels of property and arrange for labor and 
talent to prepare for removal and relocation of residential structures, and then pay to relocate and 
prepare them for installation on other parcels of land. She had no ability to marshal talent or 
orchestrate a development project, having no idea how to secure building permits, meet plaIL11ing 
and zoning criteria, or meet the burden of agency requirements. Not only did Ms. Baird fail to 
have "$50,000" as she claimed when stating she was the sole "capital contribution" in the 
fabricated document, she had no financial means or deaiings with individuals who had sold 
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those properties and structures to Trefren, who transferred them to the LLC. Ms. Baird's "skills" 
were "clerical assistance", intending to assist Mr. Sallaz with delivery of documents to agencies, 
his process of developing these lots into marketable parcels of property. She was his 
"managing agent" for a time, but at no time did she ever become a "member" of the LLC. To 
have done so would have disrupted the agreement Mr. Sallaz had with Mr. Trefren, and would 
have upset the equation upon which their arrangements were premised. 
This "operating agreement" as altered by Ms. Baird, contains the "tell-tale" signs 
throughout the document to confirm the fact there were "two members", "both males", and of 
great significance, it specifically mentioned Mr. Sallaz has a "member" of the LLC in section 
2.10, as she failed to read through the fine print in the document Mr. Sallaz had created. The 
effect of those tell-tale signs excluded Ms. Baird at every tum. Every reference to "member" is 
cited in the plural only; throughout the document, it states "the undersigned members", "the 
members", "each of the members", "other business of members", "unanimous vote of the 
members", "that the members shall make", "among the members", "such members pro rata 
share", "be approved by the members", and throughout the document there is never any reference 
to a "single" member. "Members", in the plural format, is cited not less than 75 times, and 
throughout the document the only "gender" referred to is the masculine gender, and never once is 
there reference to female gender or singular "member". Never is a member referred to as a "she" 
or "her". Not only were the "members" of the LLC masculine, but throughout the document it 
confirms there was always "two" members, beginning with the fact "it is the express intention of 
the members that the LLC be treated as a partnership for purposes of federal and state taxation", 
and the "members" are to take such action as they deem necessary "to ensure that this LLC be 
treated as a partnership". A "partnership" must have at least two people, and there cannot be a 
"partnership" with only one person, or one "member" in an LLC. Not only is the "masculine 
gender" used; not only are to be two people, but it then states there was an "equal contribution". 
The document provides that "each of the members, as his initial contribution, has contributed his 
undivided one half (1/2) interest in and to those certain two parcels of commercial real estate, 
more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto". The members, being two; the only 
gender, being masculine, is further confirmed by stating: each contributed "his" initial 
contribution, based upon '!hi~~undivided 1/2 interest, and that 
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to parcels of 
real estate acquired by Mr. Trefren, and financed by Mr. Sallaz, held in their names, not Ms. 
Baird. 
Mr. Sallaz wanted the classified and treated as a "partnership" for tax purposes, and 
went to great effort to emphasize that concept, and identified that intended purpose, and in the 
size that construction within paragraphs 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, as well as the initially expressed in 1.6. 
The emphasis of "partnership" treatment makes it mandatory there be two members, as otherwise 
such treatment would be unavailable. The document requires there were two members, and each 
had contributed his initial undivided one half interest in those parcels of commercial real estate. 
You cannot fit one member into that equation, when you must maintain partnership status for 
taxation status; you cannot create a one half "undivided" interest in commercial real property 
without a second member. Renee Baird didn't even own the car she was driving in 2001, let alone 
have an interest in commercial properties in 2001. 
Ms. Baird altered the document in three limited areas: she listed herself as the only 
member in paragraph 2.1, showing herself as having contributed $50,000, yet failing to change 
"their undivided one half interest" in the parcels of commercial real estate property as was 
described in Exhibit "A"; secondly, showed herself as the only "tax matters partner" in paragraph 
5.5, a clear contradiction to the fact there could be no "partners" if she were the sole member, and 
unable to take action to cause "each other member" to become a notice partner within the 
meaning of the federal code, since there would be no other member, could be no partnership, no 
such tax treatment, and no such need for a "tax matters partner" if just one member; and thirdly, 
she removed the signatures of Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren, placed herself as the "undersigned", 
yet failing to coffect the language where it refers to "constituting all the members of the LLC", 
when the only "logical" language in that context would be "constituting the sole member of the 
LLC". 
Ms. Baird failed to change the repeated reference to members, the repeated reference to 
the masculine gender, the reference to the initial contribution of each member's "undivided one 
half interest", and the overwhelming mandate to qualify the LLC as a gartnershJQ_for taxatio11 
purposes. She failed to change the references relating to the manners in which interests 
"members" are to be addressed in the event of dissolution, death, withdrawal, and purchase of the 
"other member's interest" demonstrating this operating agreement could only be construed to 
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have envisioned two equally sharing members, having contributed equally, with identified assets 
transferred by them. The greatest failure of Ms. Baird was overlooking paragraph 2.10 which 
it clear Ms. engaged fabrication to defraud Sallaz, Mr. Trcfren, and the 
judicial system. She failed to modify that very critical paragraph tll.at confirms Mr. Sallaz is one 
of the "male gender members", as he is specifically identified in paragraph 2.10, which states: "in 
the event the LLC suffers any loss which is compensable through the title insurance obtained by 
member, Dennis J. Sallaz. any payments made under such policies will be paid to Dennis J. 
Sallaz, and not the LLC". 
The court can readily see Dennis J. Sallaz is "identified" even in her version of the 
Operating Agreement as having always been a "member" in Real Homes, LLC, documented by 
the continuing existence of paragraph 2.10 in her "altered" Operating Agreement itself. The court 
will not allow the Alternative Plaintiff, Real Properties, LLC, to argue Mr. Sallaz was not a 
member of Real Homes, LLC, as he was always a member from the date of its formation, along 
with his partner, Mr. Trefren, and Ms. Baird was never a member, and never intended to become 
such. Mr. Trefren is the person who is to be treated as the "partner", for all federal and state tax 
purposes. 
Neither Sallaz or Trefren were ever paid for their interest when they deeded their 
undivided one half interest to Real Homes, LLC, as their "payment" was to be processed in the 
form of an equal member of the LLC. 
Mr. Trefren worked extensively for Mr. Rice after this sale, agreeing to do the work 
necessary to enable Mr. Rice (as manager of Real Properties, LLC) to finish the project and pay 
for his service, and the contract balance as agreed. Mr. Rice, on behalf of Real Properties, LLC, 
had obtained a title policy, regarding a title search of the properties in this transaction, becoming 
familiar with Ms. Baird's initial claim of an ownership interest recorded on February 11, 2004. 
Since the sale, the insurance company has never been tendered a claim upon any theory of fraud, 
breach of warranty, or any title dispute. It truly would be difficult for Mr. Rice to ever assert a 
claim to a title insurance company, as Real Properties, LLC has taken title to the properties, 
transferred title to 15584 Riverside Road to Renee Baird, and transferred the other properties to 
Ada Properties, LLC, another entity controlled by him. The conveyance to Ms. Baird was made 
in exchange for her release her claims. Mr. Rice had 
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any Litle issues, which he was 
obligated to do, and elected to do so by virtue of his dealings with Ms. Baird, as was his 
obligation under the terms of the agreement, as the agreement made clear the "buyer" was to 
satisfy all encumbrances record, and Ms. Baird's encumbrance always of record, known 
to him and the world, almost two years before the purchase agreement was made, having first 
been recorded in Canyon County on February 11, 2004. 
Though Ms. Baird filed "annual reports" on behalf of the LLC with the Secretary of State, 
both before and after separation, never in any of those filings did she ever attempt to claim to be 
a "member", but rather portrayed herself at times as a "secretary" or a "president" of Real Homes, 
LLC. She did this initially for the year preceding the separation in 2002, and thereafter in 2003 
and 2004, even after she had been removed as manager. Idaho law has reference to "officers", 
"secretaries", and "presidents" in corporations, but we have only "members" and "managers" in 
an LLC. These filings are the creativity of Ms. Baird, acting as a lay person. Only after Mr. Sallaz 
came to discover these false filings, did he file "corrected" and amended articles and annual 
reports, and listed Mr. Trefren as "manager" and as a "co-owner", since Mr. Trefren was a 50% 
member, and was then designated to be the official manager of the LLC, from September 3, 2003 
on, and to the present date, he was the only authorized person to execute an agreement with Real 
Properties, LLC. Mr. Rice was aware of those official and public filings as well, years before the 
agreement was entered into, and any representations made were based upon the existence of 
those filings, which confirmed Ms. Baird was no longer a manager after 2003, as she was 
removed from that position in 2003, and Trefren became the manager, showing Sallaz and 
Trefren the only members and co-owners of the LLC membership interests by the official filings. 
Since the Judgment of the "divorce" courts remains on appeal, there is no basis to apply 
the legal doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or argue claim or issue preclusion on 
those matters regarding the "members" of the LLC, or the validity of the "Operating Agreement" 
of Real Homes, LLC. Those are issues to be determined by this court in this case. 
W11en the Appeal was taken in the divorce action, Ms. Baird's counsel withdrew from the 
case; Ms. Baird secured Bankruptcy Counsel, and filed her Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in 
Federal Court. Mr. Sallaz secured an order, lifting the Automatic Stay so his appeal could 
proceed to the Supreme Court. 
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The Quitclaim Deed Ms. Baird executed and recorded in Canyon County, against one of 
parcels of Real Homes, LLC, in February 2004, was later supplemented with her lis pendens, 
on 2006, following testimony the sale of Real Homes, LLC, and the interests of Sallaz 
and Trefren to Real Properties, LLC, given on July 21, 2006. Ms. Baird has had a cloud on 
parcel(s) of the LLC property since February, 2004, claiming some level of ownership by virtue 
of a "conveyance" she caused by Quitclaim deed, in her efforts to either create a "community 
property interest", or otherwise obtain an interest in the prope11y to secure a loan. This Deed was 
identified in the Title Report Mr. Rice had requested and obtained by D.L. Evans Bank, and Jim 
Ronnell, and later pursued his options as to how he would deal with it with Steven Palleson, 
Michael Spink, and also with Daniel Reiss. 
Sallaz, Trefren and Mr. Rice himself testified at the "divorce" trial, confirming their 
beliefs who were members of the LLC. Though Ms. Baird testified she was the sole member by 
her "Operating Agreement", and had a "community interest" in properties, she could never 
demonstrate holding an interest in any properties conveyed to Real Homes, LLC, or how the 
"undivided interest" was addressed, repeatedly mentioned in the operating agreement. The idea of 
a "community interest" between Ms. Baird and Mr. Sallaz became a point of contention, but at no 
time was Real Homes, LLC, made a party to the action, and had Judge Epis read the "Operating 
Agreement" presented by Ms. Baird, he would have seen paragraph 2.10 destroys Ms. Baird's 
credibility entirely, as it contradicted her testimony of a single member theory. The Divorce 
Court did conclude in its Findings it did not have jurisdiction over the LLC in the first place. 
This sale took place while the divorce trial was ongoing, and occurred almost two years 
pnor to the Court's evolving Findings. Real Homes, LLC, was faced with a foreclosure 
proceeding from Saxton Farms, and Mr. Rice initially wanted to loan money to Mr. Sallaz to cure 
the default, but Saxton farms refused to allow the default to be cured after the statutory time, so 
Mr. Rice later decided he wanted to purchase Real Homes, LLC and its properties, using a new 
LLC to make the purchase, Real Properties, LLC, which he had formed on January 4, 2006, using 
the services of Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc. to make the entity. Mr. Rice wanted Real 
Properties, LLC, to purchase the Real Homes entity, its assets, and Sallaz and Trefren interests, 
and he wanted 2 years to pay Sallaz and Trefren. Mr. Rice was fully aware of the claimed 
"community interests" of Ms. Baird and the claim to membership 
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by Baird. Mr. 
Rice, an astute businessman, owning and operating pawnshops, vehicle dealerships and business 
investments, closely watched the separation and "divorce" unfold, and testified in the "divorce" 
to address the purchase, confirmed Title Report, and the search efforts 
undertaken. He employed the services of Steven Palleson, Michael Spink, and later the 
involvement of Daniel Reiss. Mr. Rice knew the entire history of both the limited liability 
company and the wave of hatred in the "divorce" proceedings, and not only did he testify the 
reasons he wanted to buy the LLC assets, and Sallaz-Trefren interests, but directly addressed 
questions of the Magistrate on the opportunity to rescind the sale, and get his money back. 
Specifically, on July 21, 2006, Roy Rice took the stand and testified under oath in the Sallaz v. 
Sallaz case, regarding his knowledge of the adverse claim to the title on properties and the 
claimed interests by Ms. Baird. Mr. Rice testified he was aware of the claims made by Ms. Baird; 
that he was "waiting for all of the dust to clear and everything else", but realized he had to act 
when he did to avoid the foreclosure action on the Trust Deed that otherwise would take place 
because of the interest of Saxton Farms, as they were about to foreclose on their Deed of Trust. 
There was only two days remaining, and if the sale proceeded, Saxton Farms would own that 
parcel, and he wanted it for himself. He would not back out of the sale, and he would not rescind 
the Real Properties, LLC, purchase transaction. He said, it was a "very, very good business 
venture; it was never a loan". Mr. Rice insisted on the purchase, as he knew Sallaz and Trefren 
logically would be the two members who had undivided interests, he knew Ms. Baird had no 
former interest to give the LLC, and her recorded claims were without consideration, and he 
testified, as identified the transcript, P. 66, L.13-P. 68, L.l; P.29, L.l-P.32, L.22; P.29, L.25-P.30, 
L.4; P.32, L.22; P. 38, L.3-P. 40, L.8; P.38, L.L.3-8; P.39, L.16-P.42, L.8. 
Mr. Rice testified on the subject in the following mam1er: 
Mr. Rice: I mean, it was either close this thing or lose it. I mean, it was a good business 
opportunity, and it was ... 
The Court: Along those lines, did you ever get a title report before you -
Mr. Rice: oh yes, uh-huh. 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAJMALVfS' PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
15 
The Court: Did the title report reveal to you that there may be some other owners of this property 
besides Real Homes? 
Mr. Rice: Everything was researched by D.L. Evans Bank. 
The Court: And did you look at the title report before you bought it? 
Mr. Rice: Yes. 
The Court: What did you who did you rely on in determining whether Real Homes had the 
property, or not, in their name? 
Mr. Rice: Jim Ronnell of D.L. Evans Bank. 
The Court: If you were paid back the sums that you have paid out, would you be willing to 
rescind the sale? 
Mr. Rice: No, simply because this was done as a business thing. This was not done as a loan. 
This was done as a business venture; and it is a very, very good business venture. 
It was because of the refusal of Mr. Rice to rescind the sale on July 21, 2006, that Ms. 
Baird's attorney, Debra Eismann, filed the lis pendens on July 25, 2006, four days after he 
testified. The actual encumbrance process started in 2004, before the divorce began, and made of 
record and remained of Record in the Canyon County Court Recorder's office, two years before 
the sale to Real Properties, LLC, as identified in the title reports. 
Given the fundamental issues with the appeal, regarding not only the Magistrate's lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the lack of authority to address members of Real Homes, LLC, and a 
finding of a "marriage", without any documentary evidence of a marriage license, the effects of 
§§32-201, 301 and 309, Idaho Code, the Supreme Court will likely void the entire rnling of the 
Magistrate, but it's that being said, Mr. Rice the managing agent of Real Properties, LLC, was 
fully aware of the Baird claims, assumed any obligations and encumbrances of record, and agreed 
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to accept the need to clear any dispute of record to title under the terms of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement. 
The testimony of Mr. Rice confirms not only was he aware of the dispute, claimed 
interests, clouds, and encumbrances created by Ms. Baird since 2004, he had various third patiies 
give him opinions on how to deal with her, including his agent at D.L. Evans Bank, Mr. Jim 
Ronnell before the purchase, and the assessment by Steven Palleson, Michael Spink, a retained 
attorney, and his alliance with Daniel Reiss, and Alex Lopez after the sale, in his efforts to 
address Baird's claim in the LLC and some of the real property. He thought the Quiet Title 
Action to be the best avenue at first, but elected to settle with her, as was his right to do as well. 
No one could ever claim any aspect of Baird's claim(s), the pending foreclosure or any 
elements of the sale were hidden or concealed from anyone, as everything was laid out and fully 
disclosed, as well as made part of the public record. Sellers always maintained their support and 
continuing agreement to work with Mr. Rice, but Mr. Rice had to do "something" as the 2 year 
grace period to pay had come due, and Sellers were entitled to be paid in full. Mr. Rice knew he 
had to commence an action to clear Baird's long standing cloud on the title, and consequently, 
Messrs. Rice, Trefren, Sallaz, Runft and Becker worked together, intending to clear her cloud to 
the real property, thereby allowing sales of the properties, to use those funds to make payment to 
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, rather than using his other investment funds. 
This Quiet Title Action was ultimately "derailed", as Mr. Rice chose to unde1iake a 
settlement with Ms. Baird. Mr. Rice had taken the position he would rather settle with Baird and 
give her the residence at 15584 Riverside ( one lot), and in exchange for her release of the other 
assets, rather than invest further in the litigation. Mr. Rice, however, then refused to pay what he 
owed to Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, after he settled with her, and we found he has allowed his 
longtime "girlfriend", Skye Hallett, to reside in the residence at 714 Smith, and then transferred 
title to the remaining properties to his other entity, Ada Properties, LLC. Consequently, by virtue 
of his settlement, Real Properties, LLC, got clear title to all parcels, but for 15584 Riverside 
which he gave to Baird, and Mr. Rice now thinks he can avoid Real Prope1iies obligation to pay, 
by asserting a claim that Sellers breached the warranties contained in the Agreement, despite the 
fact Real Properties LLC, now holds unencumbered title to all properties but the one he gave to 
Ms. Baird to settle the litigation, and transferred the properties to Ada Properties, LLC, so as to 
- COUNTERCLA11v1ANTS' PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
17 
Real Properties, LLC, judgment proof. Mr. Rice not only has "unclean hands" in this 
equitable claim, but his own contract required Real Properties, LLC to assume all encumbrances 
which Baird was among them. He has failed to return any of the property, has allowed 
his girlfriend to reside in one residence for years, won't pay the contract balance or debts, and 
due to this non-performance, Mr. Sallaz was required to pay one of the "assumed" debts under 
the agreement, to avoid default and loss of the property. Mr. Rice continues in his refusal even to 
rescind the agreement in any manner, and Mr. Rice, now acting though his "Alternative 
Plaintiff", Real Properties, LLC, has now chosen to disingenuously claim, upon the advice of 
counsel, that's Sellers are in a breach of "warranty" on a debt he was infinitely aware and thought 
would resolve with time. 
Mr. Rice is equitably estoppel to make a claim when he refused to rescind the sale, 
knowing everything he knew about the existence of Ms. Baird's claims stemming back to 2004, 
along with the assumption of the known encumbrances. He is not only estopped to make a claim 
by virtue of quasi estoppel, he is also bound to assume the encumbrances of Record, and agreed 
to hold "sellers harmless" from all recorded and known interests. Mr. Rice went to Ms. Baird to 
make a deal to settle her long standing claims, and he instructed Runft and Becker to settle with 
her, avoid the cost of litigation, and get clear title to the rest of the parcels conveyed to Real 
Properties, LLC, and to this day he controls those assets in Ada Properties, LLC. 
Mr. Rice's continuing efforts (as the managing agent of Real Properties, LLC) to avoid 
paying what is owed under the terms of the contract, is the only ongoing act of a continuing 
"breach", a clear breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in contractual matters. Mr. Rice 
made all decisions, including his decision to refuse the offer of rescission by Judge Epis, as a 
way to avoid Ms. Baird: He at all times had a full understanding of where he was and what he 
was doing from the inception, and then choosing to settle with Ms. Baird, and transfer the assets 
to Ada Properties, LLC, was his "business interest" way of avoiding the contract balance. He has 
no breach of warranty claim, and has demonstrated repeatedly he had unclean hands in these 
dealings. Defendants are entitled to specific performance in the payment of the contract balance, 
with interest, along with attorney fees and all costs of suit, or some method of return of the 
properties or recovery for the unjust emichment gleaned by Rice, Real Properties, LLC, and his 
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Ada Properties, LLC, along with a oney judgment for 
counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of Septe 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Dennis J. Sallaz 
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Attorney for Defendants Glenn Trefren and CounterClaimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, ) 
husband and wife, REAL HOMES, ) Case No. CV 09-11855 
LLC and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, ) 
An Idaho Limited Liability Company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants, ) 
) POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
vs. ) 
) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, and ) 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND ) 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, An Idaho Limited ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Defendants/CounterClaimants. ) 
___________ ) 
1. IN GENERAL 
Plaintiffs should be chastised for bringing an action wherein they seek to declare a 
contract valid and enforceable, yet not calling their own party plaintiff as a witness to 
advance their case in chief, and then only to find when he is called by Defendants to 
testify, that he does so in a one-hundred-eighty degree change from his verified 
pleadings, now claims that he had never read the contract, and that there has never been 
a meeting of the minds. 
Plaintiff's position, for approximately three and five-sixths of the four years this 
case has been pending, was an aggressive attitude that Defendants 
warranty of title, in that Real Homes, LLC, was owned or controlled . In 
DU 
the past month, however, (after apparently being talked out of the warranty of title issue 
by his counsel), Plaintiff decided it was now best to just say that he had not read the 
Plaintiff, Roy Rice, has always been "an astute businessman." The contract, 
Exhibit 41, is a three page document. Plaintiff insisted on several changes being made to 
it before he signed it on January 6, 2006.. He read it. Now, however, he just does not 
want to comply with its terms. 
A rather low point was reached when Mr. Becker insisted, in one of his pre-trial 
briefs filed this past fall, that the court should have police present to arrest Mr. Sallaz 
when he appeared, in order to charge him with various felonies. Mr. Becker sought to 
threaten Defendants in every way he could in his attempt to avoid this trial, but he feared 
dismissal and the resultant exposure to attorneys fees and costs. None of these felonies 
were proven, nor even alluded to, at trial. 
The assignment made by Mr. Sallaz to Mr. Trefren, as a security measure, has no 
effect on Plaintiffs' total failure to prove their case in any fashion. 
2. The Contract 
As mentioned, the contract was three pages long. Both Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren 
testified that the negotiations went on for some time, changes were made, and the 
contract was finally signed on January 6, 2006, after a further lengthy session and 
discussion (of the "global" objective of buying the properties and deploying other 
properties on an equal share basis) in Mr. Sallaz' office. Mr. Sallaz testified that he had 
originally written in a personal guaranty for Mr. Rice's signature, and Mr. Rice insisted it 
be taken out, looking him in the eye and saying, "You can trust me, Denny." Mr. Rice 
testified he brought in the $63,402.82, in some unmemorable form, on January 6, 2006. 
Mr. Sallaz was clear on the point that he did not receive the check to Saxton, and take it 
Saxton until just hours before the foreclosure deadline, which was on January 16, 
The Idaho Supreme Court held, in 1925, and continues to hold, that: 
Where parties have entered into a contract of agreement which has been 
reduced to writing, if the same is complete upon its face and unambiguous, 
no fraud or mistake being alleged, parol evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to 
contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the written 
contract. 
Milner v. Earl Fruit Company of the Northwest, 40 Idaho 339 (Idaho 1925), 232 
Pac. 581. 
3. Relief Requested 
Mr. Sallaz testified that, in spite of his view that all parties agreed to the terms of 
the contract, and the contract was what all parties wanted, he would be willing to 
relinquish his contract position "if I could get my land back." 
If the Court finds that a contract existed and it has been breached by simple non-
payment, that conclusion is pretty easy. Otherwise, relief in the form of unjust enrichment 
must be awarded by the Court. 
4. Trefren's Counterclaim 
Glen Trefren and Tradesman filed the counterclaims against Plaintiffs for specific 
performance and unjust enrichment as well as for recovery for services rendered after the 
execution of the contract dated January 6, 2006. These services were rendered in 
relation to a three-way partnership consisting of Trefren, Sallaz and Rice, as the "global 
development project," including the Melba property which was purchased using Riverside 
and Smith as collateral. The initial services comprised the improvement of the real 
property located at 714 Smith in Nampa, which realty was part of the January 6, 2006 
transaction, and was immediately pledged to generate funds to purchase the Melba 
In the partnership, Rice was to provide the money (which he did, as far as 
materials and labor went), Sallaz was to provide the paperwork, as needed, and Trefren 
was to do the work to improve the property, which he did for approximately three months, 
before Mr. Rice chose to take a different tack. 
A partnership can be formed, according to the Idaho Code, as follows: 
§53-3-202. FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIP 
In determining whether a partnership is formed, the following rules apply: 
Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common 
property, or part ownership does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the co-
owners share profits made by the use of the property. 
The sharing of gross returns does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the 
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from which 
the returns are derived. 
A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a 
partner in the business, unless the profits were received in payment: 
Of a debt by installments or otherwise; 
For services as an independent contractor or of wages or other compensation to an 
employee; 
Of rent; 
Of an annuity or other retirement or health benefit to a beneficiary, representative, or 
designee of a deceased or retired partner; 
Of interest or other charge on a loan, even if the amount of payment varies with the 
profits of the business, including a direct or indirect present or future ownership of the 
collateral, or rights to income, proceeds, or increase in value derived from the 
collateral; or 
For the sale of the goodwill of a business mother property by installments or 
otherwise. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Trefren, together with Sallaz and Rice, fits very nicely 
into this statutory definition of partnership. And what about three months later, when Rice 
summarily terminated his commitment under the partnership, without paying Trefren for 
the work he did? Rice is liable for the value of Trefren's services, which Trefren has 
testified to be at least $30,000.00. 
Trefren's claim, for these benefits received by Mr. Rice, is not that of a general 
contractor. In this arrangement he is not required to be registered under Idaho Code Title 
54. Chapter 52. He rendered his contribution as a partner to the unnamed partnership, 
which was abandoned wrongfully by Mr. Rice, and Mr. Trefren must be paid. 
The court will also recall that Plaintiffs sued Mr. Trefren for $30,000.00 for the 
purchase of lumber and materials which plaintiff claimed in his complaint that he was 
unable to use, together with a claim for the payment of property taxes over the years. 
However, Plaintiff did not even attempt to mention nor offer any proof in support of these 
claims, which is further support for the Court to award Defendants attorney's fees against 
Mr. Rice. 
5. Costs and Attorney's Fees 
Defendants are clearly entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees against 
each of the Plaintiffs, including both Roy and Janet Rice, individually, and not just a "dry" 
award against Real Properties, LLC, which has chosen to render itself judgment proof by 
the property transfers it made to Ada Properties, LLC. It was Roy Rice who carried on 
this multi-faceted lawsuit, at first claiming a breach of warranty of title from Real 
Properties, LLC, eventually dismissing most of it, and then making a new claim 
throughout trial that there was no contract, in spite of his signature thereto, his transfer of 
all the properties, and retaining all of the benefits. l recommend to the court a reading of 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746 (Idaho 2008), 185 P.3d 258, which contains a 
major discussion of the attorney fees issue by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
And when we see a plaintiffs case-in-chief as we saw this one, where their only 
witnesses were Dennis Sallaz and his 'ex-wife' (in common, not exact parlance), what 
are we to think about the Plaintiffs' claim of a breach of contract and their non-
established claim of damages? I think plaintiffs have been wasting the time of the court 
and of these defendants, and should pay attorneys fees, not only pursuant to §12-120(3), 
Idaho Code, but also under §12-121, Idaho Code, as well as Rule 11 sanctions. 
6. Adoption of Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Final Argument Presentation 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC, adopt in full the Final Argument and authority filed by Vernon K. Smith, Esq., on 
behalf of Dennis Sallaz, and over the signatures of Iver J. Longeteig and Vernon K. 
Smith. 
December 20, 2013 (~n~ i 
, lVE~GETEIG ;;f</\1 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Glen Trefren and Tradesman Construction, LLC 
I hereby certify that on December 20, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served upon the following by U. S. Mail: 
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1020 W. Main, Ste. 400 
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401 W. Front, Ste. 302 
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Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Iver J. Longeteig (ISB 1051) 
5304 Turrett 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 342-5995 
U'V0JLLUUv. (208) 424-6972 
Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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and REAL PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an ) 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, ) 
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Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
) vs. 
) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, ) 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS ) 
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho ) 
Limited Liability Company, ) 
) 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. ) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The above action came on for trial, sitting without a jury, commencing November 20, 
2013, concluding November 26, 2013, and the Parties thereupon were afforded the opportunity 
to submit written final argument and post-trial memorandums, regarding pending motions made 
at the conclusion of Alternative Plaintiffs case, for involuntary dismissal of their only remaining 
claim- "Count V," and to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, made at the 
completion of Defendants'/ Counterclaimants' presentation of evidence. 
B. SUMMARY OF THE CLAIMS PRESENTED 
The primary claim of Plaintiffs that was to be presented to the Court at trial was the 
Alternative Plaintiffs' Count V claim for breach of contract. A competing breach of contract 
claim had been stated by the Counterclaimants. Each of these breach of contract claims involved 
disputed issues of fact arising out of a real estate transaction that involved what have now come 
to be referred to as the Riverside properties and the Smith property, comprised of three parcels 
on Riverside, and one parcel on Smith, the latter actually consisting of three lots and a fully 
furbished house on Smith. Throughout this memorandum, these properties will be collectively 
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referred to as the four parcels, or otherwise referred to as the "Riverside" or "Smith" properties 
for convenient reference herein. The single parcel of property that is located at 15584 Riverside, 
for time being is "owned" by Renee Baird, is not included within these four parcels, as 
it was "released" from the Riverside purchase by Saxton Fruit Farms in 2004, and it ultimately 
does not play any prominent role in the issues related to the resolution of this litigation. 
These remaining four parcels of property have all come under the control/ownership of 
Mr. Rice or one of his LLC entities. Collectively these properties, which were conveyed to him 
through Real Homes LLC in 2006, are now worth approximately $630,000. The only 
consideration that Mr. Rice has ever paid for these properties is the $63,402.82, which was for 
the satisfaction of the deed of trust foreclosure on the Riverside properties that was paid in 2006. 
The evidence presented at trial by the Alternative Plaintiffs failed to establish the 
existence of any contract involving Mr. Rice or Real Properties LLC and Renee Baird with Real 
Homes LLC. The evidence concerning both Renee Baird's involvement in Real Homes LLC, 
and her assignment and relinquishment of claims in respect to the 15584 Riverside property is 
ultimately nothing more than a sideshow in respect to the issues presented for decision by this 
Court. Nonetheless, it is a sideshow that must be understood in order for the Court to eliminate 
from consideration those issues that surround Renee Baird that have for so long dogged this 
litigation. 
Obviously, in the absence of any contract in support of Count V, there was no evidence 
of a breach, and certainly no evidence of any damages. Therefore the Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants have moved for a Rule 4l(b) involuntary dismissal of that Count V claim due 
to this absolute failure of proof. The Court is requested to dismiss Count V on that basis. 
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Notwithstanding Mr. Rice's repeated denials at his pre-trial depositions of the existence 
of "any" contract with any of the parties to this action concerning the properties in question, the 
or his entities, did receive the transfer of those properties from 
Real Hornes LLC, and that either he or those entities continue to own those properties up to the 
present time. Those contract conveyances and transactions were completed, except for the 
payment of compensation. All the necessary elements are present for a completed land sale 
contract such that specific performance in respect the payment of that compensation is an 
appropriate remedy. See, P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 
233, 159 P.3d 870 (2007). 
Even in the absence of proof of a contract, as based upon the evidence presented by the 
Alternative Plaintiffs, the Sallaz-Trefren Defendants/Counterclaimants have moved, pursuant to 
Rule 15(b) for an amendment of the pleadings, to allow for either implied contract recovery, as 
based upon either unjust emichment or quantum meruit. 
In sum, Mr. Rice and/or his LLC entities have received the benefit of the transfer of the 
Riverside and Smith properties, either as a matter of contract, or as a matter of implied contract, 
and Mr. Rice should now provide compensation to the Defendants/Counterclaimants for the 
benefit that he has received from that transaction, plus the payment of accrued interest, arising 
from that transfer. 
C. THE FAILURE OF THE ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS' 
COUNT V BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
1. The Alternative Plaintiffs Failed To Introduce Evidence Establishing A Contract 
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The Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys only called two witnesses to advance their flawed 
nrPCU'n of contract "claim" - first, Renee Baird, as a foundational witness for introduction of 
0 m""0 ''~ documents, and then Dennis J. Sallaz, as an adverse witness, and also to address 
documents for admission. 
Mr. Sallaz introduced Exhibit 41, the Purchase Agreement, which addressed the sale of 
"ownership interests," and that described the properties believed to be held by Real Homes, 
LLC. The Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys refused to produce any "factual basis" from which 
Exhibit 41 could become considered an "authorized," and therefore, "enforceable agreement." 
They knew its introduction could only be compared to Ms. Baird's documents, the effect of 
which would be to seal the impossibility of any theory they might advance in the furtherance of 
the existence of an enforceable agreement. 
That was done deliberately. Mr. Rice has denounced the existence of any agreement. He 
declared that he had never read or agreed to anything in the "Purchase Agreement." Mr. Rice 
was dead-set against acknowledging its validity. Mr. Rice refused to adopt any idea of an 
enforceable contract. He did not want to pay to the Defendants what he had agreed to pay to 
them. Nor does he want to pay the attorney fees that he owes Mr. Sallaz (which is an issue in the 
Ada County case). Nor does he want to meet the obligations that he owes to them in the "bigger" 
development venture, or that he committed to do in the "Reiss sale," which he entered into in 
October, 2006. Apparently as a general manner of doing business, Mr. Rice routinely and 
regularly denies his obligations! 
Consequently, the Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys only presented "Ms. Baird's version" 
of an operating agreement, knowing that meant "no enforceable contract," knowing that meant 
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no possibility of a breach, and ultimately knowing that meant no claim for any damages. Yes, 
to 
put his attorneys in that position. Nonetheless, they made the decision to go forward, 
to a non-suit claim for recovery of attorney fees. 
To summarize the exhibits that were introduced into evidence through the testimony of 
1. Exhibit 25: Articles of Organization of Real Homes, LLC, acknowledged 
to have been drafted by Dennis J. Sallaz and filed with the Secretary of 
State on January 19, 2001. 
2. Exhibit 24: The "Baird" version of the operating agreement of Real 
Homes, LLC, described by her as having been "drafted" solely by Dennis 
J. Sallaz, with possible involvement with his legal assistants. 
3. Exhibit 48: Annual Reports for Real Homes, LLC, filed for the years 
2002, 2003 and 2004 by Ms. Baird (showing her at times, as President). 
4 Exhibit 31: Deed of Trust by Dennis J. Sallaz and Renee Baird, in 
exchange for the loan made to them in the amount of $105,000.00 on 
February 18, 2004, secured by Trust Deed created on 15584 Riverside, the 
one "released" parcel of the four parcels of property purchased as the 
"Riverside" or "Lake" property, quit claimed to them, as husband and 
wife, by Renee Baird, acting as "president" of Real Hornes on February 
10, 2004 (Exhibit No. 28). 
5. Exhibit 33: Affidavit of Ms. Baird, filed with her Motion to dismiss the 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding filed by Glen Trefren in 2005. 
6. Exhibit 43: Quitclaim Deed issued March 2, 2009, by Mr. Sallaz, 
pursuant to Order of Magistrate Epis, who had sought to create in Ms. 
Baird a "community property interest" in property held in their names. 
7. Exhibit 45: Quitclaim Deed issued by Dennis J. Sallaz to Real Homes, 
LLC, on February 27, 2009. 
8. Exhibit 162: Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement signed by Rices, 
Baird, and agents of LLCs in August 2010. 
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9. Exhibit 156: Claim of Lien recorded in the Canyon County recorder's 
office July 27, 2005 by Glen Trefren. 
Dennis J. Sallaz on September 2003, with Idaho Secretary of State. 
11. Exhibit 157: Amended Claim of Lien recorded in the Ca.nyon County 
recorder's office by Glen Trefren July 22, 2005. 
12. Exhibit 159: Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale, rescheduling sale of 
Riverside parcels for January 16, 2006. 
13. Exhibit 28: Quitclaim Deed executed by Renee Baird, as "president" of 
Real Homes, LLC, releasing Real Homes' interest in 15584 Riverside on 
February 10, 2004 to Renee Baird and Dennis J. Sallaz, husband and wife. 
14. Exhibit 44: Quitclaim Deed executed by Dennis J. Sallaz to Roy Rice, 
quit claiming his interest in 15584 Riverside on March 2, 2009. 
15. Exhibit 49: Annual Statement filed in behalf of Real Homes, LLC with 
the Secretary of State by Dennis J. Sallaz on November 15, 2004. 
16. Exhibit 143: Bank statements of Real Homes, LLC for the month of 
March, 2004. 
17. Exhibit 144: Bank statement of Real Hornes, LLC for the month of April, 
2004. 
18. Exhibit 145: Bank statement of Real Hornes, LLC for the month of May, 
2004. 
19. Exhibit 146: Bank statement of Real Homes, LLC for the month of June, 
2004. 
Upon calling Mr. Sallaz, the following exhibits were introduced into evidence: 
1. Exhibit 41: Purchase Agreement dated January 6, 2006. 
2. Exhibit 42: Articles of Organization of Real Properties, LLC. 
3. Exhibit 39: Payment tendered to Saxton Fruit Farms to satisfy the Trust 
Deed sale in the amount of $63,402.82. 
FINAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DIS2l1L'1SAL OF ALTERNATIVE PLAilVTIFFS' COUNT V, AND A-10TI01V TO AME1VD 
PLEADINGS TO CONFORl.1 TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON COUNTERCLAIMS-PAGE 7 
4. Exhibit 1: Letter from Mr. Sallaz dated January 8, 2009, regarding his 
desire for Roy Rice to proceed with a Quiet Title Action against Ms. 
Baird, to remove her recorded Lis Pendens from certain parcels of 
5. Exhibit 38: Assignment by Dennis J. Sallaz to Glen Trefren, dated March 
10, 2006, assigning his interest in the agreement to assure Trefren he will 
be protected in his right to recovery. 
The Alternative Plaintiffs rested after the testimony by Ms. Baird and Mr. Sallaz and 
introduction of those exhibits. Thusly, the Court only had the Articles of Organization of Real 
Homes, LLC. (Exhibit 25), identifying Ms. Baird as the "manager," along with the "Baird" 
version of an Operating Agreement of Real Homes, LLC (Exhibit 24), identifying Ms. Baird as 
the only member of Real Homes, LLC. The "effect" of those two documents placed sole 
authority in her to act on behalf of Real Homes, LLC, and those documents would, as a result, 
serve to "invalidate" any other document that failed to bear her signature. That evidence -
standing alone - meant there could never be an "enforceable contract" - Exhibit 41 - that would 
convey any "ownership interests" in Real Homes, LLC, and describing the parcels of real 
property held by Real Homes, LLC. 
The evidence produced by Mr. Sallaz was the actual Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 41 ), 
which was signed by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, "co-owners" of Real Homes, and which Mr. 
Trefren signed on behalf of Real Homes, LLC. That document becomes inconsistent with the 
"Baird authority" allegedly advanced by Exhibits 24 and 25 (when not considering Exhibit A, as 
it was never presented as part of Plaintiffs' case). 
This Court is then left in the exact same position where it was when it first examined the 
Alternative Plaintiffs' claim in the summary judgment proceedings. In the summary judgment 
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proceedings, the "evidence" was being presented in the form of "affidavits" and "attachments," 
now these same documents (Exhibits 24, 25 and 41) are presented as exhibits. Those 
standing alone, to create a prima facie case for the creation a "valid," 
"binding," or "enforceable" agreement, as they are inconsistent. There is an absolute 
discontinuity between the alleged authorization of Baird to act on behalf of Real Homes and the 
actual documents as executed by Sallaz and Trefren. Quite simply, there was never any contract 
between Real Homes and Real Properties that was executed by Baird on behalf of Real Homes. 
In the absence of a contract, there can be no breach, nor any damages. 
In essence, Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys chose to do nothing more at trial than they 
did in the summary judgment proceedings. At the pre-trial depositions Mr. Rice repeatedly 
denied any agreement or any "meeting of the minds." Mr. Rice was unwilling to pay anyone 
under any agreement, or upon terms under any "Purchase Agreement." Mr. Rice's attorneys 
were aware of their dilemma. They were also aware of this Court's factual concerns, as first 
declared in July 2012 - 16 months before trial. 
Mr. Rice's attorneys could not change their theory in any fashion, simply because Mr. 
Rice was unwilling to pay the contract balance that he owed to the Defendants. Obviously 
Plaintiffs' attorneys had no place to go, as the Defendants would not agree to any dismissal 
without paying their attorney fees, and certainly not without receiving full payment under the 
Purchase Agreement being advanced in the Counterclaim. 
Because the evidence that was presented in Alternative Plaintiffs' case precluded the 
establishment of an enforceable agreement, they made no attempt to establish any particular 
breach as to any representation of a warranty on the properties held by Real Homes, and they 
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made no effort to establish in what manner any damages or loss had been sustained by Real 
Properties, Alternative Plaintiffs knew Ms. Baird would acknowledge that there was 
nothing was paid to her under their mutual settlement (Exhibit 162), 
which brings us to that point at which the "sideshow" that constitutes Renee Baird's involvement 
in this matter should be more fully explained. 
2. Renee Baird Was Never A "Member" Of Real Homes LLC 
As stated at the outset, although it is a bit of a "sideshow," it is nonetheless necessary to a 
full understanding of the claims made in this action, to also understand the nature and character 
of Renee Baird's involvement in those claims as made by the Alternative Plaintiffs, and why 
ultimately her involvement in both Real Homes LLC, and with 15584 Riverside property, is 
essentially irrelevant to any relief the Court may grant to the Defendants in this case. 
It was rather interesting to hear their "new theory" which was advanced by the 
Alternative Plaintiffs in their pretrial briefing, wherein they suggested that the "settlement 
agreement" which was entered into with Ms. Baird (see, Exhibit 162) constituted a "release," or 
was a "substitute" agreement, to that of the Purchase Agreement with the Defendants. For the 
sake of argument, it would appear to be somewhat "awkward" to suggest that a "settlement" with 
Ms. Baird ( over a Lis Pendens dispute), could in any way constitute a "release" of a "purchase 
agreement," or be a "substitute" for a "purchase agreement," when Ms. Baird was never a party 
to that agreement. 
The only "value" or "benefit" ever received by Mr. Rice came from the transfer of the 
ownership interests in the four parcels of real property, resulting from the execution of the 
"Purchase Agreement," that was signed by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, and the four deeds 
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generated therefrom, as signed by Mr. Trefren, (Exhibits E, F, G, and H). This was all done to 
of Evans Bank Mr. Rice, as Mr. Rice has confirmed title policies, lot 
reports, preliminary which were obtained by Evans Bank, that 
confirmed the marketability and transferability of those parcels and the benefits that were 
received by Mr. Rice. 
There was absolutely no legitimate basis for Ms. Baird's claim to "membership" in Real 
Homes, LLC. No court, upon hearing the testimony about the formation of the "official" 
operating agreement, and when "reading" and "comparing" the official documents with Ms. 
Baird's fabricated version, could render a factual finding, based upon "substantial and 
competent" evidence, that Renee Baird was ever meant to be, or ever could have been, or ever 
was financially able to be, a contributing "member" of Real Homes, LLC. Ms. Baird had 
absolutely nothing, outside of what Mr. Sallaz gave her, and was never able to financially 
contribute anything, inasmuch as she came to the "marriage" with nothing of any financial 
worth. She was allowed to be a manager only, of Real Homes. Whatever she ended up with, she 
literally stole from either Mr. Sallaz or Mr. Trefren. 
Back in 2001, her only "claim to fame" was working her way into the Sallaz law office, 
posing to be his clerical helper, and helping the staff in the office. \Vhen you read the 
documents, Ms. Baird could never have had a membership interest in the LLC, let alone be the 
sole member of Real Homes LLC, under the contents of the operating agreement. As all 
references to the membership were in the plural, and all references to a gender were in the 
masculine gender. Due to an oversight in Ms. Baird's "edited" version, Mr. Sallaz remained 
identified as a member in both versions in paragraph 2.10, as revealed in her fabricated Exhibit 
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24. That is why Ms. Baird "walked away" from any claim to Real Homes, as she had no interest 
existed in the first instance, and she knew careful scrutiny would show her for what she was 
so to was what she stole by way her quitclaim interest in 
15584 Riverside. She wanted nothing further to do with the litigation, or in the pursuit of any 
claims of "membership interests" as none logically could be found to exist. 
Mr. Sallaz, having created the "Operating Agreement" of Real Homes, LLC, should, and 
most assuredly does, know which one he created, as it was he, and no one else, who formulated 
the venture for Mr. Trefren and himself, as partners. Mr. Sallaz confirmed the fact that the most 
he ever allowed Ms. Baird to be was his "manager," of Real Homes, LLC. At times, she chose 
to refer to herself as a "president," and she, at times, referred to Mr. Trefren as the "president" of 
Real Homes (see Exhibit Q). But she could never be a member of Real Homes, as that would 
contradict the partnership arrangements that Mr. Sallaz had with Mr. Trefren. 
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren described in detail, the nature and extent of their respective 
involvements in this venture; how properties were being acquired, how they were paid for; who 
paid for them; who was present at closings; who kept books and records relating to the parcels of 
property, maps, surveys, drawings, illustrations, permits, materials and labor billings, contracts, 
and everything associated w'ith his efforts to develop the properties for marketability. Mr. Sallaz 
testified that he was responsible for financing, and to accomplish his end, he enlisted the 
assistance of Ms. Baird, whom he relied upon to keep certain "financial" records for his review, 
including bank statements, receipts, deposits and disbursements, all of which was to be kept in 
the office files. She was authorized to sign on the Real Homes bank account, as she was also 
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involved in his law office, helping with filing, reception, assistance and file review, along with 
assisting other office staff. 
The Court has had opportunity to operating 
agreement, Exhibit A, with the "Baird" version, Exhibit 24, and can readily see Exhibit 24 is a 
duplicate of the original 21 page document, with changes in three particular areas: 
• the membership she now identified to be Ms. Baird, rather than Messrs. Sallaz 
and Trefren; 
• two aspects of Article V were altered, 
• first, where she removed Mr. Trefren from being the keeper of the books 
and records, and instead, inserted "Jeffrey W. Casey" as keeper, who she 
knew was a long-term friend of Mr. Sallaz, herself being a very close 
friend to Mr. Casey's wife, whom she knew kept various books and 
records for her husband; 
• secondly, she made herself the "tax matters partner" in Article 5, 
apparently not realizing, as a matter of law, it takes "two" to get 
partnership tax treatment; 
• she then changed the endorsement page, where she removed Messrs. Sallaz and 
Trefren as the signing members, and inserted her name as the only member, 
• yet failing to change any of the plural references or masculine gender references 
made throughout the document, or eliminating Sallaz member status in Par. 2.10. 
It is readily apparent the only person responsible for drafting the "official" operating 
agreement of Real Homes was Mr. Sallaz; it was a carefully tailored document, specifically in 
areas addressing the concerns over tax treatment for their venture as partners. Mr. Sallaz's 
accountant, Perry Harding, insisted on the partnership status as the treatment for tax purposes, 
and selected that partnership status, since there were two of them. So much emphasis was placed 
on that treatment by Mr. Sallaz in Article V, that he made it painfully clear Real Homes, LLC 
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would be treated, as a partnership at all times, and that only became a viable approach because 
were two members. That tax status treatment and requirement alone served to destroy the 
fabricated "single member created by Ms. Baird, but the worst was yet to become 
painfully obvious; Ms. Baird failed to remove reference to Mr. Sallaz where he created his 
specific interest in paragraph 2.10, as there he identified himself as a "member" (paragraph 2.10, 
on page 4), which entitled him as a "member" to receive the title insurance proceeds, in the event 
a title claim occurred, as he was the one who financed the purchases, not Mr. Trefren, and since 
Mr. Sallaz funded the partnership, he would be entitled to recover the funds he paid, should any 
parcels have a title claim, and found not to be marketable. Her failure to remove his membership 
status, identified in the Baird version, Exhibit 24, makes it obvious that Exhibit 24 was a "knock 
off' of Exhibit A, and the only differences were those brought about by the deceptive conduct of 
Ms. Baird. 
Consequently, this Court will resolve the conflict, confirm which "operating agreement" 
is official, and will do so by determining which document meets the criteria of the tax status 
requirements, and has identified Mr. Sallaz as a member (in light of the existence of his 
membership identified in paragraph 2.10). The court will necessarily find over 75 references to 
members in the plural, never in the singular; will see all references to the members in the 
masculine gender, never in the feminine gender. Clearly Exhibit A is the authentic and official 
operating agreement of Real Homes, LLC, the effect of which confirms Messrs. Sallaz and 
Trefren are the members, authorized to sign the Purchase Agreement as co-oVvners, and that 
remains consistent with all filings with the Secretary of State. 
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In the end, it was determined that Ms. Baird had already stolen $10,000.00 in one 
and having $2,500.00 from a 
this concern now being expressed by Trefren to Mr. Sallaz 
about her deceitful intentions, which he saw becoming more and more apparent, Mr. Trefren's 
fear was that she would appropriate their funds deposited in the bank, as she had signing 
authority on the account. Mr. Trefren believed invading the Real Homes bank account would be 
her next and maybe last great act of defiance, and he was no longer willing to tolerate a passive 
attitude towards her conduct, instructed Mr. Sallaz to immediately withdraw all but $1,000.00 
from the bank account, which Mr. Sallaz did on May 7, 2004, four days before Mr. Sallaz finally 
determined he must "fire" Ms. Baird, and then removed her from the office, on May 11, 2004. 
In the course of her departure, Ms. Baird took various office computers, electronic 
components, files, documents, and in particular, the office file of Real Homes, that had been kept 
in storage in the top drawer of Sallaz's two drawer oak filing cabinet in the office next to his 
office desk. Nothing she took from the office was ever recovered; demand was made upon her 
for return of all items, but instead of doing so, upon the eve of the threat of prosecution by Scott 
Gatewood, managing partner of Sallaz and Gatewood, Ms. Baird staged a "burglary" of the 
15584 Riverside residence, filed a police report, therein claiming a "burglary" had occurred, 
listing everything identified by Mr. Gatewood in his letter as having been "stolen" from that 
residence. Exhibit 24 was the "product" of what she created from her entry into the hard drive of 
the desktop computer, where she altered the "original" version of the operating agreement, 
Exhibit A, and printed a "Baird" version of the operating agreement from the computer, wherein 
she now falsely portrayed herself as the "sole member" of Real Homes, LLC. 
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Thus, it was only at the very end of involvement with Real Homes, LLC, and with Mr. 
Sallaz, that version of the operating 
as the sole member action on behalf of Real Homes was fabricated and created. 
3. Renee Baird Did Obtain An Interest In The Parcel Located At 15584 
Riverside, Which Is Excluded From Group Of Parcels At Issue In This 
Action 
It was clear, back in 2010, when Ms. Baird had walked away from any claim to any of 
the three parcels on Riverside and the three lots and residence on Smith, that she only wanted 
15584 Riverside. Mr. Rice had never wanted that property in the first place. He felt the debt on 
15584 Riverside exceeded the value of the parcel. Notwithstanding, "Sellers" had always 
expressed a willingness to assist him in getting title to it, as it was held in trust for Real Homes 
when it was used to secure the loan Mr. Sallaz obtained for $105,000.00 in February 2004. 
Clearly, Plaintiffs' attorneys knew there was no damage to Rices or Real Properties, LLC, as the 
very agreement itself prevented any damage from occurring, as it specifically gave credit against 
the purchase price for the assumed debt associated with 15584 Riverside. 
It was well known to Mr. Rice that 15584 had been released by Saxton Fruit Farms back 
in 2004, under the "partial release" provisions of that original acquisition; that's how it was able 
to be deeded from Real Hornes in 2004, and a loan obtained against it. It had been "quitclaimed" 
out of Real Homes, LLC, on February 10, 2004, which was made a matter of public record on 
February 11, 2004 (Exhibit 28), and that event was also well known to Mr. Rice, as confirmed by 
his ovm statements, as he always believed it was worth less than the loan placed against it in 
2004. 
FINAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
V, AND ?JOTION TO AJ}fEND 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON -PAGE 
The evidence is undisputed that by the end of August, 2003, upon the pretense Ms. Baird 
"show" the 1 
into the 
Riverside parcel Mr. 
to it to prospective buyers, 
had made ready for sale, 
reality, she just settied into the 
residence, bought new furniture (at Sallaz' expense), and did little, if anything to pursue 
marketing the property, causing Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren to consider need to secure a 
development loan, but having only marginal credit established in Real Homes, they could not 
obtain a construction loan, so they decided to use Mr. Sallaz' credit to get a personal loan. 
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren agreed to allow 15584, being the released parcel from the Saxton 
Fruit Farms deed of trust, to be transferred from Real Homes, LLC to Mr. Sallaz, thereby 
allowing Mr. Sallaz to get a "personal" loan using 15584 Riverside as collateral. 
The quitclaim deed used to make that temporary transfer was created by Ms. Baird, who 
signed it in her "capacity" as the "president" of Real Homes. She made it out in the name of 
herself and Mr. Sallaz, as grantees, and at the time Mr. Sallaz just didn't see it coming. His 
focus was upon the understanding it was being done for the benefit of Real Homes. It was 
clearly understood by Dennis and Renee that title to that parcel would be held in trust for the 
benefit of Real Homes, LLC, as it would belong to Real Homes until it was sold to a third party, 
as was the objective all along. It was being used for the sole purpose of obtaining a loan, not 
intended to constitute a sale to Mr. Sallaz. The loan proceeds were to be used for the 
development of the remaining parcels, with Mr. Sallaz personally guaranteeing the loan. The 
loan fonds \Vere obtained and deposited in the Real Homes bank account, and the idea being the 
loan proceeds would be repaid from sale proceeds of the Real Homes parcels that were to be 
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sold. Ms. Baird, however, reneged on that understanding they were to deed the property back to 
and later asserted a claim to and refused to move from the residence. 
obvious Ms. Baird knew she had no claim to the "ownership 
interests" of Real Homes LLC, or to the four parcels of real property, as otherwise she never 
would have "walked away" from that valuable property, receiving nothing in exchange for her 
"release," by which she personally quitclaimed any "right, title and interest" regarding Real 
Homes, LLC. All she wanted was to keep possession of 15584 Riverside, the one parcel 
released from the Riverside transaction, being the parcel she had obtained a "personal" interest 
in, along with Mr. Sallaz. She full well knew that when the transfer of title to the 15584 
Riverside property was undertaken, it was intended to be held in trust, as much discussion took 
place about the fact "why" Ms. Baird and Mr. Sallaz together took title to it from Real Homes 
LLC; there was a clear understanding that it was to be held in trust for Real Homes, and 
conveyed back to Real Homes, so it could be sold, and the sale's proceeds used to satisfy the 
loan of $105,000.00 that would, and ultimately was, obtained from World Savings in February 
2004. Recognizing she was named in the "quitclaim deed," however, she could, and as we all 
know, she did claim a "community interest" in 15584 Riverside, and refuses to let go. 
The settlement in August, 2010, (Exhibit 162) itself confirmed no damage, as Mr. Rice 
continued in his choice to refuse to take 15584. Just because Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren wanted 
Mr. Rice to go after 15584 Riverside, as that parcel was to be held in trust for Real Homes, and 
Ms. Baird had breached that trust, nonetheless, we find Mr. Rice continuously saying he was 
unwilling to assume the debt on 15584 Riverside, and that he told that to Mr. Sallaz "over 40 
times," and each time Mr. Sallaz would remind him that if and when he took title, he would 
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receive credit for the encumbrance he assumed, as it was to be deducted from the purchase price, 
so it would cost 
never damage, let actual "breach" any 
warranty in the agreement, as it was envisioned by Real Homes, LLC and Real Properties, LLC, 
and these Defendants, that any debt, associated with taking title to 15584 Riverside, would be 
offset by a credit against the purchase price. That is precisely why Alternative Plaintiffs' 
declined to produce a Real Properties, LLC agent to testify about a "breach," as Real Prope1iies 
always knew its options, and there could never be any damage. Mr. Rice was ultimately forced 
to make that apparent when he was called as an "adverse witness" himself by Defendants to 
answer questions in defense of Count V. He made it painfully clear he never wanted it. 
Even though Ms. Baird had recorded her Lis Pendens, she sought no action to advance 
any claim, and all she ever wanted to keep was her "titled" interest to 15584 Riverside, as 
acquired by the quitclaim deed she was issued on February 10, 2004 (Exhibit 28). She "walked 
away" from any claim when the Rices made it clear to her they wanted nothing to do with the 
15584 Riverside parcel, and never had interest in that property from the inception of the "deal" 
with Defendants. Again, it should come as no surprise, after this Court rendered its Summary 
judgment analysis in July, 2012, the claim within Alternative Count V was a "non-suit" in the 
making, as Plaintiffs' attorneys were faced with the clear awareness that in the absence of a 
willingness to accept Defendants' operating agreement (Exhibit A), there could never be an 
enforceable agreement with Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, and if they continued their theory of the 
"Baird" operating agreement, there could never be an enforceable contract upon which any claim 
to any "contract" damage could prevail under Count V. 
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Additionally, in the absence of any showing of a tangible basis to claim, any "contract 
damage, Alternative Plaintiffs could never be successful in establishing a cause of action 
to any relief for any damage. The evidence was obvious Mr. Rice never wanted 15584, and 
though the Purchase Agreement had stated Real Homes had represented the right to title to 
15584 (parcel 1 B), Mr. Rice knew of the earlier transfer in 2004, ( as well as having been 
recorded and repeatedly referred to in title reports) and it had always been Mr. Rice's position he 
never wanted title to 15584 Riverside from the inception, as it wasn't worth the assumed 
indebtedness (at least to him). Because of that, Real Properties, LLC never paid anything toward 
it, and would never pay anything owed against it, and never expected to acquire it, and had 
always remained reluctant to give any consideration at any time for it. The only "breach" that 
could ever be established in this dispute by any party is Mr. Rice's failure to perform under the 
terms of the purchase price with the required payments, which would become the concern of the 
Court under Defendants' counterclaim, but not under Plaintiffs' case; that would not be just 
because of their failure to establish a cause of action, but as importantly because of the "unclean 
hands" doctrine with their failure to perform, or discharge their duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Mr. Sallaz ( emphatically)wanted Plaintiffs to take title to 15584 and to assume the 
obligation that went with it, as the assumed amount was deducted from the purchase price under 
the terms of the Purchase Agreement. He wanted that done because he had all he could take 
from Ms. Baird, and he had come to despise her clever acts as a thief. No "damage" could ever 
be sustained, regardless which way he went, as either he didn't want it, and he paid nothing, or if 
he wanted it, and got it in the quiet title action, the debt that came with it was deducted from the 
purchase price under the Purchase Agreement, and the only "loss" was to sellers. 
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THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANTS' 
It was for the above reasons Defendants moved for involuntary dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
case, as there was no legal or factual presented to support a prima facie enforceable 
contract case, let alone grant relief upon an unproven claim to non-existent damages. Defendants 
requested the Court non-suit Plaintiff, for failure to establish a claim for which any relief can be 
granted. Defendants moved for involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Rule 41(b), I.R.C.P., 
Rule 41(b), I.R.C.P., provides as follows: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against the defendant. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence, the 
defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may 
then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to 
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for failure to join a 
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Case law has developed the manner in which courts will analyze the evidence, when 
presented with such a motion. See Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho, 823, 825, 606 P.2d 473,475 
(1980). When a defendant moves for involuntary dismissal at the close of Plaintiffs 
presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as the trier of fact, and is not required to construe 
evidence, or any inferences drawn, in a light more favorable to the nonmoving party. In 
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rendering a decision pursuant to a motion for dismissal under Rule 41(b), the trial court is not 
limited in its evaluation of Plaintiff's case, as it otherwise would be if the motion were made 
to Rule 50(a), . , in situations where evidence is being presented to a jury . 
The court makes no special inferences for Plaintiff's favor, nor even concerned whether Plaintiff 
has made out a prima facie case. Instead, the court weighs the evidence, resolves any conflicts, 
and decides where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See Keenan v. Brooks, supra at 825; 
see also Clear Springs Foods v. Clear Lakes Trout, 136 Idaho 761, 40 P.3d 119 (2002); see also 
State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho 18, 72 P.3d 858 (2003). For earlier 
authority, see also Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118,391 P.2d 340 (1964), and Sorenson v. 
Adams, 98 Idaho 708,571 P.2d 769 (1977). 
The evidence presented on Plaintiffs' Count V, at best, shows a "purchase agreement" 
was entered into, as identified by Mr. Sallaz, through Exhibit 41, but there is no evidence to 
show it was signed by an "authorized representative" on behalf of Real Homes, LLC, according 
to the evidence presented by Ms. Baird. Exhibit 24 and 25, and that, standing alone, in the 
absence of any other "authorizing" document produced to give the Court an opportunity to 
"resolve any conflict," precluded the court from entering a finding of a valid and binding 
contract was entered into between sellers and Real Prope1iies LLC, as signature( s) were not 
"authorized," given the exhibits presented to the Court. Without a contract, there can be no basis 
to asse1i a breach, and there is no evidence of any damage or loss. Clearly, the Alternative 
Plaintiffs' case is the proper subject of a non-suit, as Plaintiffs' have deliberately refused to go 
forth with any documentary evidence to establish a valid contract, and have deliberately refused 
to present any basis to claim a breach, and well knew there was no factual basis to claim a 
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damage, for which any relief could be granted. These Plaintiffs have maliciously remained 
face of knowing full well they had no provable under their flawed theory, 
would serve to defeat the contract, and to 
that end they were intending to be self-defeating, as Mr. Fice would not tolerate the creation of 
any enforceable contract. 
For Alternative Plaintiffs to become "serious" about any intent to pursue a "valid, binding 
and enforceable contract," they would need to abandon their reliance upon the fraudulent version 
of an operating agreement developed by Ms. Baird, created by her when she removed the files 
and computers from the law office of Mr. Sallaz, and had used the equipment to print a modified 
version of the operating agreement from the hard drive contained in the computer, and Plaintiffs 
would need to instead advance the "official" version of the operating agreement, Exhibit A, the 
document actually drafted by Mr. Sallaz, as he later testified in his defense and presentation of 
the counterclaims. 
Had Alternative Plaintiffs wanted to produce evidence of an enforceable agreement, they 
would have produced Exhibit A when they presented their case in chief, as that established the 
existence of a "valid and binding agreement." Ms. Baird "testified" that Mr. Sallaz would 
obviously know which "operating agreement" he had created. To produce that document, 
however, was not the desire of Mr. Rice, as he knew he had no damage resulting to Real 
Properties, LLC, and Mr. Rice had also chosen to claim he never read the contract; he never 
agreed to any $250,000.00; he never agreed to pay $5,000.00 to Mr. Sallaz, had not assumed 
any debt, beyond paying Saxton Fruit Farms $63,402.82 for release of their Deed of Trust, 
despite the fact Mr. Rice holds title to four parcels of property, valued at over $630,000.00 in 
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2006, and he elects to ignore the fact he obtained a benefit (title to real property worth over 
$630,000.00), from which he borrowed hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy the Melba 
property; these same four parcels of property had "agreed" to sell to Mr. Reiss for 
$400,000.00, cash, on October 6, 2006, having taken a $4,000.00 "earnest money" dmvn 
payment from Daniel Reiss (Exhibit P), only later to renege on that deal as well, wanting Mr. 
Reiss to pay $500,000.00, cash, if he still wanted to buy the four parcels of properties. Mr. Rice 
has chosen to say Mr. Reiss failed to generate the funds to pay the $400,000.00 in cash, but 
regardless, whether Mr. Rice reneged, or Mr. Reiss could not get the balance to pay the cash 
sale's price, the fact remains the "value" and the "benefit" received by Mr. Rice, by virtue of the 
"Purchase Agreement," upon which he took "title" to four parcels of property (3 parcels at 
Riverside and three lots and a house on Smith), represented a value and benefit of $630,000.00 
on January 6, 2006, and well in excess of the $400,000.00 he would take "cash" for on October 
6, 2006, only then to state he wanted $500,000.00 after he cashed the $4,000.00 check. Upon 
what basis does he tell the Court he needed only pay $63,402.82 to own all of these parcels? 
Where is the written agreement from which he gets that understanding? It is long established 
Idaho law that interests in real property are to be reduced to a written document under Idaho's 
Statute of Frauds. LC. §§ 9-503 & 9-505. He fails to show us what "agreement" allowed him to 
acquire title to $630,000.00 worth of property in January, 2006, by paying only 10% of its true 
market value as the "agreed" purchase price. Obviously he feels the need to deny the existence 
of the only \Vritten agreement there was, as he does not want to be bound to pay what he agreed 
to pay. However, the issue remains: upon what basis did he acquire the title to real property 
worth $630,000.00 in January, 2006! ! We know did not pay Renee Baird a dime!!! 
FINAL ARGWl!fENT AND AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DIS1'rfJSSAL OF ALTERNATIVE COUNT V, A!vD lv!OTION TO Alv/END 
PLEADINGS TO CONFORJU TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON COUNTERCLAIMS -PAGE 
24 
Furthennore, Renee Baird did not "deed" any property to anyone in behalf of Real Homes, LLC; 
simply "quitclaimed" "released" "right, title, interest" to any claim to those 
as her "settlement" confirms (Exhibit 162). Title conveyance to these properties only 
came from the Purchase Agreement and deeds Trefren executed. See 
Defcndants/Counterclaimants Exhibits E, F, G, H. 
E. THE DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO RECOVER ON THEIR 
CONTRACT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Defendants presented their own contract as executed on behalf of Real Homes LLC, 
for the conveyance of the real property in question that Roy Rice and his LLC entities has had in 
his possession since 2006. Notwithstanding Mr. Rice's continued denials of the existence of any 
contract, the fact of the conveyances themselves exist as does the written contract. Therefore, 
the Defendants submitted evidence in support of the specific enforcement of that contract, which 
at this point in time would only entail the payment of the required compensation by Mr. Rice to 
the Defendants, with accrued interest. 
In the absence of an enforceable express contract between the parties, then these 
Defendants have submitted evidence in support of implied contract alternatives, including both 
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. To the extent that either remedy has not been fully pled 
they requested the court permit an amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence under 
I.R.C.P. 15(b ). The argument on that procedural amendment is presented first, followed by the 
argument on specific performance and then on each of the implied contract theories. 
1. The Court Should Grant Defendants-Counterclaimants' Motion For 
Leave To Amend The Pleadings To Conform To The Evidence 
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Given the circumstances of this case, should the Court find the express contract to be 
any reason, Court must then necessarily a factual 
basis to apply an implied contract in fact or an implied contract in law, for which the reasonable 
value of the benefit received by Mr. Rice must be paid to these "sellers." 
Because Defendants/Counterclaimants alleged the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment, under the theory of an implied contract in law, it was deemed necessary to move the 
Court to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented, by Counterclaimants in the 
case, so as to enable this Court to have the full availability of all equitable doctrines, including 
quantum meruit (a contract implied in fact) as well as the pleaded relief under an unjust 
enrichment claim (a contract implied in law). 
The motion was made under Rule 15(b) I.R.C.P. which provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected 
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. 
The court may grant a continuance tO enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
It is the position of Defendants/Counterclaimants the equitable principles of quantum 
meruit and unjust enrichment were tried either by the express consent or by the implied consent 
of the parties, as both doctrines are species of an equitable doctrine to a right of recovery, which 
was pled by Counterclaimants, and no objection was ever made, since equitable relief was at all 
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times being requested. Since a right to recover under a theory of equity was raised in the 
pleadings, and no attempt was ever made by Plaintiffs to limit the testimony to be received by 
such that it would • 1 1 conswerea a doctrine of unjust enrichment as opposed 
to quantum merit, it is appropriate to allow the amendment, consistent with the prayer for relief. 
The formality of an amendment of the pleadings is not necessary, if the court concludes 
the issues were, in fact, tried to the court by at least the implied consent of the parties. See Lynch 
v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238,561 P. 2d 380 (1977); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331,597 P. 2d 217 
(1979). For an issue to be tried to the court upon the implied consent of the parties, it must 
appear the parties understood the evidence would likely be aimed at an unpleaded issue, as well 
as the pled issue. See Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,292 P.3d 248 (2012). Clearly, 
Plaintiffs understood evidence supporting an application of equitable doctrine would be, and in 
fact was, being offered by the parties, as unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are each species 
of an implied contract, one imposed by a matter of fact and one imposed by a matter of 
applicable law, each of which prevents an inequitable result. Plaintiffs had every opportunity to 
address either equitable doctrine, but declined to present any rebuttal evidence in any aspect of 
Defendants/Counterclaimants presentation of the evidence in this case. 
The purpose of Rule 15(b) I.R.C.P. is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather 
than upon technical pleading requirements. Implied consent to try a case upon an unpleaded 
issue, will have the appearance that the parties understood the evidence would ultimately be 
aimed at an unpled issue. See Belstler v. Scheler, 151 Idaho 819,264 P. 3d 926 (2011); See 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P. 3d 376, 384 (2004); Nguyen v. BUI, 146 Idaho 187, 
191 P. 3d 1107 (2008). 
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The determination that any issue has been tried with the consent of the parties (express or 
is a matter within the trial court's discretion; a court can only abuse its discretion if it 
to act consistently within the legal standards aliowed by the Rules. See State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559,568, 165 P. 3d 273,282 (2007). See also Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 
P. 3d 937, 943 (2007); Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 484, 129 P. 3d 1223, 1233 (2006). Due 
process requires that a party have sufficient opportunity to address an issue with the evidence 
and with argument, and the evidence presented must be clear enough so that both parties knew 
the issue, and considered the issue as being tried. See Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 
827, 761 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1988). The equitable principles of quantum meruit and unjust 
enrichment are so interrelated, one being a contract implied by virtue of the facts, and the other 
being a contract implied by virtue of the application of law, it becomes readily apparent the 
evidence presented could be used to apply to either equitable principle, as it would be inequitable 
for Mr. Rice and his limited liability companies to retain the benefit received, either as a matter 
of fact or as it is implied by law, without paying the value of the benefit he seeks and thus far 
successfully retained. 
Clearly, Mr. Rice has never been willing to "rescind" the agreement, as you cannot 
rescind what you deny even exists. He does not want to pay under the terms of the agreement as 
he is bound by his denials there was never a "meeting of the minds." He does not want to 
unwind the deal, as he refuses to give up the benefit he has been able to enjoy. He is unable to 
deny the value of the benefit, as his testimony and conduct has demonstrated he has accepted the 
values, used the properties to borrow hundreds of thousands of dollars, as he did that back in 
2006. Since he is not willing to accept the terms of his Purchase Agreement, he has now come 
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too far with his denials, as it is now too late to tum around. Clearly, being able to borrow 
of thousands of dollars, pledging these assets as collateral, in 2006, he was able to go 
out and the prope1iy, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Both the law as 
well as the facts obligate Mr. Rice and his limited liability companies to pay the reasonable value 
of the benefit he was successful in obtaining, and to that end, the court should grant 
Defendants/Counterclaimants their motion to amend the pleadings to conform to all of the 
evidence presented, which allows the count to consider both uajust enrichment and quantum 
meruit as the evidence deems it would be reasonable and equitable for Counterclaimants to have 
a recovery of the benefit obtained by Mr. Rice and his various LLC's. 
2. Defendants Are Entitled To Specific Enforcement Of The Agreement 
Once Count V is dismissed, what this Court is left to consider is the legal remedy 
available to grant specific performance under the terms of the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 41 ), 
pursuant to the evidence and testimony presented by Defendants/Counterclaimants, given the 
admission of Exhibit A. If there is no adequate legal remedy, relief is then to be given under an 
equitable theory of a contract, either implied in fact ( quantum merit), or a contract implied in law 
(unjust enrichment). 
If Real Properties, LLC, had agreed to pay a purchase price of $250,000.00, and there 
was a "meeting of the minds" whereby it was agreed to certain terms of payment, such as to pay 
$5,000.00 to Mr. Sallaz; pay the $63,402.82 to Saxon Fruit Farms; and to assume other 
obligations ofrecord or as stated in the agreement, then given what Mr. Rice has paid, we are left 
with a balance of the purchase price to be paid in the remaining sum of $181,597.18, which sum 
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is owing to the "sellers" under the "Purchase Agreement" as of January 6, 2008, as the contract 
for a two-year delay in payment. From that principal balance, interest would then accrue 
6, 2008, at the rate of 12 % annum, pursuant to § 28-22-104, Idaho Code until 
entry of judgment. That combined amount would be due and owing from the date of entry of a 
judgment awarded by this court, but that assumes this Court finds a "legal remedy," with the 
required finding of a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement under the law. If so, 
Counterclaimants are entitled to "specific performance" under the terms of a binding and 
enforceable contract. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 
159 P.3d 870 (2007). 
The Court must be satisfied there was a mutual "meeting of the minds" between the 
parties. There is evidence sufficient before this Court to find that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren had 
a "meeting of the minds" with the contracting party, Roy Rice, who was acting for Real 
Properties, LLC, since all parties knew Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were the only "partners" and 
were the rightful "sellers," as they were the true and only members of Real Homes, LLC. Mr. 
Rice said that when he testified in the Sallaz "divorce", and furthe1more signed "verified" 
pleadings, his Complaint in this action, that said, under oath, he specifically knew Messrs. Sallaz 
and Trefren were the authorized parties and "partners" in Real Homes, and he knew that, not 
from what his attorneys told him, but from what he actually knew; he discussed their dealings on 
a regular, if not at least weekly, basis with them, always looking for a great deal or investment 
for himself, and he rather did so extensively testify to that effect when asked about his 
understanding in the Sallaz divorce on July 21, 2006. He there testified he "knew" they were 
partners. He well knew Exhibit A was the official Operating Agreement f'rPC>TP'" by Mr. Sallaz 
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for Real Homes, LLC, and it was never at any tirne believed by anyone who knew the workings 
the Sallaz-Trefren partnership that anything of the liking of Exhibit 41 had any validity, as Mr. 
was famiiiar with this long standing partnership since it was formed in 2001. This matter 
was previously discussed hereinabove in the narrative concerning Renee Baird's involvement in 
Real Homes, LLC. 
The Counterclaimants have requested specific performance, believing it to be an 
appropriate form of legal relief, but in the alternative did request the Court to consider the 
equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, as the law will not allow Mr. Rice to keep a benefit 
which he has no equitable right to retain, without paying the value of the benefit. Because of the 
various "species" of these equitable rights to relief, Counterclaimants seek a remedy that is 
equitably required to prevent the unjust retention of the benefit received by Mr. Rice. 
This Court could readily find the Purchase Agreement entered into by Messrs. Sallaz, 
Trefren and Rice to have created a binding and enforceable agreement, as Mr. Sallaz confirmed 
what changes were made to the Purchase Agreement were made at the request and demand of 
Mr. Rice, not once but at least three times, which not only brought about the elimination of the 
personal guarantee intended for Mr. Rice to sign, but also caused the two year period of delay 
before payment of the purchase price. Those changes could not have occurred had Mr. Rice not 
read the document. Clearly, this Court would be reasonable in finding, as a matter of fact, Roy 
Rice read all the terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement, numerous times, as he 
mandated the changes he wanted made before final execution on January 6, 2006. 
Although this Court could justify finding an enforceable agreement between these paiiies, 
and compel "Buyer" to pay the balance owing under the terms of the purchase price pursuant to 
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an award of specific performance under an "adequate legal remedy" under the law, the Court 
well look differently to the relief, given attitude of Mr. Rice, where his current 
is not only inconsistent with his testimony presented on July 21, 2006, during the 
Sallaz v. Sallaz "divorce" proceedings; and not only inconsistent with the content of the 
allegations contained in his Complaint filed on November 6, 2009, but he now has formed such a 
persuasion that he has chosen to repudiate the existence of any contract at any time, and has 
taken the position there has never been a meeting of the minds of the parties to engage 
acquiescence in any terms under the Purchase Agreement, as he claims to be unaware of any of 
the terms and conditions contained in the Purchase Agreement. With that "sworn" testimony 
before the Court, ifhe truly contends there has been no "meeting of the minds," this Court is 
afforded the opportunity to award Counterclaimants equitable relief that prevents the "buyer" 
from keeping and retaining the benefits received in this transaction for which he now refuses to 
pay. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Mr. Rice, his Real Properties, LLC, or his latest 
entity, Ada Properties, LLC, to keep the benefits which were transferred to the "buyer," under 
the terms of the Purchase Agreement, that he now denies he agreed to. He even says he never 
paid the $5,000.00 to Mr. Sallaz. Consequently, the Court may elect to apply the equitable 
doctrine of an "implied contract in law," being "unjust enrichment," or an "implied contract in 
fact," being a quantum meruit right of recovery. These equitable forms of relief are available to 
a court to avoid an unjust result by the actions and conduct of a party to an "unenforceable" 
contract. Mr. Rice, acting in behalf of Real Homes, LLC, and Mr. Rice, acting in behalf of Ada 
Properties, LLC seeks to keep the benefits he has obtained, initially taking title under the guise of 
a "Purchase Agreement," receiving deeds from Mr. Trefren to four parcels of property, following 
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the execution of this Purchase Agreement transaction, then only later to denounce the purchase 
claim he never read any agreement that bears his signature. In essence, he is now 
never agreed to anything." 
3. In The Absence Of An "Enforceable" Express Contract, Defendants/ 
Counterdaimants Are Entitled To Equitable Relief 
Given the two species of "equitable forms" of relief, Defendants /Counterclaimants did, 
at the conclusion of their case, present the Court with a motion to amend their pleadings to 
conform to the evidence, so both "species" of equitable relief are available to the Court for 
consideration and application. Counterclaimants had requested in their prayer: "such other and 
further relief as this Court may deem to be proper and just under the circumstances." 
The very fact Alternative Plaintiffs chose to avoid presenting the official version of the 
"operating agreement," a document they were very familiar with, and instead chose to promote 
the presentation of fabricated testimony with Ms. Baird and pursue introduction of the "Baird" 
version, we are confronted with a clear and deliberate attempt to "prevent" a finding as to the 
existence of an enforceable agreement. It demonstrates their "unclean hands," was aimed at 
avoiding any enforceable finding by the Court, well knowing the contention of Mr. Rice was 
there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties. Mr. Rice thinks he can repudiate his 
obligation to pay anything, for what has a value of no less than $450,000.00 for three parcels on 
Riverside (three parcels worth $150,000.00 each), and $180,000.00 worth of property on Smith 
(three lots at $30,000.00 each, and a house worth $90,000.00), representing a benefit and value 
worth $630,000.00, only paying $63,402.82 for cancellation of the Riverside Trust deed sale, and 
absolutely nothing for Smith, having refused to pay the $30,000.00 owed to D.L. Evans Bank, 
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requiring Mr. Sallaz to pay that obligation because of his personal guarantee on that loan. Mr. 
agreed to pay that debt, as it went with Smith property, but he declined to do so, 
Mr. Sallaz would have to do it, to save credit. This conduct borders on something 
worse than just "unclean hands." Ifhe doesn't want to pay the contract balance, then he can face 
the equitable relief sought by Counterclaimants, either under the theory of recovery by unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit, as such fonns of relief are "just and proper under the 
circumstances." 
If a legal remedy of specific performance of the Purchase Agreement is not to be awarded 
Counterclaimants as an available legal remedy, then quantum merit or unjust enrichment must be 
considered among the equitable forms of relief to be awarded Counterclaimants. It would be 
wholly unjust to allow Mr. Rice and his LLCs to retain the benefit ($630,000.00 worth of 
properties), merely by the payment of $63,402.82, when there is no written document to 
demonstrate that was ever the agreement. Mr. Rice is quick to forget the fact the $63,402.82 
went only to Saxton Fruit Farms to satisfy their trustee sale, relating only to three parcels in 
Riverside, and it had nothing to do with the title he also acquired on the Smith property. 
In light of the Plaintiffs' deliberate attempt to avoid establishing the contract that was 
intended by the parties; and with Mr. Rice continuing to deny having ever read the Purchase 
Agreement (though having demanded at least three different drafts to it); and with Mr. Rice 
having denied ever agreeing to a price of $250,000.00; and his having denied agreeing to assume 
anything other tha..ri Saxton Fruit Farms deed of trust foreclosure; and having repudiated any 
obligation to assume any other debt referenced in the "Purchase Agreement," and having taken 
the position there never was a "meeting of the minds," as to the terms identified in the Purchase 
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Agreement; then it could leave this Court with the conclusion that if Mr. Rice really claims there 
was ,uvvuLll-', of the minds," then he still needs to explain how he ended up getting title to 
one parcel (three lots and a residence) on Smith, from 
which he was able to transfer all parcels from Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, and 
then in August, 2010, transfer all those titles to Ada Properties, LLC, another one of his limited 
liability companies, and hold a benefit bestowed on him that has a market value of $630,000.00 
on January 6, 2006! 
Although Mr. Rice has denied accepting any terms of an agreement, he has at the same 
time been able to hold ownership to these same properties, having held exclusive possession and 
exercised dominion and control over them ever since January 6, 2006, well knowing their market 
value was over $630,000.00 in 2006. He subsequently agreed to sell all four parcels for 
$400,000.00 in cash by an agreement reached with Mr. Daniel Reiss on October 6, 2006; but 
after accepting the $4,000.00 down payment, we find him then later demanding $500,000.00 in 
cash from Mr. Reiss, if Mr. Reiss still wanted to purchase those same four parcels. 
These figures serve to establish the "value" of the "benefit" Mr. Rice has "received" and 
"kept" by his artful way of creating a deal for his benefit. He knows those values, as he has 
expressed them himself. Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were part of that "Reiss" deal in the making, 
and saw the "hatchet job" Mr. Rice pulled on Mr. Reiss, but little did they know then that they 
would later be the object of Mr. Rice's subsequent manipulations as well. The original deal with 
Reiss had taken place at the Sallaz law office, out by the pool, in the very presence of Messrs. 
Sallaz and Trefren, as they were to be included in that "deal", as each of them were then told by 
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Mr. Rice that they were to share equally in the profits of the anticipated larger "development 
that Rice was proposing. 
As his testimony later confirmed, when confronted by counsel over the loans Mr. 
obtained from D.L. Evans Bank in 2006, it was made readily apparent that Mr. Rice had 
successfully obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars from the bank, using the value of these 
properties for collateral to get loans to buy these other properties (like Melba), which was 
another one of those "great deals" Mr. Trefren had put together, and upon which Messrs. Sallaz 
and Trefren were specifically told and induced to believe that they would participate as 
benefactors in that venture. This development venture was clearly the "carrot" that Mr. Rice 
used to induce Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren to agree to convey these properties to him for only 
$250,000.00 as reflected by the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 41). 
The evidence confirms that Mr. Rice paid only $63,402.82 to resolve the trustee sale, but 
denies paying $5,000.00 to Mr. Sallaz, though Mr. Sallaz confirmed he did receive $5,000.00, 
paid to him by Mr. Rice under their Purchase Agreement, though Mr. Rice has callously taken 
the position he probably "loaned" that money to Mr. Sallaz, and never paid it under the terms of 
the Purchase Agreement. 
.Mr. Rice has refused to disclose he made any payments under the payment terms of the 
"Purchase Agreement," and though there is a passing reference to "taxes," when he testified, no 
amounts were confirmed as paid by him or Real Properties, LLC, for any years prior to January 
2006. Mr. Rice testified that each of the four parcels of property are now "free and clear," a.rid 
we "assume," from that testimony, that Mr. Rice satisfied those encumbrances he created with 
D.L. Evans Bank to purchase the "Melba" property, and others, which he and finally 
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admit he had done, as the recorded documents of record with the Canyon County Recorder's 
it painfully what he had accomplished with those properties in 
2006. Those documents described in detail what he had done, as the Bank recorded their 
collateral interests in those properties and described in detail the huge cash loans he created. 
Generally, equitable claims will not be considered by the Court when an adequate legal 
remedy exists. See Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 
487,492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003); see also Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark, 153, Idaho 828, 834, 
291 P.3d 1027, 1033 (2012). When paiiies enter into an "express contract," equity is usually not 
to be considered, as the existence of an enforceable express contract precludes reliance upon 
alternative equitable claims. However, in some instances, "an award for unjust enrichment may 
be proper even though an agreement exists." See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,776,203 P.3d 
702, 706 (2009), see also Buku Properties, LLC, v. Clark, supra. Such a situation occurs when 
the express agreement is found to be "unenforceable" for one reason or another. See Bates v. 
Selden, supra, at 776-77, 203 P.3d at 706-07. 
To recover under the equitable doctrine of "unjust enrichment," based upon an "implied 
contract in law," a benefit is found to have been conferred from one party to another, and the 
circumstances are such that it would be unjust to allow the receiving party to retain the benefit, 
without paying the "value of the benefit." See Beco Construction Company, Inc. v. Bannock 
Paving Company, Inc., 118 Idaho 463,467, 797 P. 2d, 863,867 (1990); see also Med. Recovery 
Serv., LLC. v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Court of Appeals ofldaho, filed January 18, 
2013, Docket 39408. 
Essentially, the elements of unjust enrichment are that: 
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1. A benefit is conferred by one party upon another; 
2. The receiving party appreciates the benefit; 
,., 
.) . It would be inequitable for the receiving party to the benefit without 
payment of the value of the benefit. See Teton Peaks Inv. Co. LLC, v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 
398, 195 P. 3d, 1207, 1211 (2008); See also Indian Springs, LLC, v. Andersen, 154 Idaho 708, 
712, 302 P. 3d, 333, 337 (2012). 
Both quantum meruit (that being an implied contract in fact) and unjust enrichment (that 
being implied contract in law) are measures of equitable recovery. See specifically Farrell v. 
Whiteman (Farrell I), 146 Idaho 604,612,200 P.3d, 1153, 1161 (2009) (citing Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp, 132 Idaho 754, 767, 979 P. 2d 627, 640 (1999)). 
See also Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228,232,280 P. 3d 731, 735. The application of equitable 
remedies is a question of fact, as it requires a balancing of the parties' equities. See Farrell v. 
Whiteman (Farrell II), 152 Idaho 190,194,268 P. 3d 458,462 (2012) (citing O'Connor v. 
Harger Construction Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)). In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury, court will find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law. See Clayson v. Zebe, supra, Rule 52(a) I.R.C.P. 
An implied contract in fact ( quantum mernit) exists where there is actually no express 
agreement, but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists. See Clayson v. Zebe, supra; Fox v. Mountain W Electric, Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 
706-07, 52 P. 3d 848, 851-52 (2002); Forest Product Inc. v. Chandler Supp. Co. 95 Idaho 739, 
743, 518 P. 2d 1201, 1205 (1974). An implied contract in fact is defined as one where the tenns 
and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the paiiies with the request of one 
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party, and the performance by the other, and the contract may be inferred in fact from the 
circumstances attending the performance. See Fox v. },,fountain W Electric, Inc. supra, citing 
Farnworth v. Femling 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P. 1378, 1382 (1994). The "performance" in 
this case was the conveyance of the parcels of property to the buyer, Real Properties, LLC, 
which ever since have been continuously controlled by Mr. Rice. The "conduct" was the 
agreement to convey, and the "acceptance" by the buyer was to receive ownership of the 
prope11y, by the deeds of conveyance, and the retained ownership to the parcels. The general 
rule has been stated that where the conduct of the parties allows the duel inferences that one 
performed at the other's request, and the requesting party promised a payment, the court will find 
a contract implied in fact. See Gray v. Tri-way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378,387,210 P. 3d 
63, 72 (2009) (quoting Homes by Bell-Hi Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319,321, 715 P. 2d 989,991 
(1986)). That could well fit the situation under the circumstances here. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court observed in Barry v. Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 
Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004), "Though some courts do not differentiate between the 
measure of recovery under unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, this Court has carefully done 
so." In Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 64 P.3d 959 (Ct.App.2002), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals drew the following distinctions between a recovery based upon quantum meruit and a 
recovery based upon unjust enrichment: 
Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are related theories of liability, but 
carry different measures of recovery. See generally, Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 
Idaho 655, 659-61, 551 P.2d 610, 614-16 (1976). Unjust enricfonent theory 
allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff and 
it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to retain the benefit without 
compensating the plaintiff for its value. Beco Const. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 
118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990); Continental Forest Products, 
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v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739,743,518 P.2d i201, 1205 (1974); Hausam 
v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569,573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Ct. App. 1994); Idaho 
Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 710 P.2d 647,655 (Ct. App. 1985). 
defendant must make recompense only for that amount of the 
would be unjust for the defendant to retain. Continental Forest Products, Inc., 
Idaho at 743,518 P.2d at 1205; Hausam, 126 Idaho at 573-74, 887 P.2d at 1080-
81; Idaho Lumber, Inc., 109 Idaho at 744, 710 P.2d at 654. For a quantum meruit 
claim, on the other hand, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the 
services rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was 
enriched. Peavey, 97 Idaho at 659-61, 551 P.2d at 614-16; Hartwell Corp. v. 
Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 141, 686 P.2d 79, 86 (Ct. App. 1984). Under either theory, 
the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. Peavey, 97 Idaho at 661, 551 P.2d at 
616; Hausam, 126 Idaho at 574, 887 P.2d at 1081. 
138 Idaho at 434-35, 64 P.3d at 963-64. 
Exactly how these alternative measures of damage may be determined upon the facts in 
this case is for this Court to decide. But as based upon the facts of this case, it is quite possible 
that there may be no actual difference between these two alternative measures of damages. 
Clearly, Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren conveyed their "ownership interests" in Real Homes LLC., 
and caused to be executed those deeds of conveyance, transferring title to four parcels of 
property to Real Properties LLC, upon what they understood was a promise of payment of 
$250,000.00 by Mr. Rice, less those obligations that were to be assumed by the Buyer, along 
with credit of the sum of $5,000.00 to be paid to Mr. Sallaz. Since it was never to be considered 
a gratuitous transfer of ownership interests of real property, especially given the testimony which 
confirms the parcels of property were worth well in excess of $630,000.00, it becomes rather 
clear that when the conveyance was made, there would have to be a promise of some payment of 
more than just a promise to pay Mr. Sallaz $5,000.00, as otherwise these "sellers" have received 
nothing whatsoever in exchange for relinquishing their right to the title of four parcels of real 
property, and ownership interests in their limited liability company. 
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The Parties signed an agreement that provided for a "promise of payment," and if that 
promise for a specific payment is deemed "unenforceable" because Mr. Rice says there was "no 
meeting of the minds," despite having brought about each of the changes made to the original 
draft, then the party receiving the "benefit" under that transaction, being Mr. Rice, acting through 
his various limited liability companies, is obligated to pay the "reasonable value" of the "benefit" 
he received, which should be the market value of the parcels, being the sum of $630,000.00, as 
of January 6, 2006. The evidence is clear Mr. Rice was offered a "cash" sum of $400,000.00, 
being the price Mr. Reiss agreed to pay "in cash," for those four parcels of property on October 
6, 2006, but as the Court was informed, Mr. Rice increased the sum to $500,000.00, the price 
Mr. Rice insisted thereafter that Mr. Reiss would need to pay if he wanted to purchase the four 
parcels, after cashing the $4,000.00 "earnest money" down payment given on the transaction. 
The funds were applied to one of Rice's "interest" payments. Mr. Rice has now stated that he 
would sell the four parcels for $300,000.00, a statement he made under oath on November 22, 
2013, when he indicated the parcels were "free and clear" of any encumbrances. The Court can 
well appreciate how Mr. Rice was able to get Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren to accept 
$250,000.00, as addressed earlier, as part of Mr. Rice's inducement to get this conveyance 
of properties was his promise to include Sallaz and Trefren in the bigger development 
venture, including the Melba property, where they would split profits three ways, and they 
would all make excellent returns on their investments. 
The equitable principles of quantum memit and unjust enrichment are each remedies that 
are designed to give reasonable value for the service or benefit received or bestowed upon 
another. To justify the recovery, one party must show a "value" or "benefit" that was bestowed, 
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that it would be unjust to allow the party to be enriched by that value or benefit, without 
the reasonable of what was received. See generally, In Re: Estate 34 
669, 8 P. 3d 664 (2000). The value and benefit received here was $630,000.00 worth of 
real property; $450,000.00 worth of which was subject to a payment of $63,402.82, or be subject 
to loss to a non-redemptive process of a trustee's sale set for January 16, 2006. The remaining 
$180,000.00 worth of property had no pressing financial obligation, but was subject to a 
$30,000.00 loan at D.L. Evans Bank; a loan that Mr. Sallaz was later required to pay because Mr. 
Rice failed to pay it under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. If you deduct the $63,402.82 
from the value of$450,000.00 (leaving $386,597.18), and add that sum to the $180,000.00, 
being the value of the three lots and house on Smith (no deduction of the $30,000.00 because 
Sallaz paid that), we have a "benefit" and "value" received by Mr. Rice in the amount of 
$566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006 with the titles placed in Mr. Rice's LLCs. 
To establish the primafacie case for an implied contract in law (recovery through unjust 
enrichment) there must be shown (1) a benefit was conferred; (2) appreciation of such benefit; 
(3) acceptance of the benefits under circumstances that would make it inequitable to retain the 
benefit without paying the value of the benefit thereof. See Boyd, supra, Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. 
Buck, 109 Idaho 737 at 745, 710 P. 2d 647,655 (1985). Once again, the benefit has a net value 
of $566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006. The benefit must have been tendered under such 
circumstances as to indicate that the person tendering same expected to be paid and that the 
recipient either expected, or should have expected, to pay for same. Nobody conveys 
$630,000.00 worth of property to another without expectation of some payment. The law makes 
it patently clear that the "actual intent" of the party upon whom the benefit is conferred is 
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immaterial, just so long as a "reasonable person," in a similar circumstance, would have 
that a benefit has been conferred and that the conferring party did so in a reasonable 
expectation of payment. See Boyd supra; see also Kennedy v. Forrest, 129 Idaho 584,587, 930 
P. 2d 1026, 1029 (1997). The "Purchase Agreement" demonstrates that "understanding" of a 
"payment" though Mr. Rice denies the "amount" of that promised payment. 
No one can reasonably expect to receive the benefits of these ownership interests in an 
LLC and ownership to four parcels of real property, worth $630,000.00, without both parties 
having a reasonable awareness of compensation to be made in exchange for the sale and 
purchase under the transaction of conveyance. Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were partners in their 
own development venture, and "thought" they had been made partners with Mr. Rice in this 
bigger development venture Mr. Rice was agreeing to finance. Mr. Trefren was eminently 
familiar with property values, as he has been recognized to be by all parties in this deal, as he 
was being referred to as a "property scout" who knew property values and current markets, and 
was constantly informed and updated as to property values. Mr. Trefren not only found the 
"deals" regarding the parcels Real Homes acquired at both Riverside and Smith, but also Mr. 
Trefren was the one who found the "Melba" property that Mr. Rice got excited about and then 
borrowed hundreds of thousands of dollars from D.L. Evans Bank, using the three Riverside 
parcels and the three lots on Smith, as the collateral to secure those loans to buy "Melba" 
property, thereby obtaining all the funds he needed to purchase the Melba property outright. 
That was all being done, of course, on the pretense and promise by Mr. Rice that there was this 
larger development venture, where he represented and agreed there would be a three-way venture 
partnership that involved the development of all these properties, and the three of them would 
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share equally in the profits generated from the developments, once Mr. Rice got back his initial 
had to pay the terms of the "Purchase Agreement." It 
wouid not only be "unreasonable" to think a reasonable man would convey away $630,000.00 
worth of prope1iy, and Mr. Sallaz, an attorney, would expect to receive only $5,000.00, and Mr. 
Trefren, an astute property locator and developer he was, would intend to receive nothing in the 
transaction!!! There is nothing reasonable or logical to think that the parties would give away 
$630,000.00 worth of property in exchange for Mr. Rice paying only $5,000.00 to Mr. Sallaz, 
and absolutely nothing to Mr. Trefren, the one who actually made it all possible. 
Since Mr. Rice does not want to pay (what he promised to pay), he should expect the 
court to be absolutely willing to find, as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, that it is only 
equitable and just to compel him to pay the "value" of the "benefit" he received by virtue of the 
transfer of the ownership interests and parcels ofreal property, as valued on January 6, 2006, to 
be the net value of $566,597.18. He may learn from this experience to be less inclined to 
repudiate a Purchase Agreement in the future. 
F. THE DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS SHOULD BE A WARDED THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
1. An Award of Attorney Fees Under I.C. § 12-121 Is Appropriate in This Case 
At the outset of this trial, the Court had expressed a genuine desire to hear from 
Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys as to some presentation of an "opening statement," in seeking a 
glimpse of what was the "theoretical" basis for the single remaining "meritorious" claim that was 
stated within Count V of the Complaint. The Court received nothing in response to that inquiry, 
and at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case, it became apparent why Plaintiffs had deprived the 
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Court of an opening statement. Plaintiffs' attorneys had no idea what to give the Court, let alone 
disclose where they were headed. 
It became apparent, after the Plaintiffs rested their case, that they had no evidence to 
establish a prima facie case for the existence of an enforceable contract. They had no evidence 
proving an authorized agent who signed Exhibit 41, the Purchase Agreement, let alone any proof 
of damages (that had never before existed). Given the repeated denials of Mr. Rice, denouncing 
the existence of any agreement, and failing to show any damage by his deposition testimony, it 
was apparent that their case was indeed, "dead on arrival." 
Yes, the attorneys for Alternative Plaintiffs had been placed by their client in a very 
unenviable position. They knew that they could not put their client - Mr. Rice on the stand. 
They knew that he would deny everything when it came to any issue touching on the existence of 
any enforceable contract. That had become Mr. Rice's unwavering position ever since he 
determined that he wanted to "walk away from" all of his agreements, be it with these parties, or 
his later "deal" involving these same properties with Daniel Reiss. Knowing the extent of their 
limitations, this made the Alternative Plaintiffs' case "without merit," not very far from the gate 
of its very origination. The Complaint was represented as being filed for a very different 
purpose than where we are today, and the "road" these attorneys took this case down is shameful, 
if not outright despicable. 
The fact these attorneys discovered the "bridge was out" on the road they followed so 
foolishly, in no way justifies the Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys conduct, as it is an absolute and 
complete bad faith act undertaken by them in taking their nonexistent claim all the way to trial. 
Knowing that the only facts that they could present to this Court would, in fact, defeat 
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establishment of their only remaining claim, which at the very least includes the critical and 
fundamental element of establishing an enforceable contract, they nonetheless persisted in 
demonstrating none existed. The only apparent reason for this course of conduct is that the 
Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys could not dismiss after their summary judgment efforts had 
failed, inasmuch as they had too great of an exposure to the imposition of fees and costs. 
Likewise, they were unable to induce a global settlement of all disputes with all the paiiies, and 
furthermore, given their refusal to submit to any binding arbitration, when coupled with the 
Alternative Plaintiffs' relentless hardheadedness, they found themselves simply forced to, 'jump 
into a river of no return," knowing they could never establish any contract given their client, Mr. 
Rice's attitude, where he would claim that there was never any "meeting of the minds," with 
anyone, and more specifically, that he had "never even read the document." 
The Alternative Plaintiffs' attorneys knew long ago that Exhibit 24, (Ms. Baird's version 
of the Real Homes LLC operating agreement), itself prevented the creation of any enforceable 
contract, and could never be of any support to accomplish a task of proving their Count V breach 
of contract claim. That single document - standing alone - without allowing for reference to 
Exhibit A for the Court to even consider in an effort to resolve any "conflicts" in the evidence, 
functioned effectively to void any legal remedy for the enforceability of Exhibit 4i from their 
case presentation. They knew that even before we heard the first words out of their mouths. 
Without an enforceable contract, the Alternative Plaintiffs were fully aware it simply had 
become impossible for them to successfully assert any "breach of contract," claim let alone 
demonstrate any damages flowing from a failure to perform under the terms of an enforceable 
contract. 
FINAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT 1WOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DIS111ISSAL OFALTERJVATIVE PLAllVTIFF:S' COUNT v: AND TO 
PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON COUNTERlLAiivfS 
46 
These facts support, on their face, the required findings for the award of attorney's fees 
§ 12-121, as case was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably without 
On that basis, Defendants/Counterclaimants request an 
award of attorney's fees. Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536,539, 129 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Ct.App.2006) 
2. LC. § 12-120(3) 
Plaintiffs have previously dismissed five of the six counts originally alleged in their 
voluminous complaint before trial upon their ill-fated Count V. Plaintiffs requested this Court to 
either dismiss the claims or otherwise structure an opportunity to "transfer" various elements of 
their claims to Ada County, where there they would become incorporated in Rices' 2nd amended 
counterclaim, along with the malpractice claim against Mr. Sallaz, hoping by that tatical move to 
avoid paying Mr. Sallaz and his law firms over $350,000.00 for legal fees owed for services 
rendered at the request of Mr. Rice, for his businesses, entities, friends, employees, and family 
members during the past 25 years. In response to those "logistical" transitions sought by these 
Plaintiffs, these Defendants objected to and dismissal or transfers without their fees and costs 
being paid, and this court understood that concern, and reserved the right for Defendants to have 
that avenue of relief at the conclusion of this case. Plaintiffs' election to continue their senseless 
pursuit of a "breach of contract claim," well knowing there was never a basis for establishing any 
damage under a "transaction", one they later chose to run from and refused to even attempt to 
demonstrate, let alone outwardly refusing to prove there even existed an enforceable contract, 
should leave this Court with an abiding conviction that Defendants/Counterclaimants are the 
prevailing parties in every aspect ofthis case, and entitled to a recovery of their fees. 
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-PAGE 
The Defendants/Counterclaimants, request an award of attorney fees pursuant to § 12-
award of to the prevailing party. 
Collection v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 192 1110, 1114 
(Ct.App.2008). 
3. Rule 11 Sanctions 
This case presents an appropriate application of Rule 11 sanctions. Clearly, since July, 
2012, Plaintiffs' attorneys have fully understood any effort to present a "good faith" and "valid 
claim" against Defendants could never be supported by the evidence they chose to present. It 
would be no less impossible to herd a hundred cats down the middle of Main Street, in 5:00 
traffic, than it would be to prevail on a case Alternative Plaintiffs presented under Count V. 
When this case turned from what it was originally intended to be, to what it later turned into 
becoming, it evolved into a rather dark and evil state of being. This case then became something 
that was then pursued by Plaintiffs, against these Defendants, for a bad and wrongful purpose, a 
bad motive, and with the worst of unclean hands and the most inequitable of intentions 
forthcoming from these Plaintiffs. At least John L. Runft saw the evil turn of events unveiling 
before his very eyes, and had the good sense to step back and look to see how he needed to avoid 
the obvious "conflict of interest" he had participated in allowing to transform, unintendedly 
creating a much different direction than was represented to him, all of which began with the full 
and complete involvement of Mr. Becker, but only later did they come to see the maneuvering of 
events being then orchestrated by Mr. Rice, after Mr. Runft had resolved the elimination of the 
lis pendens of Ms. Baird, at no cost to Mr. Rice, consistent with the fact there never would have 
been, either way he chose to go. Mr. Runft then saw the "plan" of Mr. Rice was to now 
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eliminate his remaining obligation under the "Purchase Agreement" about which Mr. Runft full 
knew, from conversation with all parties, was the reason the action was filed ~,-,~,urn Ms. 
so property would go forward to generate the funds to pay the purchase price owing 
under the Agreement, as the two years were up and payment was due. Mr. Runft saw the wisdom 
in getting out of the case; Mr. Becker, however, succumbed to the temptation of "easy money" 
being offered to him by Mr. Rice, to stay in the case, who, according to Ms. Baird, "has more 
money than God". Mr. Becker choose to "follow the money", rather than "follow his 
conscience", and as a result of that, Mr. Becker took on this dark and evil endeavor being 
orchestrated by Mr. Rice, and despite knowing what he did know about "how" and "why" the 
case was even initiated in the first place, he completely accepted the "new" role and pursued the 
inequitable objective for which he has done since the settlement with Ms. Baird was finalized. 
This has taken place in an atmosphere that is completely contrary to what he was initially 
induced to believe from Mr. Rice, wherein they, together with Mr. Runft, had a completely 
different purpose and understanding in mind when they caused this case to be filed, for an 
entirely different purpose than what it was then evolving into becoming, now at the leadership of 
Mr. Becker, undertaken for and on behalf of Mr. Rice, who sought to engage in conduct that 
would further a deliberate attempt to undermine and avoid a legitimate debt, and delay the 
satisfaction and payment of a just obligation Mr. Rice had committed to in order to get title to 
$630,000.00 worth of property. Money sure does cause strange things to happen, and now these 
Plaintiffs and their attorneys are coming to the end of the line, and hopefully at the end of the 
rope as well. 
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Hopefully, the decision in this case will serve to cause a "re-evaluation" of where Mr. 
wants to go with ill-fated claims, and maybe attorneys will a similar message as 
the result of case may then bee ch more animosity 
needs to be displayed between these parties efore Mr. Rice steps forward and hon s his 
commitments and obligations that he has made to ers overt past 25 years or so. 
Respectfully submitted this 201h day of Dec 
er J. Longetei 
Attorney for Trefren and Counterclaimants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. and REAL ) 
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
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liability company, and REAL HOMES, 
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, 
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Case No. CV 09-11855 
ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/ 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS'POST 
TRIAL BRIEF 
L BPJEF-
COME NOW Alternative Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Real Prope1iies, LLC, and 
Counterdcfendants Eugene and Janet Rice by and through J. Kahle 
, and file their Post-Trial Brief as follows 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
Four years of litigation resulted in a five day trial conducted November 20-26, 2013. 
This litigation arose out of Dennis Sallaz's false representations regarding the facts giving rise to 
his mid-divorce transfer of an LLC known as Real Homes. Mr. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, 
falsely informed the Rices, his longtime clients, that he and his client/handyman, Glen Trefren, 
had the right to sell the assets of Real Homes, LLC on January 6, 2006 ~ a few days before some 
of the real estate Real Homes, LLC owned was to be sold at foreclosure. Mr. Sallaz created the 
entity Real Properties, LLC on January 4, 2006. Titles to the subject Real Estate were 
quitclaimed to Real Properties, LLC allegedly to effectuate January 6, 2006 sale. Thereafter, 
Real Properties, LLC then expended approximately $90,000 in improving and caring for the 
subject properties only to discover that Mr. Sallaz's ex-wife, Renee Baird, claimed an interest in 
Real Homes, LLC and the subject prope1iies. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Mr. Sallaz then induced 
the Rices and Real Properties, LLC to file this lawsuit against him and his ex-wife, Renee Baird, 
as ,vell as Glen Trefren based on false information. Id. 
In the summer of 2010, the Rices met with Renee Baird and discovered that they had 
been deceived by Mr. Sallaz. The Rices and Real Prope1iies, LLC settled their case with Mrs. 
Baird, quitclaim deeds for all the properties were issued and recorded, and Plaintiffs were 
assigned the entirety of the ownership of Real Homes, LLC from Ms. Baird. It is undisputed that 
1 The Court has directed the pa1ties to file their briefs simultaneously on Friday December 20 l 3. Counsel for Plaintiffs has contacted opposing counsel to inquire as to how to effectuate the simultaneous exchange. 
Mr. Longeteig has responded that he intends to put his brief in the mail on Friday December 20, 2013. Mr. Vernon K. Smith has elected not to respond to Plaintiffs' counsel's Counterdefondants ask this Court to 
and exclude tardy post-trial briefing by all parties. 
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Renee Baird now owns Riverside 1 B, and Real Properties, LLC owned the remaining Riverside 
as well as 714 
that 
following the August 
Riverside as as 7i4 
10 
arc now owned 
Baird. It is 
Ada Properties, 
(an entity admittedly controlled by the Rices) \.Vhich is not a party to this case. 
Plaintiffs tried to dismiss the entirety of this case after they settled with Ms. Baird. Mr. 
Sallaz objected to the dismissal and filed three counterclaims (I Breach of Contract, II Breach of 
Contract - Reimbursement for Materials and Labor, and III Unjust Enrichment) through Glen 
Trefren. Thereafter, the Rices and Real Properties, LLC were largely in a defensive posture. 
From approximately September 2010 until trial, the litigation became extremely contentious. 
Mr. Sallaz conducted this litigation by proxy by "assigning" his interest to Mr. Trefren, 
preparing Mr. Trefren' s pleadings, and even had his own attorney, Vernon K. Smith, present Mr. 
Trefren 's case at trial. Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren argued claims of ownership and oral contracts 
at trial that were not plead or even disclosed in their discovery responses. The bulk of the self-
serving testimony Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren gave at trial should be assigned a credibility level 
of zero. The conduct of Mr. Sallaz was frivolous and an award of attorney's fees incurred since 
September of2010 is wairnnted under Idaho Code 12-121. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1) Counterclaimant's Motion to Amend at the Close of Trial 
At approximately 5:00 PM on the last day of trial, counsel for Counterclaimants made a 
motion to amend their pleadings to "conform to the evidence." Specifically, Mr. Trefren, an 
unlicensed contractor, saw that Count II of his Counterclaim was barred by Idaho Code ~ 54-
17 and attempted to plead a previously undisclosed claim for an oral contract with Mr. Rice 
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which conferred some unspecified, unrecorded, I /3 ownership interest in the subject properties 
on Mr. 
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, 
unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this 
state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or 
contract for which registration is required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a duly registered contractor, or that he was otherwise 
exempt as provided for in this chapter, at all times during the performance of 
such act or contract. 
Idaho Code § 54-521 7. 
Counsel for Mr. Trefren conceded that neither Mr. Trefren nor Tradesman were licensed in 2006. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, this alleged oral contract was not plead in the 
Amended Answer with Counterclaim, was not disclosed in Mr. Trefren 's discovery responses 
despite numerous Motions to Compel and for Sanctions, and was never discussed in the Sallaz v. 
Sallaz divorce trial wherein both Mr. Sallaz & Trefren testified. 
Mr. Trefren's last minute motion to amend his Counterclaim "to conform to the 
evidence" is governed by IRCP l 5(b): 
When issues not raised by the pleading[s] are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to arnend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow 
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in 
maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a 
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
IRCP l 5(b). 
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Counsel for Mr. Trefren, with the assistance of counsel for Mr. Sallaz, made the motion to 
at the close evidence on the of trial. Thereafter, the Court correctly noted that 
a JS discretion of the trial court. 
The determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the parties 
is within the trial court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed 
when that discretion has been abused. Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 335, 597 
P.2d 217,221 (1979); Lynch v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238, 561 P.2d 380 (1977). In 
reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider ( 1) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 834, 907 P.2d 807, 811 (1995); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 ). 
Here, the district judge perceived the issue as one of discretion, and correctly set 
out and applied the standard for a motion to amend. The district judge reached his 
decision by an exercise of reason illustrated by his statement that: ( 1) the 
Lindbergs' motion was untimely; (2) the Lindbergs' pleadings did not give notice 
of the chimney issue; and (3) while some discovery touched upon the issue, the 
Roseths were not given the opportunity to meet the chimney evidence. 
The record fully supports this finding. First, the Lindbergs' motion was filed 
approximately four months after the last evidence was presented. Second, the 
district judge articulated his reasons for finding the Lindbergs' pleadings did not 
give notice of the chimney issue, stating that although some discovery touched 
upon the issue, it was insufficient. Finally, the Roseths expressly articulated in 
their trial brief their speci fie intent to try only those issues framed by the 
pleadings. 
Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222,226, 46 P.3d 518,522 (2002). 
There was no express consent of the parties to try Mr. Trefren's new claim for an oral contract. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs timely objected to Mr. Trefren's Motion to Amend by pointing out that this 
proposed claim was not disclosed in discovery and directly violated Idaho Code § 54-5217. 
Similarly, Mr. Rice testified he had never heard of this alleged oral contract, and the testimony 
elicited from other witnesses directly contradicted the existence of such a contract Therefore, 
the claim was not 1ried with the implied consent of Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants. 
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Additional objections and grounds for denying Mr. Trefren's motion are provided herein. 
proposed claim for the alleged oral contract is untimely under Idaho § 17: 
\Vi thin four ( 4) years: 
An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument 
of writing. 
Idaho Code§ 5-217. 
Mr. Trefren testified that Mr. Rice/Real Properties, LLC breached this alleged oral agreement in 
March of 2006. The Amended Answer with Counterclaim filed July 6, 2012 is Nzmc Pro Tune 
to December 2010. Therefore, Mr. Trefren missed the applicable statute of limitations by at 
least 9 months (but more accurately, 3 years and 9 months based on the date the proposed 
amendment was made during trial) and a claim for oral contract cannot be cobbled together 
under any stretch of the imagination. 
The alleged oral contract for ownership of real estate violates the Statute of Frauds: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or 
memorandum thereof: be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his 
agent Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the 
writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one ( 1) year, or for the 
sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an 
agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the 
agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged. 
Idaho Code § 9-505. 
From what Counterdefendants understand based on the arguments of Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Longeteig, the alleged oral contract consists of an oral agreement that Mr. Trefrcn owned 1/3 of 
the subject real estate and was to be paid as an owner (as opposed to a general contractor) when 
the properties were sold. 
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In addition to running afoul of Idaho Code §§ 9-505, and 54-5217, Mr. Trefren failed 
10 any damages from this alleged breach. Had he succeeded in any evidence in 
his claim, Plaintiffs are greatly prejudiced in being denied the opportunity to conduct 
discovery on this proposed claim and the alleged damages. The little bit of testimony provided 
by Mr. Smith and Mr. Longeteig on this issue should not be considered as evidence and is wildly 
speculative at best. 
Finally, the proposed claim overtly acknowledges Mr. Sallaz provided false testimony in 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, wherein he asserted that Real Homes, LLC and it assets were sold to Real 
Properties, LLC. Mr. Sallaz even stated under oath in 2006 that there were no side deals to 
Exhibit 41. 
[Quasi-estoppel] prevents a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine applies 
where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position with 
one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. The act of the party 
against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself 
or produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel 
must have been induced to change his position. 
Silicon Int'! Ore, LLC v. J\llonsanto Co., 39409, 2013 WL 6190607 (Idaho Nov. 
27, 2013). 
For these reasons Counterclaimants' motion to amend should be denied. 
2) Count I of the Counterclaim should be denied 
There appears to be no meeting of the minds on the contract asserted by Mr. Trefren in Count 
I of the Counterclaim. 
AL 
There must be a meeting of the minds between parties for a contract to be formed. 
Barry v. Pacific West Constr., Inc .. 140 Idaho 827. 831, 103 P.3d 440, 444 
(2004). "A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to 
contract which takes the form of an offer and acceptance." Id 
Panike & Sons Forms. Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 567, 212 PJd 992, 997 
(2009). 
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First, Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren advanced for the first time, at trial, an additional term a 3 
way oral contract side contract was unplead sclosed last two 
days of trial. Additionally, the testimony of Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren as well as Plaintiff's 
exhibits 43-45 confirms Riverside 1 B was to be included in the transaction. The evidence 
indicates Real Hornes, LLC did not own Riverside 1 B on January 6, 2006. See February l 0, 
2004 Quitclaim for Riverside l B from Real Homes, LLC to Renee Baird and Dennis Sallaz, 
Exhibit 28. Any ambiguities in the contract should be construed against the drafter -- Mr. Sallaz 
- and his assignee Glen Tre1ien. "Ambiguous contracts are construed against the drafting patiy." 
Barber v. State Farm 1\1111. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 677, 680, 931 P.2d 1195, 1198 (1997). 
Furthermore, the weight of the evidence indicates Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren did not 
have the capacity to contract on behalf of Real Hornes, LLC. In order to be competent to 
contract, a corporation or other business entity must exist and be authorized to enter into the 
agreement by action of its officers or directors. See IDJI 6.02.2 -- Capacity to contract 
corporation. Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren were not authorized in the authentic operating 
agreement (Exhibit 24) to enter into the January 6, 2006 transaction on behalf of Real Homes, 
LLC. See Exhibit 24 p. 4-5 provisions 3 .3 .1 "Acts Requiring a Majority Vote," 3 .2 "Authority of 
Members to Bind the LLC" and 3.2.3. Though, Dennis Sallaz attempted to cloud the record 
with false filings at the Jdaho Secretary of State regarding the ownership of Real I-Jomes, LLC, 
Idaho Code § 30-6-112 makes it clear that the authentic operating agreement (Exhibit 24) 
governs as to transferees such as Real Properties, LLC. 
AL 
(4) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, if a record that has been delivered by 
a limited liability company to the secretary of state for filing and has become 
effective under this chapter conflicts with a provision of the operating agreement: 
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(a) The operating agreement prevails as to members, dissociated members, 
' d 1 transierees an managers:~ 
§ 112. 
Here, the authentic operating agreement indicated that Renee Baird held 100% of the 
ownership of Real Uornes, LLC. The evidence indicated Ms. Baird never voted to amend the 
operating agreement and never voted to admit additional members. 3 Therefore, only Ms. Baird 
could have entered into the January 6, 2006 transaction on behalf of Real Homes, LLC. Mr. 
Trefren and Mr. Sallaz simply "sold" Real Properties, LLC something neither of them owned. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that Counterclaimant Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC was even a party to this alleged contract or had any ownership interest in Real Iiomes, 
LLC. See signature page on Exhibit 41. Therefore, at a bare minimum, Count I of Tradesman's 
Counterclaim for breach of contract must be denied. 
Though Counterdefendants contend Counterclaimants were unable to prove the elements 
necessary to support their claim for Breach of Contract, the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel 
should prevent the enforcement of Exhibit 41. 
Equitable estoppel requires 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; 
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and 
( 4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment 
to his or her prejudice. 
Willig v. Slate. Dep'l ofI!ealrh & Welfare, l 
(1995). 
Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971 
(17) ·'Transferee·' means a person to which all or part of a transferable interest has been transferred, whether or not 
rhc transferor is a member. Idaho Code§ 30-6-l 01. 
3 (4) A limited liability company may have one (J) or more members. Idaho Code§ 30-6-104. 
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In the event this Court decides to find in favor of Counterclaimant Trefren on Count I, 
sum due under the Real Hornes/Real Properties contract remains at issue due to 
s to attor11ey, Jin1 Bevis, 4 days prior 
to the assignment to Glen Trefren. Thus, Mr. Sallaz had nothing to assign to Glen Trefren when 
subsequently assigned that same contractual interest to Glen Trcfren on March 10, 2006. See 
Exhibits 37 and 38. 
An assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to another. 
Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of"Fin.. 140 Idaho 121, 125, 90 P.3d 
346, 350 (2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999); 6 Am.Jur.2d 
Assignment§ 1 (1999)). An assignment "confers a complete and present right in 
the subject matter to the assignee." Id (quoting 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 1 
(1999)). "[A]n assignee takes the subject of the assignment with all the rights and 
remedies possessed by and available to the assignor." 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment § 
144 (1999) ( emphasis added). Once an assignor makes an assignment, he no 
longer retains control of the subject of the assignment. See First State Bank of 
Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608,612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2006). 
Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530,533, 164 P.3d 810,813 (2007) (Emphasis added). 
It is settled in Idaho that "choses in action are generally assignable." Purco Fleet 
Servs.. Inc. v. Idaho St ate Dep 't of Fin.. 140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 P .3d 346, 3 51 
(2004). "An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests 
the assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee 
becomes the real party in interest." Id Thereafter, "lo)nly the assignee may 
prosecute an action on the chose in action." Id 
St. Luke ·s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 
P.3d 661,665 (2013) (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Bevis was not a party to this case and the statute of limitations for him to join has long since 
expired. See Idaho Code § 5-216. 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates that Glen Trefren had no interest in 
Real Homes, LLC at the time he signed the subject contract and therefore he had no capacity to 
contract. The indicated Mr. Tre1ien \Vas proceeding with his Counterclaim based on a 
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false operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Mr. Trefren had no1hing to sell and thus there 
was a failure consideration on his part. 
A of consideration a party fails to a contractual 
obligation. World Wide Lease, Inc., 111 Idaho at 884, 728 P.2d at 773 (citing 
Converse v. Zinke, 63 5 P .2d 882 (Colo. l 981 ); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
~ 237 cmt. a (1981)). 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n. Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 526-27, 272 P.3d 
491, 498-99 (2012). 
Thus, neither Mr. Sallaz, Tradesman, nor Mr. Trefren should be able to recover under Count I of 
the January 6, 2006 agreement. 
Finally, should this court decide to find in favor of Counterclairnants, any judgment 
should be against Real Properties, LLC and not the Rices in their individual capacities. 
The Request for Admission at issue, set forth in Plaintiffs Second Set of 
Discovery, states: "Admit Eugene 'Roy' Rice is not personally liable for any sums 
which may be due pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement attached to 
Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit D." 
Defendant Trefren bas not established that leaving the admission in place 
would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case. As noted 
above, the evidence before the court indicates that Plaintiff Eugene Rice executed 
the Agreement in a representative capacity, as Manager of Real Properties. 
Defendant Trefren has adduced no evidence or legal basis upon which the trier of 
fact could reasonably conclude that Rice is personally liable on the Agreement. 
Order on Swn mary Judg,ment at 13. 
3) Count II of the Counterclaim should be denied 
It is unclear whether Counterclaimants have abandoned Count Il of their Counterclaim as it 
was plead in their Amended Answer with Counterclaim. The last minute motion made by Mr. 
Longeteig sought 10 amend Count II at the close of trial to assert a nc,v theory of recovery. 
Count JI ns currently µlead in the Amended Ans11·er wirh Countercluim is barred by several 
provisions of Jdaho Code. Count If of Mr. Trefren/Tradesman's Counterclaim ::isserts: 
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105. Plaintiffs contracted with Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors 
& Construction, LLC for goods and services to be used in the maintenance and 
of the properties at issues in this litigation. 
106. That Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
did provided materials and services used in the maintenance and improvements 
of the subject matter properties as agreed, until they were prevented from 
continued performance by the actions and/or requests of Plaintiffs. 
107. That Plaintiffs failed and or refused to pay Glenn Trefren or 
Tradesman Contractors & Construction, LLC for the goods and services they did 
perform and are in breach of the agreement as a result thereof in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
See Amended Answer with Counterclaim (Emphasis added). 
There is no indication of which Plaintiff contracted with Mr. Trefren and Tradesman. 
There is no apparent legal distinction between Mr. Trefren and his LLC, Tradesman. Likewise, 
the Counterclaim contains no description of what the terms of this alleged contract were, when it 
was executed, whether it was oral or written, or what amount of "materials and services" were 
provided. Mr. Trefren's testimony at trial confirmed if any contract existed under Count II it was 
oral, executed on January 6, 2006, and breached in March of 2006. 
Plaintiffs propounded a series of discovery requests to try to ascertain the factual basis for 
Mr. Trefren/Tradesman's claims. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please provide an itemized break down detailing 
the cost(s) for any and all goods or materials you claim to have purchased and for 
which you are seeking reimbursement in Count II of your Counterclaim. 
ANSWER: I am not seeking reimbursement for goods or materials. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Please provide an itemized break down detailing 
the cost(s) for any and all labor for which you are seeking reimbursement in 
Count II of your Counterclaim. This request is meant to seek the names of any 
and all individuals you claim to have worked on the subject prope1iies, the 
number of hours they worked, the hourly rate they were paid, whether or not they 
were actually paid by you or Counterdefendants, the specific tasks each individual 
performed, the dates each individual worked on the subject properties, and any 
other information or facts which support the allegations contained in paragraph 
106 of your Counterclaim. 
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ANSWER: I am not seeking reimbursement for labor. 
Defendant Trefi'en's Response To PlainlifTs 
Ser Reques1 Production Of at 3 
attached to Affidavit of J Kahle m Support of Alotion in Limine re. 
Exclusion of Tesrimony in support of Counr II of Glen Trefi'en/Trodesmon ·s 
Counterclaim as Exhibit A. (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, Counterdefendants propounded discovery requests specifically asking about 
any oral agreements. 
INTERROGATORY N0.7: Please identify any communications you have 
had with plaintiffs in relation to the underlying facts of the case and state whether 
or not you intend to rely upon any such communication made by plaintiffs 
and/or their employees and officers. If your answer is in the affirmative, identify 
the following: 
a. The date of the communication; 
b. The place of the communication; 
c. The name, address and telephone number of each person present at the 
time of the communication; 
d. The substance of the communication, and 
e. Any documents of tangible items, including electronic information, 
produced used or created in relation to the communication. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY N0.7: Glen Trefren objects to this 
interrogatory to the extent that Plaintiffs seek information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. Glen Trefren further 
objects to this interrogatory as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague. 
Finally, Glen Trefren objects to this interrogatory to the extent that Plaintiffs, as 
the subjects of these communications, have equal knowledge of any alleged 
conversations. Subject to, and without waiving this objection: Glen Trefren had 
numerous and ongoing communications with Plaintiffs and their attorneys 
concerning the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction and related matters which 
form the basis for this case. The precise dates and times are all but impossible to 
recall, but are equally known to Plaintiffs. 
See Exhibits B and C to Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Plaintiffs'· 
A1otion to Compel Discovery Responses From Defendants Trefen and 
Tradesman (Emphasis added). 
Trefrcn/Tradcsman 's repeatccl · 1ure to respond to these discovery requests became the 
subject of several Motions to Compel and a Motion for Sanctions. See Plaintiff's Morion to 
ond Plaintiffs Revised 
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Morion ro Cmnpel Discove,y Responsesfi·om Dejendanfs Trcji-en and Tradesnwn and !vforionfor 
Appointmenr Mas/er, Plai11riff'.1· 1\Iorion to Compel Re.sponses .fi'om 
Tradesman andfor Sonclions. Consequently Counterdefendants filed a 
1Ylofio11 in Limine re: Exclusion a/Testimony in Supporr of Count ll of Glen Trefi,en/Tradesnwn ·s 
Co1111terclaim. That motion was granted in this Court's November 19, 2013 Order 011 lvfotions in 
Limine. 
The determination whether to exclude testimony based on late disclosure, as a sanction 
under LR.C.P. 37(b), is a matter of discretion for the trial court. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 
568,571.J 49 P.3d 843,846 (2006). In making a discretionary determination, this court must: (1) 
correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; (2) act within the boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to the court; 
and (3) reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. Upon motion of a party or upon its own 
initiative, the court may impose sanctions for failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, 
including an order preventing a party from introducing designated matters in evidence. Id. 
(citing l.R.C.P. 16(i)). Counterclairnants' late disclosure violated the parties' Stipulation for 
Scheduling and Planning, which was entered into pursuant to the court's Order Setting Case for 
Trial and Pre/rial. Counterclaimants provided no reason or good cause for their failure to timeiy 
disclose and therefore the Court acted within the bounds of its discretion in prohibiting the 
introduction of evidence in support of Count 11. 
Based on Mr. Trefren's inability/failure lo prove damages, much less an offer and 
acceptance of his alleged terms, his testimony about the date of the alleged breach ( of both the 
oral agreement for providing materials :md labor as \Ve]] as the previously unplead 1/3 ownership 
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contract), it is now appropriate to grant judgment in favor of Counterdefendants on Count II 
Counterclaim to Limitations. 
ll1 (4) 
An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument 
of writing. 
Idaho Code § 17. 
The Counterclaim filed by Glenn Trcfren and Tradesman, was filed July 6, 2012, mine 
pro tune to December 30, 20 I 0. See Amended Answer vvirh Countercloim, p. 1. The Purchase 
Agreement for the Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC was signed January 6, 2006. See Exhibit 
41. Mr. Trefren testified the breach occurred in March of 2006. Under any set of facts, Count II 
of the Counterclaim for an oral contract is untimely. 
Mr. Trefren 's discovery responses also reveal that Count II is a thinly veiled attempt to evade 
Idaho Code § 54-5217. 
;\L 
(1) On and after January 1, 2006, it shall be unlawful for any person to engage in 
the business o( or hold himself out as, a contractor within this state without being 
registered as required in this chapter. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for a contractor to engage any other contractor who is 
required by this chapter to be registered as a contractor unless such other 
contractor furnishes satisfactory proof to the contractor that he is duly registered 
under the provisions of this chapter. 
(3) Any person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of a contractor, 
whether or not duly registered, has thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
state of Idaho and to the administrative jurisdiction of the Idaho contractors board, 
and shall be subject to all penalties and remedies available under Idaho law for 
any violation of this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 54-5204 (Emphasis Added). 
2) No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, 
unless othcnvise exernpL may bring or maintain any action in any court of this 
state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or 
contract /'or which registration is required by this chapter withou( alleging and 
proving that he ·was a duly registered contractor, or that he \Vas otherwise 
exempt as provided for in this chapter, at all times during the performance of such 
act or contract. 
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Idaho Code § 54-5217 ( Emphasis added). 
s admi nor esman \:vere 1 · at 
they allegedly performed general contracting services for Real Properties,] ,LC in January -
J'vfarch 2006. Counsel for Mr. Trefren argued and Mr. Trefren testified that he could not prove 
the terms of the contract or his damages in an hourly format and therefore Counterclaimants just 
figure they have $30,000 in increased value coming to them under an ambiguously argued 
theory. This type of haphazard pleading and testimonial "evidence" from counsel cannot support 
a judgment in Counterclaimant' s favor on Count JI of the Counterclaim. In any event, should the 
Court award damages on Count J L it is apparent that as of the time he allegedly began work 
(January 6, 2006) Mr. Trefren knew he was performing work for property owned by Real 
Properties, LLC as opposed to the Rices individually. See Exhibits 41, E, F, G, and H. 
4) Count III of the Counterclaim should be denied 
Count III of the Counterclaim seeks a rescission of the contract and a return to the parties' 
pre-contract positions under an unjust enrichment theory: 
109. That as a result of Defendant's transfer of all right, title and interest in and to 
Real Hornes, LLC and all property owned by Real, Homes, LLC, and Plaintiffs 
failure to pay and subsequent breach of the Purchase Sale Agreement, Plaintiffs 
have been unjustly enriched as a result thereoC and the contract and aii property 
transfers should be set aside with the parties being returned to the their respective 
pre Purchase Sale Agreemen1 positions. 
Amended Answer wirh Co11nrerc!ai111 at 8. 
It would appear Counterclaimants have abandoned Count I of their Counterclaim based on 
Dennis Sallaz's testimony that there was no meeting of the minds as to the written agreement 
found in Exhibit 4 J. 13ased on the defects in the other claims described herein .. the focus or l\,1r 
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s and Mr. Sallaz's testimony at trial seemed to indicate their preferred claim was 
an 
doctrine enrichment is not permissible there is an enforceable 
express contract between the parties which covers the same subject matter. 
Vanderford Co .. Inc. v. Knudson .. J 44 Idaho 558, 165 P.3d 261,272 (2007). 
Unfortunately for Counterclaim ants, Count lil of the Counterclaim fails as a matter of law due to 
Counterclairnants' failure to make a timely tender. 
Rescission of a contract is intended to place the parties in the pos1t10ns they 
occupied prior to the contract and is available only when one of the parties has 
committed a material breach, which destroys the entire purpose for entering into 
the contract. See Crowley v. Laf'ayett e Life Ins. Co .. 1 06 Idaho 818, 821, 683 P .2d 
854, 857 (1984). The party desiring to rescind a contract must, prior to 
rescinding, tender back to the other party any consideration or benefit 
received under the contract by the rescinding party. See id; see also Peterson 
v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co .. 53 Idaho 11, 16, 20 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1933) 
(The company, after notice of the ground for forfeiture, by retaining the premium 
without canceling the policy, waives the breach.); Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of' 
Washington. 133 Wash.2d 954, 948 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1997); 17 Arn.Jur.2d 
Contracts§ 512 (1964); 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 439 (1963). These rules of the 
common law are in effect in Idaho unless modified by other legislative 
enactments. See I.C. § 73-116; Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,215, 
796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). 
Robinson v. State Farm Mur. A 11/0. Ins. Co., 13 7 Idaho 173, 180-81, 45 P.3d 829, 
836-37 (2002). 
Coun1erclaimants failed to provide any evidence that they made a timely tender to Reai 
Properties, LLC. 
A party seeking to rescind a contract ordinarily must return any consideration or 
!he benefit received by the rescinding party before the rescission is valid. 
Robinson, 137 Idaho at 181, 45 P.3d at 837. More than a mere offer of the deposit 
is required; the party must exhibit an actual intent and willingness to pay to 
constitute a valid tender. Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen. 103 Idaho l 10, 116, 645 
P 2d 344, 350 ( 1982). 
O'Connor v. Harger Const, Inc .. 1 Jdaho 904, 9 J J, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008). 
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closest Counterclairnants came to introducing evidence of a tender is the dialogue between 
Epis as to 
s willingness to the return the funds he expended for the purchase. was 
no actual presentation of the $68.000, much less the additional $90,000 for the costs of the 
improvements Real Properties, LLC made. This colloquy \Vith the Court does not constitute a 
timely tender under O'Connor. 
Likewise other grounds warranting the equitable remedy of rescission, such as mutual 
mistake of fact, have not been plead by Counterclaimants. 
Rescission is the proper remedy where there is a mutual mistake of fact that is 
material or fundamental to the contract. Murr. 113 Idaho at 777, 747 P.2d at 1306 (citations omitted). "[M]utual mistake permits a party to rescind or modify a 
contract as long as the mistake is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the 
object of that party." Primary Health Network. Inc., 137 Idaho at 668, 52 P.3d at 
312 ( citing United States v. Fowler. 913 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.1990)). 
The party alleging the mutual mistake of fact bears the burden of proof. 
Murr, 113 Idaho at 777,747 P.2d at 1306; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McClelland. 57 
Idaho 139, 144, 63 P.2d 657, 658 (1937). Whether a mutual mistake of fact exists 
is a finding of fact and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Cline 
v. Hoyle & Associates Ins .. Inc, 108 Idaho 162, 164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985) (citing Ed Sparks & Sons v. Joe Campbell Constr. Co .. 99 Idaho 139, 578 P.2d 
681 (1978)). The mistake must be common to both parties, and must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. Cline, I 08 Idaho at 164, 697 P.2d at 1178 
(citations omitted). 
O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). (Emphasis added). 
Even had mutual mistake-of-fact been plead by Counterclairnants, it is readily apparent Dennis 
Sallaz, a licensed attorney and a party to Exhibit 41, knew he was selling his clients property he 
didn't have the right to sell. Likewise, Mr. Trefren repeatedly testified bis reckless course of 
conduct \Vas designed to "cloud title.'. There are simply no legal grounds to support a theory of 
mutual mistake-of-fact or the equitable remedy of rescission. 
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Factually, there 1s nothing unjust regarding the situation Counterclaimants now find 
111. 
Unjust occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be 
inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention 
is unjust. Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 
863, 866 (1990) (quoting Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 457, 567 P.2d 1, 2 
(1977)). A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) 
there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation 
by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Aberdeen--Springfleld 
Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). 
Vande,ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557-58, 165 P.3d 261, 271-72 
(2007). 
Counterclaimants' evidence supporting elements 1 and 2 of Vande,ford can be summarized as 
follows: Real Properties, LLC bought 3 Riverside lots for the cost of the Saxton foreclosure, 
$63,402.82, and thereafter made an additional payment of $5,000 to Deru1is Sallaz. Mr. Trefren 
and Mr. Sallaz testified the 714 Smith property was purchased by Real Homes, LLC for 
approximately $25,000. Mr. Rice put approximately $90,000 into 714 Smith per Dennis Sallaz's 
admission in his January 9, 2009 letter, Exhibit 1. 
Under Counterclaimant' s theory for element 3 of Vanderford, it is apparently unjust for 
Real Properties, LLC to have paid $68,402.82, borne the $90,000 costs of improvements, the 
costs of maintenance, taxes, and the hassle of holding distressed properties through the worst 
economic downturn since the great depression. Yet it is somehow equitable and just to now 
require Real Properties, LLC to surrender improved properties, in exchange for $0, to parties 
that had nothing to sell in the first place. 
Recovery under au unjust enrichment theory, on the other hand, is limited to the 
amount by the defendant was unjustly enriched. 
Barry v. , 140 Idaho 103 P.3d 4110, (2004). 
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Real Properties, LLC was not sold land but a nightmare of a lawsuit by the Rice's former 
s during the middle of his divorce trial. .. he of hands 
IS comes rnto must come clean hands.--· Sword v. 242, 
25 L 92 P 501 (2004) (applyi Indiana law). The Rices and Real Properties, LLC were 
then set off lo Mr. Sallaz's personal vendetta against Renee l3aird based on false 
information. There is nothing unjust or inequitable about the situation Counterclairnants find 
themselves in, their hands are anything but clean, and Counterdefendants were certainly not 
enriched by this quagmire. 
It is undisputed that neither Dennis Sallaz nor Glen Trefren brought a claim for quiet title 
or alleged that their claim to title to any of the subject properties was superior to that of Real 
Properties, LLC. The holder of title to property (Real Properties, LLC and, as of 2010, Ada 
Properties, LLC for all tl1e property at issue except Riverside 1 B, which as of August 20 l O was 
owned by Renee Baird) is the presumed legal owner of that property, and if someone else claims 
ownership of such property, he must establish his claim by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence. Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253, 145 Idaho 741 (2008). See also 
Idaho Code § 6-401. [ A J party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strengtb 
of his own title, and may not rely merely upon the ,veakness of his adversary. A/dupe v. Akins, 
105 Idaho 254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Ct. App. 1983). Likewise neither Mr. Trefren nor Mr. 
Sallaz brought a claim for rnesne profits. "In an action for mesne profits, the plaintiff may 
recover the rnesne profits of the land and also all damages which have been sustained by reason 
of the disturbance of his possession by the defendant." Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 62-63. 558 
P.2d (132, 633 ( 19T!). J\ cbim for quiet title or mesne pro1its would be compulsory 
counterclaims in this litigation. See IRCP I 3(a). Therefore, due to Counterclairnant's failure to 
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a timely tender and their failure to bring a quiet title or mesne profits claim, judgment 
entered for on III of the 
5) 
The maturation of this cl aim depends on the Court's findings on several issues addressed 
above - namely the actual 0vvnership of Real Homes, LLC as of January 6, 2006. Based on the 
contingent language in the Complaint, Alternative Count V should be construed as a claim for 
unjust enrichment against Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren in their individual capacities.4 
Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract 
covering the same subject matter. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 
P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991). "The reason for this rule presently is that the 
remedies for breach of an express contract, whether by law or by express 
agreement, afford adequate relief." Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 
753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.1985). However, an express contract cannot provide 
adequate relief when it is not enforceable. Thus, this Court has stated that "only 
when the express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from 
applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the 
express contract." Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 
203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009). 
Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 643, 249 P.3d 829, 836 (2011) (Emphasis 
added). 
Idaho is a "notice pleading" jurisdiction. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l) states 
that a pleading setting fo1ih a claim for relief shall contain "a short and piain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Likewise, LC. § 5-335 provides that "a 
pleading which sets fo1ih a claim for relief.. .shall contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the 
4 80. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates 
them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
81. In the alternative, if this Court declares the purchase and sale agreement invalid or unenforceable and does not 
quiet title to the above referenced assets and in Real Properties, LLC, Alternative Defendants Glenn 
Trefrcn, Dennis Sallaz, and Real L.L.C. breached the Purchase and Sale Agreement by failing to convey 
good and marketable title to Real Properties, LLC. 
Complaint at I 4. 
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claims showing that the pleader is enli1led to relief (3) a demand for judgment for the relief 
!O 
'l 
J 
the 
Supreme 
himself or enti 
that '·1uJnder pieading, 'a party is no longer 
slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings.--· Sei11iger Law Office, YA. v. N. 
Pac. Ins. Co .. 145 Idaho 241, 246, 1 78 P.3d 606, 611 (2008) ( quoting Cook v. Skyline C01p, 135 
Idaho 33, 11 P.3d 857,864 (2000)). In other words. 
··a complaint must merely state claims upon \vhich relief may be granted, and 
pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of securing 'a just, speedy 
and inexpensive resolution of the case.' ... The technical rules of pleading have 
long been abandoned in Idaho, and the 'general policy behind the current rules of 
civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court."' Br<xwn 
v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (quoting 
Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 
611 (2008); C!arkv. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,325,715 P.2d 993,995 (1986)). 
The key issue to be assessed by a court when considering whether a complaint satisfies 
Idaho statutory pleading requirements is "whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims 
brought against it. ... Although a complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief nor 
include a formal statement of the cause of action being pursued, there must be some indication of 
the theory or recovery supporting the relief sought a naked recitation of the facts is insuflicient. 
Without a clear and concise statement sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the 
plaintiff's theories of recovery that must be defended against, \Vhether in the body of the 
complaint or the prayer for relief, it cannot be said that a cause of action was sufficiently pled.'' 
Brown v. City o/Pocare!!o, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010) (citing Dewey v. 
Tacoma Sch. Disr. No. 10, 95 Wash.App. 18, 974 P.2d 84 7 .. 851 ( J 999). 
Alternative Plaintiff concedes Properties. Ll believed il \Vas buying the subject 
properties for rhe cost preventing foreclosure. Real Proper!ies. LLC was in existence .January 
4, 200() and F.xhibi1 41 \lvas s1 6. . i'v1r. J-~ ice: rel' on his to 
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1.he funds from Mr. Rice's personal account 1o formation of the cn1i1y Real 
Brown City v. Thomas. cl 111 
80-87. with preceding paragraphs incorporated by reference, allege a 
claim for unjust enrichment where Exhibit 41 is found to be an unenforceable express contract. 
agrecmcnl giving rise to this claim was signed by Dennis Sallaz in his individual 
capacity and he, along with Glen Trefren, should be held personally liable due to their lack of 
authority to bind Real Homes, LLC. Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren should be held personally 
liable due to their actions on behalf of an entity they did not own or have the authority to contract 
on behalf of. The Complain! and the "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, 
LLC" indicate Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren signed the "Purchase Agreement for Sale of 
Interest in Real Homes, LLC" in their individual capacities: 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 6th day of January. 2006, by 
and between GLENN TREFREN and DENNIS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, and REAL 
PROPERTIES, LLC, BUYER. 
Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC Exhibit 41. See 
also signature lines with Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren signing as "Co-Owners" 
and Glen Treferen signing on behalf of Real Homes, LLC. 
The Complaint alleges5: 
26. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and \Varranted to Plaintiff Real 
Properties, LLC that they bad full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of 
Real Homes, L.L.C. to Real Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
31. (ilenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC 
that Real Homes, L.L.C. had title to and full authority to transfer the ovmership of 
15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
5 Testimony was elicited at trial that Plai11tiffs al in their Com;!lail7f 1ha1 (ilcn Trcfrcn :-rnd Dennis Sallaz signed 
documents purport to be owners and managers of Real Hornes, LLC. Set' paragraphs I 7 ancl I 8 of Complaint. lt 
is important to remrn1ber that Dennis Sallaz testified that he provided infornrntion lltilized in dran the Comp/ailll. 
l 9 Gf the C'on1;)/01nt thrit Rt::nce 13aird docun1enis on !Jrh~1Jf or Real Hn111cs. LLC: as an 
owner and ma11:1gcr. 
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35. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz, warranted to Plaintiff Real Properties, 
that Real Homes. had title 1o full authority to 
714 Smith Ave. to in the 
37. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sak Agreement, Plaintiff Rea! Properties, LLC 
expended $63 .82 10 extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd. 
Canyon County, TD and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
38. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC 
made an advance payment in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
Glen Trefren and Dennis Salla;, have denied Paragraphs 26, 31 and 35 and admitted paragraphs 
37 and 38. See Amended A11.11n'r 11·irh Co1111terclain1 and Answer with Affirmative Defemcsfom 
Defendant Dennis Sa/la::. Thus it is established that $68,402.82 changed hands on or about 
January 6, 2006. Of those funds, Dennis Sallaz admittedly received $5,000 that had nothing to 
do with extinguishing a debt on the subject properties. Glen Trefren & Dennis Sallaz's breach of 
the warranties they made in the '·Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Hornes, LLC' 
remained in dispute, thus necessitating the trial. 
The relevant warranties in the "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, 
LLC' which Dennis Sallaz & Glen Trefren in their individual capacities could never perform 
are: 
Whereas, Sellers each hold J 00% of the ownership interest l!1 Real 
Homes, LLC, which is all of the ownership interest therein .... 
Whereas, it is the mutual desire oC the parties hereto that Sellers shall sell 
to the Buyer all of said Ovmership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to 
all real property ovmed by Real Homes. LLC as set forth in Exhibit A attached 
hereto. 6 
3. Sellers represent" \varranl and agree \Vith 1311yer as follo\vs: 
(a) That the Ovvn,"rship lnlcrcst which is being sold herein constitutes 100% or 
!he Ownership of Rc,1! Homes, LLC: 
6 Dennis Sallaz testified that Exhihil /\ !l'fcrrd 10 ail the lots :11 Riv(:rsidc 
house) as well as I ,f S111i1h. 
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(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to Said Ownership Interest 
being sold and transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign, 
transfer same to Buyer and clear of all liens, pledges, security or 
encumbrances any to which he is a 
The properties owned by Real Homes, LLC 
and being transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed 
herein. 
(d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real prope1iies and Sellers 
shall execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer all interest 
therein to buyer. 
Exhibit D to Counterclaim at 2-3. 
The evidence demonstrated that the actual member/manager of Real Homes, LLC (Renee 
Baird) has already settled this case with Alternative Plaintiffs on behalf of Real Homes, LLC and 
Renee Baird now owns Riverside Lot 1-B. 
"If, on the other hand, the compromise agreement itself is accepted as a 
substitution for and extinguishment of the existing claim, then the compromise is 
a substituted contract." Johnson v. Utile, 86 Nev. 593, ---, 472 P.2d 335, 337 (1970). Under an executory accord, the original duty is suspended until 
satisfaction or breach of the accord. 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 885, 728 P.2d 769, 774 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Defendants testified that they were aware Renee Baird settled her case with Plaintiffs 
and, as part of that settlement, that Renee Baird executed an "Assigmnent of Interest in Real 
Homes, LLC." See page 15 of Exhibit 162. The evidence demonstrated the settlement with 
Renee Baird is either an outright release or a substituted contract which resolved the claims as 
between Real Prope1iies, LLC, Renee Baird, and Real Homes, LLC. 
Glen Trefren and Dennis Sallaz refused to consent to this settlement and instead asserted 
a false counterclaim. Dennis Sallaz received $5,000 and Dennis Sallaz confirmed Real 
Properties, LLC received nothing but a lmvsuit from him on January 6, 2006. Roy Rice, through 
what his attorney told him was Real Prope1iics, LLC, paid $63,402.82 to stop a foreclosure and 
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ended up with the remaining following with Renee Baird. 
714 with Baird to 
Real Properties, LLC's expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars in improving that prope1iy. It 
is unjust for Dennis Sallaz to retain this $5,000 for having sold nothing but a mess of a lawsuit to 
his clients. Therefore a judgment in favor of Alternative Plaintiffs for $5,000 on Count V is 
justified. 
6) An Award of Attorney's Fees under Idaho Code 12-121 is Warranted 
The conduct of Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren throughout this litigation was frivolous at 
best, and is more accurately described as malicious and vexatious. Idaho Code section 12-121 
authorizes the court, in any civil action, to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. 
However, pursuant to IRCP 54( e )(I), the court may award attorney fees against a defendant 
under Section 12-121 only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Therefore, an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 is not a matter of right. Nampa & Meridian irrigation 
District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001). Instead, 
an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 is within the discretion of the trial court, but 
only when the court "is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. A claim is not necessarily 
frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a matter of law. Garner v. Pavey, 
151 Idaho 462, 259 P .3d 608, 614 (2011 ). A misperception of the law, or of one's interest under 
the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Id. ( quoting Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 
p 262, 265 (Ct. App. 1997)). , the is whether position adopted was not 
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incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
foundation." 
or 
Dennis Sallaz testified assisted in preparing the complaint and drafting initial 
discovery requests for the Rices/Real Properties, LLC. The bulk of the information he provided 
at the outset of this litigation turned out to be false. Thereafter, Mr. Sallaz refused to provide 
information and documents that were the subject of discovery requests he helped draft, 
necessitating a Motion to Compel and ultimately an award of sanctions against him. Mr. Sallaz 
also hid behind Glen Trefren in: 1) unlawfully adding him to the operating agreement for Real 
Homes, LLC; 2) assigning Exhibit 41 to him despite having already assigned that same interest 
to Jim Bevis four days earlier; 3) asserting a counterclaim through judgment-proof Glen Trefren 
and even having his own attorney, Vernon K. Smith, present Mr. Trefren's case; 4) admitting to 
preparing Glen's pleadings; 5) having his attorneys take 72 hours of Mr. Rice's deposition 
(though some portions of the deposition were admittedly taken in connection with discovery in 
the Ada County case) despite the extreme hardship this placed on Mr. Rice due to his COPD -
only not to use any of the deposition transcripts at trial; and 6) filing a lis pendens on all of the 
subject properties, including Riverside lB which is owned by non-party Renee Baird, despite not 
having asse1ied a single claim that would entitle him to any interest in any of the subject 
properties See !is pendens filed May 8, 2013. Additionally, Mr. Trefren and then Mr. Sallaz 
asked for a jury trial; only to waive it at the last minute after Plaintiffs prepared jury instructions. 
Counterclaimants case was presented through false testimony and was based on false 
documents Countcrclaimants admittedly filed to "cloud title." Dennis Sallaz is a licensed 
attorney. His divorce and the of cases taken up the of 
approximately ten tribunals, countless government officials, numerous court reporters, and a 
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impacted Our system better. An attorney's 
§ 12-121 is 
CONCLUSION 
Dennis Sallaz should be held accountable for the time he has wasted and for his frivolous 
conduct in this aspect of the personal vendetta he has waged against Renee Baird. Consequently, 
a money judgment in Alternative Plaintiffs' favor for $5,000, plus prejudgment interest, against 
Dennis Sallaz is warranted. Likewise an award of Counterdefendant's attorney's fees and costs, 
awarded jointly and severally against Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren in their individual 
capacities, as well as Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, under Idaho Code § I 2-
121, is appropriate. Finally, upon the denial of the Counterclaims, this Court should order the 
immediate removal of the !is pendens Defendant§. filed on the subject properties, including that 
of Renee Baird. 
'],; 
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DATED this ~day of December 2013. 
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